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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this case is vested in the Utah Court of 
Appeals as a case properly transferred from the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2-2(4) 
(1989). Original jurisdiction was in the Supreme Court 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2-2(3)(j). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal seeking reversal of a Summary Judgment 
entered in the Fourth Judicial District Court In and For 
Millard County, State of Utah. Said Summary Judgment was 
entered in favor of Plaintiffs/Respondents and against 
Defendants/Appellants quieting title to certain placer mining 
claims located in Millard County. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. WHETHER GRIFFIN'S FILING OF A "SYNOPSIS" OF INFORMA-
TION CONTAINED IN THE OFFICIAL NOTICES OF LOCATION OF 
MINING CLAIMS RATHER THAN AN ACTUAL "COPY" THEREOF 
SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENTS OF 43 U.S.C. §1744(b). 
II. WHETHER THERE EXISTS ANY SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCE 
EXCUSING THE FILING OF AN ACTUAL "COPY" OF THE NOTICES OF 
LOCATION, AND, IF SO, WHETHER THE "SYNOPSIS" CONSTITUTES 
SUFFICIENT "OTHER EVIDENCE" UNDER THE CODE OF FEDERAL 
REGULATIONS. 
III. WHETHER RETENTION AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE RED DOME 
FILINGS BY THE BLM CONSTITUTES OR EXCUSES ACTUAL COMPLI-
ANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE FLPMA. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
43 USC §1744(b) (See Appendix 19.) 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
a. Nature of Case 
This is an action wherein both parties seek to quiet 
title to unpatented placer mining claims. The Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants, hereinafter collectively referred to as "Griffin", 
claim to own said claims, denominated RED DOME Placer Mining 
Claims Nos. 1 through 7, and RED DOME NEW DISCOVERY Placer 
Mining Claims. Defendants/Appellants, hereinafter collective-
ly referred to as "Memmotts" claim that Griffin did not 
properly file Notices of Location with the Bureau of Land 
Management ("BLM") in accordance with §1744 of the Federal 
Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA). 
The parties acknowledged that if Griffin had established 
title to the claims said claims were not open to "location" by 
the Memmotts and the counter-claim would be subject to 
dismissal. If, however, Griffin was found to not be in 
compliance with the FLPMA, the RED DOME claims were open to 
location, had been located on by Memmotts, and Griffin would 
have no "standing" to challenge Memmotts7 ownership because 
Griffin had not filed "over" said claims. 
b. Course of Proceedings and Disposition 
Both sides submitted Motions for Summary Judgment on the 
issues of ownerships of the claims. Griffin's ancillary 
claims for damages were abandoned after trial. On September 
30, 1986, the Court issued a "RULING ON PLAINTIFFS' FIRST AND 
SECOND MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANTS7 MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT", denying Griffin's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and granting, in part, Memmotts7 Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R. 561-65; See Appendix 1 and 2). On January 2, 
1987, the Trial Court issued a "RULING ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR RELIEF FROM AND RECONSIDERATION OF RULING" setting aside 
its Summary Judgment in favor of Memmotts. (R. 851-53; 
Appendix 3). Then, on April 20, 1987, the Court vacated both 
3 
prior rulings, determining that issues of material fact 
existed precluding Summary Judgment. (R. 925-29; Appendix 21). 
The case proceeded to trial whereupon the matter was submitted 
on proffer after Plaintiff rested. The District Court entered 
Judgment quieting title to said claims in favor of Griffin and 
against Memmotts (R 1254-1287; Appendix 4-7). 
c. Relevant Facts 
1. In December, 1983, Memmotts filed Notices of 
Location of the Feather Lite Claims Nos. 1 through 5. 
(Appendix 22). Under Utah law said recorded Notices are prime 
facie evidence of the facts of location recited therein. 
(UTAH CODE ANN §40-1-10 (1953)) The factual recitation 
therein described were undisputed and unchallenged at trial. 
2. "Griffin's" ownership of the subject claims origin-
ated with the filing of Notices of Location of claims denomi-
nated RED DOME Nos. 1 through 7 and NEW DISCOVERY (Exhibit P-
2, Appendix 16). Said claims were filed in 1936, 1938, 1939, 
and 1950. 
3. Under the applicable provisions of the FLPMA certain 
filings were required in order to preserve unpatented mining 
claims. Said filings were required to be made prior to 
October 22, 1979. 
(b) Additional Filing Requirements 
The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining 
claims or mill or tunnel site located prior to 
October 21, 1976 shall, within the three-year period 
following October 21, 1976 file in the office of the 
Bureau designated by the Secretary a copy of the 
official record of the notices of location or 
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certificate of location, including a 
description of the location of the mining 
claim or mill or tunnel site sufficient to 
locate the claimed lands on the ground. 
(Emphasis added.) 
43 U.S.C. 1744(b) 
4. The "official record" of the Notices of Location is 
the record maintained by law in the Millard County Recorder's 
Office. (UTAH CODE ANN. §40-1-4 (1953)). 
5. Rather than obtaining "copies" of the Notices of 
Location on the "RED DOME and NEW DISCOVERY" from the Millard 
County Recorder's Office and filing the same with the Bureau 
as proscribed by the FLPMAf Griffin filed an abbreviated 
synopsis of said filings. (Exhibit P-3, Appendix 17). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Under the terms and provisions of the FLPMA, Griffin was 
required to file with the BLM prior to October 22, 1979 
"copies" of the official Notices of Location of its mining 
claims in order to preserve those claims. Although "copies" 
of said Notices were readily obtainable from the Millard 
County Recorder's Office, Griffin merely filed an abstract or 
abbreviation thereof, which contained some of the releveant 
information, but not all, and contained nubmerous errors and 
ommissions. 
Under special circumstances, i.e., where the official 
recorders had been lost, destroyed, or were illegible, "other 
evidence" is permitted to be filed. No special circumstances 
exist in this case and the C.F.R.s which purportedly permit 
such filings cannot legally vary the precise statutory 
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language used by Congress. The BLM's "acceptance" (stamped 
receipt thereof and noted deficiencies) does not constitute 
compliance. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS UPON GRIFFIN TO 
ESTABLISH ITS OWN VALID TITLE, 
Griffin is, admittedly, the senior locator. In this 
quiet title action, therefore, Griffin's title succeeds or 
fails solely on a showing, by it, of the validity of its own 
filings. (Michael v. Salt Lake Inv. Co., 9 Utah 2d 370, 345 
P. 2d 200 (1959); Homeowners Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah 
208, 141 P.2d 160 (1943); Coleman v. Butkovich, 538 P.2d 188 
(Utah 1975).) 
Claims may only be challenged by junior locators. 
Therefore, in the absence of a "relocation" by Griffin on 
Memmotts' FEATHER LITE Claims, Griffin's failure to comply 
with §1744 leaves the claims open to location by Memmotts and 
immune from challenge by Griffin. 
II* 
A SYNOPSIS IS NOT A "COPY* WITHIN THE 
MEANING OF S1744. 
The statute required Griffin to file a "copy" of the 
official record of the Notice of Location. Griffin would have 
this Court ignore the plain, everyday meaning of the words 
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chosen by Congress. Black's Law Dictionary. Fourth Edition, 
defines ''copy" as follows: 
The transcript or double of an original 
writing; as the copy of a patent, charter, 
deed, etc. [Citations omitted and 
emphasis supplied]. 
Congress did not choose to require a "summary"1 or an 
"abstract"2 of the official record—it required a "copy". 
The United States Supreme Court has previously rejected a 
claimant's effort to rewrite the plain language of the statute 
to comport with what was filed rather than what was required, 
noting "It is clear to us that the plain language of the 
statute simply cannot sustain the gloss appellees would put on 
it." United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 85 L.Ed. 2d 64, 75 
(1985). The Locke Court also cautioned against attempting "to 
soften the clear import of Congress' chosen words whenever a 
court believes those words lead to a harsh result." Id. at 
76. 
Congress presumably recognized that a real property 
instrument such as Notice of Location must be examined in its 
entirety. To permit the filing of parts of an instrument 
1
 "Summary, n. An abridgment; brief; compendium;. . ." 
Black's Law Dictionary. Fourth Edition at 1604. 
2
 "Abstract, n. Less quantity containing the virtue 
and force of a greater quantity (citation omitted). A 
transcript is generally defined as a copy, and is more 
comprehensive than an abstract. (Citations omitted) Summary 
or epitome, or that which comprises or concentrates in itself 
the essential qualities of a larger thing or of several things 
(citations omitted)." Black's Law Dictionary. Fourth Edition, 
at 24. 
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leaves the BLM and the public in the position of the prover-
bial blind men describing the elephant by touching its 
individual parts. The BLM and public never see the whole 
instrument. Rather than specifying certain desired parts of 
the official record of the Notice of Location, Congress 
specified that a copy of the official record must be filed. 
Griffin inexplicably tried to second-guess what informa-
tion Congress was really after, and then filed only that 
limited information. In every instance, however, the docu-
ments prepared and filed by Griffin omitted at least the 
following information that would have been apparent from a 
copy of the official record: (1) The names of the locators, 
(2) the number of the locators, (3) the specific minerals 
claimed, (4) the dates of amendments to the claims, and (5) 
the exact quantity of acreage claimed. 
In individual cases the significance of the omissions is 
obvious. For example, for the RED DOME No. 3 claim, the 
document prepared and filed with BLM omitted any reference to 
one lot containing some 40 acres of land. Thus, it was 
impossible to tell from the documents filed with the BLM that 
Griffin claimed such land. In other cases the significance of 
the missing information, though equally important, is less 
obvious to one unfamiliar with the more arcane aspects of 
mining law. For example, the number of locators is material 
to whether a claim was properly located, as there must be at 
least one locator for each 20 acres embraced in the claim or 
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the entire claim is invalid. (30 U.S.C. §§35 and 36 (1976)). 
Similarly, the exact acreage claimed in each irregularly 
shaped lot is material to determine if the 20 acre rule has 
been violated. Id. Or, the date of an amended location is 
often necessary to establish the priority of the location. 
(See e.g., R. Gail Tibbetts et al., 43 IBLA 210, 217-19 
(1979) .) 
III. 
A "SYNOPSIS*. EVEN IF CORRECT, IS NOT A 
"COPY" OF THE NOTICE OF LOCATION AS 
PROSCRIBED WITHIN THE STATUTE. 
Griffin has made no proffer of evidence why actually 
photographically reproduced "copies" of the Notices of 
Location were not filed with the BLM. Other mining claimants 
from Millard County obtained photo or xeroxed copies of their 
Notices of Location and timely filed the same. (See, e.g., 
Appendix 13 and 14) . Not one scintilla of evidence was 
produced or proffered in an effort to establish some unusual 
or special circumstance justifying filing of "other evidence" 
rather than an easily and readily obtainable "copy" of the 
Notice of Location on file in the County Recorder's Office. 
rv. 
THE "SYNOPSIS" OF THE NOTICES OF LOCATION 
ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE "OTHER EVIDENCE" UNDER 
43 C.F.R. S3833.0-5fi) AND SAID REGULATION 
CANNOT AMEND OR VARY THE PLAIN STATUTORY 
MANDATE, 
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Griffin claims that the Code of Federal Regulations 
permits the filing of a "synopsis" of the official record and 
that its filings were, therefore, adequate to preserve its 
claims• The history of said CFR is somewhat confusing, as 
evidenced by the District Court's inconsistent prior rulings 
regarding the same. 
On January 2, 1987, the Trial Court issued its "RULING ON 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM AND RECONSIDERATION OF 
RULING [of September 30, 1986]" in which the Court reversed 
its earlier position and vacated its Ruling of September 30, 
1986, In vacating its earlier Ruling, the Court indicated 
that it had erroneously relied on the current version of the 
federal regulation defining the term "copy" as used in 43 
U.S.C. §1744 (i.e., 43 C.F.R. §3833.0-5 (i)), rather than the 
version that was in effect at the time Griffin was required to 
comply with the filing requirements of 43 U.S.C. §1744. The 
Court then quoted the version of 43 C.F.R. §3833.0-5(i) that 
was in effect from March 16, 1979 through the end of the 
period during which Griffin was required to file the documents 
specified in 43 U.S.C. §1744(b) (viz., October 22, 1979) in 
part as follows: 
"Copy of the official record of the notice of 
certificate of location" means a legible reproduc-
tion or duplicate, except microfilm, of the original 
instrument of recordation of an unpatented mining 
claim, mill or tunnel site which was or will be 
filed in the local jurisdiction where the claim or 
site is located or other evidence, acceptable to the 
proper BLM office, of such instrument of recorda-
tion. 
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(Ruling of January 2, 1987, at 2, quoting 43 C.F.R. 
§3833.0-5(i); emphasis added by Court). 
The Court then proceeded to find that Griffin had in fact 
submitted "other evidence, acceptable to the proper BLM 
office, of such instrument of recordation" and therefore, the 
Court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Griffin 
solely as to the issue that Griffin had in fact complied with 
43 U.S.C. §1744(b). (See Ruling of January 2, 1987, at 2; R. 
851-53; Appendix 3.) 
At trial the Court adopted the same legal posture 
determining that the BLM's "acceptance" of Griffins's filings 
was, in effect, conclusive. The Court's rulings are legally 
flawed for the following reasons: (1) The version of 43 
C.F.R. §3833.0-5(i) relied upon by the Court was not yet in 
effect at the time that Griffin made its filings with the BLM 
relating to the Notices of Location of the RED DOME claims, 
and consequently, it was error for the Court to apply the 
"other evidence" exception to those filings; and (2) even if 
the so-called "1979 version" of the regulation were applicable 
to Griffin's RED DOME filings, those filings failed to comply 
with the regulation because they did not include all of the 
amended notices of locations; and (3) even if the "other 
evidence" exception were applicable in this action, such 
"other evidence" is permissible only in those rare instances 
where copies of the official records are not available, e.g., 
where the official county records have been lost or destroyed; 
and (4) even if BLM were to take the more expanded view and 
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permit "other evidence" when copies of the official records 
are readily available, as in the present case, the quoted 
regulation clearly would not comport with the express statu-
tory language of 43 U«S.C. §1744(b), which requires "a copy of 
the official record of the notice of location or certificate 
of location"; and (5) even if "other evidence" were permis-
sible despite the fact that copies of the official records 
were readily available, and even if the acceptability of such 
"other evidence" did not conflict with the express language of 
43 U.S.C. §1744(b), the undisputed evidence in this case 
demonstrates that BLM has not determined that Griffin's RED 
DOME filings were "acceptable", 
A. THE VERSION OF 43 C.F.R. §3833.0-5(i) 
RELIED UPON BY THE COURT WAS NOT IN EFFECT 
AT THE TIME GRIFFIN FILED "OTHER EVIDENCE" 
OF THE NOTICES OF LOCATION FOR ITS RED 
DOME CLAIMS, 
"Official record of the notice or 
certificate of location" means the 
official document of recordation and all 
accompanying maps, papers, or other 
documents filed for record with the 
recorder or other officer now authorized 
to record such instruments under state law 
in the local jurisdiction where the 
unpatented mining claim, mill site, or 
tunnel site is located and any amendments 
thereof which may change or alter the 
location of the claim or site. 
As indicated by the above-quoted version of the regula-
tion that was in effect during the time that most of Griffin's 
RED DOME filings were made, the "other evidence" exception had 
not yet come into existence 1 Consequently, it was improper 
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and legally erroneous for the Court to apply the "other 
evidence" exception to the RED DOME filings• 
B. EVEN IF THE SO-CALLED "179 VERSION" 
OF 43 C.F.R. §3833.0-5(i) WERE APPLICABLE 
TO GRIFFIN'S RED DOME FILINGS, THE TRIAL 
COURT DID NOT APPLY THE REGULATION IN ITS 
ENTIRETY. 
In its Ruling of January 2, 1987 and Summary Judgment 
herein, the Court quoted from the so-called "1979 version" of 
43 C.F.R. §3833.0-5(i) only so far as the regulation referred 
to the "other evidence" exception. The regulation, however, 
went on to state as follows: 
"Copy of the official record of the 
notice [or] certificate of location" . . . 
also includes an exact reproduction, 
duplicate or other acceptable evidence, 
except microfilm, or an amended instrument 
which may change or alter the description 
of the claim or site. 
43 C.F.R. §3833.0-5(i) (effective as of 
March 16, 1979) (emphasis added.) 
Under the above-quoted version of the regulation, Griffin's 
were required to file "an exact reproduction, duplicate or 
other acceptable evidence" of any Amended Notices of Loca-
tions. Consistent with the pattern of their other filings, 
however, Griffin failed to file with BLM all of the Amended 
Notices of Location relating to their RED DOME claims. (For 
example, Griffin's summary filing for the RED DOME Placer 
Claim No. 3 omitted a description of some 40.95 acres that 
were claimed by a subsequent amendment.) 
C. "OTHER EVIDENCE" IS PERMISSIBLE ONLY 
IN THOSE INSTANCES IN WHICH COPIES OF THE 
OFFICIAL RECORDS ARE NO LONGER AVAILABLE. 
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As indicated above, the "other evidence" exception 
contained in 43 C.F.R. §3833.0-5(i) has been uniformly 
interpreted by BLM, the agency charged with the administration 
of the FLPMA, to apply only in those rare instances where 
copies of the official records are not available, such as 
where such records have been lost or destroyed. (See, e.g., 
Cleo May Fresh, 50 IBLA 363, 365 (October 16, 1980) "In any 
event, the provision of the regulations concerning the 
submission of 'other evidence' only applies when the notice of 
location is no longer available"; John J. Vikarcik, 58 IBLA 
377, 379 (October 21, 1981) ; Organic Act Directive No. 79-7 
(November 24, 1978) "Where a search of the local (county or 
recording district) records, therefore, does not reveal the 
original filing, but does show that there is reason to believe 
that a recording may have been made, secondary evidence will 
be accepted.") (Copies are attached as Appendix 10, 11, and 
12.) 
Griffin attempts to distinguish both Cleo May Fresh and 
Vikarcik on several grounds, none of which is persuasive. 
First, Griffin asserts that in Cleo May Fresh, BLM had 
returned various documents to the appellant and declared the 
subject claims abandoned, and in Vikarcik, BLM rejected the 
recordation of certain mining claims held by the appellants. 
Griffin then asserts that by contrast, in the present case, 
BLM "accepted" Griffin's RED DOME filings. Griffin obviously 
ignores or misunderstands the distinction between the meaning 
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of the term "accept" as a legal term of art, versus its 
meaning in ordinary and common usage. In Cleo May Fresh, the 
IBLA specifically addressed this distinction and stated that 
"[nor] do noncomplying submissions become 'acceptable' because 
BLM takes receipt of them." 50 IBLA at 367. Thus, merely 
because BLM in the present case may have taken receipt of 
Griffin's RED DOME filings in no way demonstrates that those 
filings were "acceptable" to BLM. 
Griffin also argues that, unlike the documents filed by 
the appellants in Cleo May Fresh and John J". Vikarcik, the 
documents filed by Griffin in this matter contained all of the 
pertinent data necessary to satisfy the purposes and objec-
tives of FLPMA. This argument, however, is unpersuasive for 
two reasons. First, it is nothing more than a "substantial 
compliance" argument, which was has been expressly rejected. 
(Rogers v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 4, 8 (D. Mont. 1982)). 
Second, contrary to Griffin's assertions that their RED DOME 
filings contained all of the pertinent information necessary 
to satisfy the purposes and objectives of FLPMA, a number of 
items of information contained in the official records of the 
Millard County recorder's Office are not contained in 
Griffin's RED DOME filings. 
That the "other evidence" exception applies only in 
instances where copies of the official records are no longer 
available is reinforced by the use of the term "other evi-
dence" in other BLM regulations. For example, 43 C.F.R. 
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§3862.1-4 (Appendix 24) (10-1-85 Ed.) relating to lode mining 
claim patent applications) provides as follows: 
Evidence relating to destroyed or lost 
records. 
In the event of the mining records in 
any case having been destroyed by fire or 
otherwise lost, a statement of the fact 
should be made, and secondary evidence of 
possessory title will be received, which 
may consist of the statement of the 
claimant, supported by those of any other 
parties cognizant of the facts relative to 
his location, occupancy, possession, 
improvements, etc; and in such case of 
lost records, any deeds, certificates of 
location or purchase, or other evidence 
which may be in the claimant's possession 
and tend to establish his claim, should be 
filed. (Emphasis added.) 
The clear import of the above-quoted regulation, like Organic 
Act Directive No. 79-7 (Exhibit "C" hereto), is that "other 
evidence7' is permissible only in situations where the original 
records are lost or destroyed. The rationale for this 
conclusion is obvious: to permit "other evidence" in situa-
tions where the original official records are available would 
be in direct conflict with the purposes and objectives of 
FLPMA to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date database of 
information. Instead, it would permit claimants to file 
whatever documents might be in their possession, regardless of 
the ready availability of the very documents that Congress 
chose to require. For these reasons, the "other evidence" 
exception should be applied only in instances where the 
required documents are no longer available. 
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D. TO PERMIT "OTHER EVIDENCE" EVEN IN 
SITUATIONS WHERE COPIES OF THE OFFICIAL 
RECORDS ARE READILY AVAILABLE WOULD 
DIRECTLY CONFLICT WITH THE EXPRESS 
STATUTORY LANGUAGE OF 43 U.S.C. §1744(b). 
Even assuming, arguendo, that BLM were to take a more 
expansive view of 43 C.F.R. §3833.0-5(i) and permit "other 
evidence" even in situations, as in this case, where copies of 
the official records were readily available, such an interpre-
tation of §3833.0-5(i) would be in direct conflict with the 
express language of 43 U.S.C. §1744(b), in which Congress 
specifically required "a copy of the official record of the 
notice of location or certificate of location". Since 
regulations are inferior to the statutes under which they are 
promulgated, the regulations must be interpreted in a manner 
consistent with the statutory language. See, e.g., Utah Hotel 
Co. v. Industrial Commission, 151 P. 2d 467, 471-73 (Utah 
1944) . 
E. THE BLM'S "ACCEPTANCE" OF GRIFFINS 
FILINGS IS NOT CONCLUSIVE OF THE ISSUE OF 
VALIDITY OF SAID CLAIMS. 
Griffin contends that the BLM has "accepted" the "other 
evidence" of the notices or certificates of location filed 
with respect to the RED DOME claims, within the meaning of 43 
C.F.R. §3833.0-5(i). This contention is flawed in two salient 
respects. First, Griffin has muddled the distinction between 
the meaning of the term "accept" as a legal term of art versus 
its meaning in common and ordinary usage, which refers to 
"taking receipt of" something. See Cleo May Fresh, 50 IBLA 
17 
363, 365 (Oct. 16, 1980) ("Nor do noncomplying submissions 
become 'acceptable7 because BLM takes receipt of them."). 
Second, and related to the first point, BLM has expressly 
indicated that it has not determined whether Griffin's RED 
DOME filings are sufficient to comply with the recordation 
requirements of 43 U.S.C. §1744(b). 
The IBLA on July 12, 1986 ((Sandra Memmott on 
Reconsideration) 93 IBLA 113 (1968)) vacated the BLM 
decision of August 21, 1985. in its entirety. The 
IBLA vacated the decision without ruling ont he 
sufficiency or correctness of the decisions. As a 
result, we now have no opinion as to whether or not 
the documents contained in our records for the Red 
Dome claims are adequate to comply with the recorda-
tion requirements of Section 314 of FLPMA and 
regulations promulgated thereunder. (Empha sis 
added.) 
(See Sandra Memmott (On Reconsideration), 93 IBLA 113 (July 
24, 1986). (Appendix 23; Exhibit P-26; Appendix A) 
V. 
"SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE* DOES NOT VALIDATE 
A DEFECTIVE FILING UNDER S1744. 
Griffin relies upon certain language of §1744(c) of FLPMA 
and two cases, Topaz Berylium Co. v. United States, 649 F.2d 
775 (10th Cir. 1981) and Jackson v. Robertson, 763 F.2d 1176 
(10th Cir. 1985) as standing for the proposition that its 
defective filings did not result in an abandonment of its 
claims. Griffin misconstrues both the cited language of 
§1744(c) and the cases. 
Section 1744(c) provides, in pertinent part: 
The failure to file such instruments as 
required by subsections (a) and (b) shall 
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be deemed conclusively to constitute an 
abandonment of the mining claim or mill or 
tunnel site by the owner; but it shall not 
be considered a failure to file if the 
instrument is defective . . . 
The statutory reference concerning a "defective" instrument 
does not relate to any document filed by a party. It refers 
to the "instrument" "required by subsections (a) and (b)" of 
§1744, referenced earlier in the sentence quoted above. Only 
one "instrument" is "required by subsection (b)" of §1744. It 
is the "copy of the official record of the notice of location" 
for each claim. Such official records" were routinely 
photocopied at the Millard County Recorder's office at the 
pertinent time but Griffin admits that no copies of such 
official record were filed for the RED DOME claims. None of 
the documents prepared and filed by Griffin purported to be a 
"copy" of the record. They were simply Griffins7 interpreta-
tion of those portions of that record that its legal counsel 
thought relevant or required. None were the specified 
"instrument" referenced in the statute. Thus, the quoted 
language concerning "defective" instruments is inapplicable to 
resuscitate Griffin's inadequate filing. 
Griffin misreads the Jackson and Topaz cases. Those 
cases did not deal with the effect of a claimant's failure to 
file an instrument explicitly required by §1744. The Topaz 
case developed a distinction between the effect of failure to 
file something explicitly required by statute and the effect 
of a failure to file certain supplemental information required 
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only by BLM's regulations. In the former case the effect was 
clear: abandonment! In contrast, the failure to file 
supplemental information required only by the general regula-
tions does not result in abandonment of the claims. (649 F.2d 
at 778) . Jackson simply applied the Topaz rule, noting that 
the alleged filing deficiency in that case related to informa-
tion required only by the BLM's regulations rather than §1744 
itself. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Griffin has not established a prima facie case of 
compliance with the provisions of the FLPMA, the Court's 
granting of Judgment should be reversed. Griffin's failure to 
timely comply with said Act left the subject ground open to 
location. Memmott's filed Notices of Location thereon in 
1984. 
This Court should reverse the District Court's determina-
tion that Griffin's filings with the BLM were sufficient to 
satisfy the FLPMA. The case then should be remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with said ruling, including 
determination of damages arising, if any, from Griffin's use 
and occupation of Memmott's claims. 
DATED this *r day of June, 1990. 
' fLuuU ti 
Harold A. Hintze 
Attorney for Defendants/ 
Appellants 
Af-*-w-«Xx. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
******* 
GORDON GRIFFIN and 
RED DOME, INC., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
SANDRA MEMMOTT, et al., 
Defendants. 
Case Number 7975 
RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S 
FIRST AND SECOND MOTIONS 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
******** 
The court, having reviewed the memoranda, 
interrogatories, affidavits and other pleadings submitted to the 
court, finds that plaintiffs have failed to comply with the 
filing requirements of 43 U.S.C. Section 1744(b), and therefore, 
as a matter of law the nine (9) "Red Dome" mining claims that are 
the subject of this action are deemed to have been abandoned 
pursuant to 43 U.S.C. Section 1744(c). The court also finds that 
there remain several genuine issues of material fact relating to 
the validity of defendants1 "Feather Lite" mining claims yet to 
be resolved in this matter. 
URCP 56(c) states that a motion for summary judgment 
will be granted if: 
The pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law. 
w 
Concerning defendants1 motion for summary judgment, the 
court finds that there are no issues of material fact concerning 
(1) what documents were filed by plaintiffs with the Bureau of 
Land Management in attempted compliance with 43 U.S.C. Section 
1744(b), and (2) concerning what documents constituted the 
official records of the notices of location of the "Red Dome" 
mining claims maintained by the Millard Court Recorder's Office-
It is also uncontested that the documents filed by plaintiffs 
were not "exact" copies of the official records of notice of 
location maintained by the Millard County Recorder's Office. 
Since defendants1 motion can be partially decided on these facts 
alone, and since such facts are uncontested, the court finds that 
there are no genuine issues of material fact relating to granting 
a partial judgment on defendants1 motion for summary judgment. 
Based on such uncontested facts, the court finds that defendants 
are entitled to a partial judgment on their counterclaim as a 
matter of law. U.S.C. Section 1744(b) states in relevant part: 
Additional filing requirements. The owner of an 
unpatented lode or placer mining claim or mill or 
tunnel site located prior to the date of approval 
of this Act [enacted October 21, 1976] shall, 
within the three-year period following the date of 
approval of this Act [enacted October 21, 1976], 
file in the office of the Bureau designated by the 
Secretary a copy of the official record of the 
notice of location or certificate of location, 
including a description of the location of the 
mining claim or mill or tunnel site sufficient to 
locate the claimed lands on the ground. 
If such filings are not made, U.S.C. Section 1744(c) provides the 
following penalty: 
Failure to file as constituting abandonment; 
defective or untimely filing. The failure to file 
such instruments as required by subsections (a) 
o 
and (b) shall be deemed conclusively to constitute 
an abandonment of the mining claim or mill or 
tunnel site by the owner; but it shall not be 
considered a failure to file if the instrument is 
defective or not timely filed for record under 
other Federal laws permitting filing or recording 
thereof, or if the instrument is filed for record 
by or on behalf of some but not all of the owners 
of the mining claim or mill or tunnel site. 
The court finds that the instruments filed by 
plaintiffs with the BLM, although timely filed, were not the type 
of instruments required to be filed under U.S.C. Section 1744(b), 
and therefore, plaintiffs failed to comply with 43 U.S.C. Section 
1744(b). Under 43 U.S.C. Section 1744(b) plaintiffs were 
required to file "cop[ies] of the official record of the notice 
of location or certificate of location" of all mining claims. 
(Emphasis added). The federal regulations accompanying 43 U.S.C. 
Section 1744 define "copy of the official record" as follows: 
"Copy of the official record" means a legible 
reproduction or duplicate, except microfilm, of 
the instrument which was or will be filed under 
state law in the local jurisdiction where the 
claim or site is located. It also includes and 
[sic] exact reproduction, duplicate, except 
microfilm, of an amended instrument which may 
change or alter the description of the claim or 
site. 
43 C.F.R. Section 3833.0-5(i). 
A definition of the term "reproduction" equates it with 
the term "duplicate". Random House Dictionary of the English 
Language, unabridged edition (copyright 1983). The definition of 
"duplicate" most favorable to plaintiff defines a "duplicate" as 
"a document the same as another in essential particulars." 
Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th Edition (copyright 1979). The court 
finds that even in applying this extremely lenient definition of 
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the term "copy" to plaintiffs1 filed instruments, in comparing 
them to the official records, such instruments are not the same 
as the official records in "essential particulars", and therefore 
do not constitute "copies" of the official records of the notices 
of location maintained by the Millard County Recorder's Office, 
Instead, the court finds that such instruments are only 
"summaries" of such official records, rather than "copies" of 
such official records. Additionally, even though such 
"summaries" contained approximately the same information as the 
above mentioned official records, federal law does not recognize 
the theory of "substantial compliance" in relation to 43 U.S.C. 
Section 1744. See, Rogers v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 4, 8 
(1982). 
The court also finds that the instruments filed by 
plaintiff do not fall under the exception set out in 43 U.S.C. 
Section 1744(c) in the following language: 
But it shall not be considered a failure to file 
if the instrument is defective... 
The court interprets this language to refer to instruments 
(copies of the official records) that are informationally 
deficient/defective for purposes of the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act of 1976, only because they were copied from 
official records that were themselves informationally defective 
for purposes of such Act. If the instrument filed is defective 
in the sense that it cannot be construed as a "copy" of the 
official records, it does not fall under this exception. 
Accordingly, the court grants defendants' motion for 
summary judgment in part, ruling that plaintiffs' "Red Dome" 
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mining claims are deemed to be abandoned pursuant to 43 U.S.C. 
Section 1744(c), because of noncompliance with 43 U.S.C. Section 
1744(b), and ruling that plaintiffs have no right or interest in 
the subject area of interest of this lawsuit based upon their 
"Red Dome" mining claims. 
Concerning plaintiff's first and second motions for 
summary judgment, such motions are denied on the basis that 
plaintiffs1 Red Dome mining claims have been deemed abandoned as 
explained hereinabove and also on the basis that there remain 
several genuine issues of material fact relating to the validity 
of defendants1 "Feather Lite" mining claims yet to be resolved in 
this matter. 
Defendants are requested by the court to prepare an 
appropriate order pursuant to this ruling. 
DATED this J?U day of September, 1986. 
RA#-?M. HARDING, JUDGE^T 
cc: Patrick J. Garver and Hal J. Pos 
Dexter L. Anderson 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
******* 
GORDON GRIFFIN and 
RED DOME, INC., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SANDRA MEMMOTT, et al., 
Defendants. 
Case Number 7975 
RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S 
OBJECTION TO RULING, AND 
REQUEST FOR ORAL 
ARGUMENT AND ON 
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' 
PROPOSED ORDER FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
******** 
The court, having reviewed the memoranda submitted by 
counsel on plaintiffs' objection to defendants' proposed order 
for partial summary judgment and on plaintiffs' objection to 
ruling, rules as follows: 
1) That the court, having never received plaintiffs' 
letter dated June 25, 1986, in which plaintiffs requested oral 
argument on defendants' motion for summary judgment, and finding 
no copy of such letter in the file, finds that oral argument on 
such motion for summary judgment was never properly requested, 
and as such, plaintiffs had no right to oral argument on such 
motion. Wherefore, plaintiffs' motion for rescission of the 
court's ruling dated September 30, 1986, and for oral argument on 
defendants' motion for summary judgment filed May 28, 1986, is 
denied. 
2) That plaintiffs' objections to defendants' proposed 
order for partial summary judgment are well taken. The court 
hereby rejects the proposed order submitted by defendants 
~7 
pursuant to the court's September 30, 1986, ruling and requests 
that plaintiffs submit to the court an amended order, identical 
to defendants' proposed order, except for the following changes: 
1. That the language contained in paragraph 4 of 
the defendants' proposed order be stricken completely from such 
proposed order; 
2. That the language contained in paragraphs 2 and 
3 of defendants' proposed order be replaced by new paragraphs 2 
and 3 containing the following language: 
2. That defendants' motion for summary 
judgment is hereby granted in part, whereas 
plaintiffs' "Red Dome" mining claims are deemed 
abandoned, pursuant to 43 U.S.C. Section 1744(c); 
and 
3. Plaintiffs have no right or interest in 
the subject area of interest of this lawsuit based 
upon their "Red Dome" mining claims. 
DATED this JL+- day of October, 1986. 
cc: Dexter L. Anderson 
Patrick J. Garver 
1ARDING, JUDGE^ -y 
pursuant to the court's September 30, 1986, ruling and requests 
that plaintiffs submit to the court an amended order, identical 
to defendants' proposed order, except for the following changes: 
1. That the language contained in paragraph 4 of 
the defendants' proposed order be stricken completely from such 
proposed order; 
2. That the language contained in paragraphs 2 and 
3 of defendants' proposed order be replaced by new paragraphs 2 
and 3 containing the following language: 
2. That defendants' motion for summary 
judgment is hereby granted in part, whereas 
plaintiffs' "Red Dome" mining claims are deemed 
abandoned, pursuant to 43 U.S.C. Section 1744(c); 
and 
3. Plaintiffs have no right or interest in 
the subject area of interest of this lawsuit based 
upon their "Red Dome" mining claims. 
DATED this 2>- day of October, 1986. 
cc: Dexter L. Anderson 
Patrick J. Garver 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY 
JAN , 5 lio7 
******************* 
GORDON GRIFFIN and RED DOME, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
-VS-
CASE NUMBER 7975 
RULING ON PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 
AND RECONSIDERATION OF 
RULING 
SANDRA MEMMOTT, et al., 
Defendant. 
******************** 
The court, having reviewed the memoranda 
submitted by counsel pursuant to this motion, and being fully 
advised in the premises, grants plaintiffs1 motion to set aside 
its ruling of September 30, 1986, pursuant to URCP 60(b)(7), for 
the reason that the court relied on the current version of the 
federal regulations defining "copy" as used in 43 U.S.C. Section 
1744 (i.e., 43 C.F.R. Section 3833.0-5U) ), rather than the 
version that was in effect at the time plaintiffs were required 
to comply with the FLPMA. The court finds that such an error in 
law by the court justifies relief from the previous ruling. 
Having set aside its ruling of September 30, 
1986 (ruling on plaintiffs1 first and second motions for summary 
judgment and defendant's motion for summary judgment), the court 
in reconsidering such motions, finds that plaintiffs have complied 
with the filing requirements of 43 U.S.C. Section 1744(b), which 
states in relevant part: 
w 
"Additional filing requirements. The owner 
of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim 
or mill or tunnel site located prior to the 
date of approval of this Act [enacted Oct. 
21, 1976] shall, within the three-year period 
following the date of approval of this Act 
[enacted Oct. 21, 1976], file in the office 
of the Bureau designated by the Secretary a 
copy of the official record of the notice of 
location or certificate of location, 
including a description of the location of 
the mining claim or mill or tunnel site 
sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the 
ground." 
The 1979 version of 0WgrW9KM&«^mtf&on 3833^05(1) (theT federal 
regulation defining "copy of the official record") varies from the 
version relied upon by the court in its previous ruling. The 1979 
version states the following: 
" 'Copy of the official record of the notice 
of certificate of location1 means a legible 
reproduction or duplicate, except microfilm, 
of the original instrument of recordation of 
an unpatented mining claim, mill or tunnel 
site which was or will be filed in the local 
jurisdictionw, where.._J:he,__ claim or site is 
locatedj^|^^ acceptable to ttig
 r 
' ^^^y**- ^g < such iristrument off 
lasis added.] 
The court finds that plaintiffs have submitted "other evidence, 
acceptable to the proper BLM office, of such instrument of 
recordation," and therefore, the court grants partial summary 
judgment on plaintiffs1 first motion for summary judgment as to 
this issue only, having found that plaintiffs have complied with 
43 U.S.C. Section 1744(b). Concerning the issue of whether 
plaintiffs have properly maintained their "Red Dome" mining claims 
in relation to performing proper assessment work, the court finds 
that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
plaintiffs have complied with 43 U.S.C. Section 1744(a). 
Accordingly, the court grants partial summary judgment to 
plaintiffs on plaintiffs' first motion for summary judgment, only 
to the degree set forth hereinabove. 
In addition, the court finds that there remain 
genuine issues of material fact concerning plaintiffs' second 
motion for summary judgment and defendant's motion for summary 
judgment, and therefore, denies such motions. 
Plaintiffs to prepare a proper order. 
.i./£f-< DATED this A f day of Jaml^ry, 1987. 
"M. HARDING, <KMt3E 
cc: Dexter L. Anderson 
Hal J. Pos 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY 
• * * • * * * * • * * * * * * * * * • • * 
GORDON GRIFFIN and RED DOME, 
INC- , 
Plaintiffs, CASE NUMBER CV 7975 
-vs- RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE 
SANDRA MEMMOTT, RALPH 
MEMMOTT, SUE BUSHNELL, 
SHEREE BUSHNELL, JIM 
BUSHNELL, BRETT SANDERS, 
PAM SANDERS, and CRAIG 
SANDERS, 
Defendants. MEMORANDUM DECISION 
* • • • * * * • • * • • * • • * * • ' • * • 
The Court, having conducted a bench trial on this 
matter finds that plaintiffs are entitled to have title to the 
"Red Dome" mining claims quieted in them. 
The major issue which is before the Court in this 
matter is whether the documents filed with the Bureau of Land 
Management (B.L.M.) were sufficient and acceptable to that 
agency; and whether the Court finds the documents acceptable to 
preserve plaintiffs rights against the defendants. The documents 
are required to be filed under 43 U.S.C. section 1744. Under 
this section claimants are required to file with the B.L.M. 
before December 31st of each year a notice of intention to hold a 
claim and an affidavit of assessment work performed on the claim. 
There is no issue as to whether plaintiffs filing with the B.L.M. 
was timely. The issue is whether the documents filed by 
plaintiffs adequately complied with the statute in their form so 
that they were sufficient and acceptable to the B.L.M. If the 
1 0Q125<* 
documents were acceptable, plaintiffs are entitled to retain 
possession of the claim, and may be entitled to damages from the 
defendants for trespass. If plaintiff's documents were not 
acceptable to the B.L.M., defendant's claims may be valid, and 
plaintiffs may be liable to defendants for damages. 
After consideration of the evidence presented at trial, 
the Court finds that the documents supplied by the plaintiffs, 
were sufficient and acceptable to the B.L.M., in both form and 
content, and that their filing on the property remained valid. 
There is substantial evidence that the documents were acceptable 
to the B.L.M. 1. U.M.C. numbers were assigned to the claims. 2. 
Before October 22nd, 1979 the filings were affirmatively 
recognized by the B.L.M. through correspondence requesting more 
information. Plaintiffs supplied the information. 3. The B.L.M. 
has continued to receive and respond to further filings of proof 
of labor. 4. The B.L.M. continues to maintain a file on the Red 
Dome Mining claims. 5. In the past, the B.L.M. advised the 
defendants that the filings made on behalf of Red Dome were 
acceptable. Had the documents supplied by plaintiff's been 
insufficient, the B.L.M. would have requested that plaintiffs 
supplement the information provided to the agency. While the 
B.L.M. does not have the authority to determine whether the 
documents filed by plaintiffs were sufficient and acceptable 
concerning the dispute between these parties, the agency has the 
responsibility to determine sufficiency and acceptability of the 
documents between the plaintiff and the B.L.M. 
We do not disparage the right of BLM on its 
own initiative to adjudicate any mining claim 
in terms of compliance with section 314 of 
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 
1976, 43 U.S.C. section 1744 (1982). Clearly 
this is BLM's responsibility in administering 
the statute. We note, however, that upon 
review of the sufficiency of the section 314 
filings for a claim, no decision would 
2 
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ordinarily be issued approving the filings* 
On Reconsideration, Sandra Memmott, 93 IBLA 
115 footnote 2 (1986) . 
There is no evidence before the Court that the B.L.M. 
was not satisfied with the sufficiency and acceptability of 
documents as they were presented by the plaintiffs. The Court 
finds that the documents were also sufficient and acceptable to 
accomplish the purposes of the statute. For the above reasons, 
the Court finds that plaintiff's filings were acceptable to the 
B.L.M.
 f and to this Court, and that the claims at all relevant 
times remained valid. The claims were therefore not subject to 
relocation by the defendants. 
Defendants claim that the holding in United States et 
al., v. Madison d. Locke, et al., 53 L.W. 4433 (1985), should be 
controlling in this case. There the United States Supreme Court 
held that the date for filing a notice of intention to hold a 
claim required strict compliance. The Court finds that Locke, is 
distinguishable because it is the sufficiency of the information 
filed which is at issue in the case at bar rather than the time 
it was filed. In Locke, the lawsuit was filed because the B.L.M. 
indicated that the filing was late and was not in compliance with 
the statute. The evidence presented to the Court indicates that 
where the B.L.M. is not satisfied with the sufficiency of 
documentation, the agency requests further information. Whether 
a party is in compliance is left to the discretion of the B.L.M. 
This is far different from non compliance with a strict time 
limit set by Congress as was the case in Locke. In the case at 
bar, there is no evidence that the B.L.M. did not consider 
plaintiffs to be in compliance with the statute. The Court is 
satisfied that the summary submitted by the plaintiff's to the 
B.L.M. satisfied the requirements of the statute, and that 
supplying an actual copy of the sheets on file in the recorders 
office was neither practical or necessary. The Court notes that 
3 00125G 
in a strictly technical sense, the documents in the recorders 
office are not actual notices of claim. If defendant's argument 
was to be accepted, the only documents accepted by the B.L.M. 
would be the original notices which were returned to the 
claimants after copying into the county records. 
A second issue is whether plaintiffs in any way 
jeopardized their claim through failing to file proof of their 
assessment work with the county. The evidence before the Court 
is that the assessment work was done, but there was no filing 
with the county. Plaintiffs made the required filing with the 
B.L.M. The holding in Knight v. Flat Top Mining Co., 305 P.2d 
503 (1957) is dispositive of this issue. In Knight, the Supreme 
Court stated that: " . . . failure to file proofs of labor where 
the work is actually done does not render claims subject to 
relocation." The evidence in the case at bar indicates that the 
work was done. The land was therefore not subject to relocation. 
Because plaintiffs have a continuous valid claim on the 
property, it was not subject to location by the defendants. 
Defendants cross claim therefore is moot. 
Because trial in this matter was bifurcated, the issue 
of damages if any, has not been resolved. If the plaintiffs wish 
to pursue damages, they must request a trial setting on that 
issue in writing within ten days, or damages will be presumed 
waived. 
Counsel for plaintiffs to prepare findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and a judgment, incorporating the terms of 
this decision and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as 
to form prior to filing with the Court for signature. 
4 
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Dated this 23rd day of May, 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
cc: Frederick A. Jackman, Esq. 
Harold A. Hintze, Esq. 
5 00I25C. 
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FREDERICK A. JACKMAN, #1632 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300 
Orera, Utah 84058 
(801) 225-1632 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY 
GORDON GRIFFIN and RED DOME, 
INC., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
SANDRA MEMMOTT, RALPH 
MEMMOTT, SUE BUSHNELL, 
SHEREE BUSHNELL, JIM 
BUSHNELL, BRETT SANDERS, 
PAM SANDERS, and CRAIG 
SANDERS, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. CV 7975 
iJmvvULU fix a ^ tfaidvz^ 
This matter having come before the Court on the 22nd day of 
May, 1989, on a bench trial, the Court having heard the proffered 
evidence, and having reviewed the documents stipulated into 
evidence, now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That U.M.C. numbers were assigned to each of the claims 
made by Red Dome. 
2. That before October 22, 1979, the filings by Red Dome 
were affirmatively recognized by the Bureau of Land Management 
(hereinafter B.L.M.) through correspondence requesting more 
0012oO 
information. Red Dome, Inc., provided the information. 
3. The B.L.M. has continued to receive and respond to 
further filings of proof of labor. 
4. The B.L.M. continues to maintain a file on the Red Dome 
mining claims. 
5. In the past, the B.L.M. advised the defendants that the 
filings made on behalf of Red Dome were acceptable. Had the 
documents supplied by the plaintiffs been insufficient, the 
B.L.M. would have requested that plaintiffs supplement the 
information provided to the B.L.M. 
6. There is no evidence that the B.L.M. did not consider 
the plaintiffs to be in compliance with the statute. 
7. The Court finds that the appropriate assessment work for 
all years in question was done but there was no filing with the 
County. 
8» The Court finds that the plaintiffs did make the 
required filings with the B.L.M. 
9. The Court having entered its Findings of Fact now enters 
its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. While the B.L.M. does not have the authority to 
determine whether the documents filed by the plaintiffs were 
sufficient and acceptable concerning the dispute between the 
2
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parties, the B.L.M. has the responsibility and authority to 
determine sufficiency and acceptability of the documents as 
between the plaintiff Red Dome and the B.L.M. 
2. The summary submitted by the plaintiffs to the B.L.M. 
satisfied the requirements of the statute and that supplying an 
actual copy of the sheets on file in the recorder's office was 
neither practical or necessary. 
3. The Court finds the documents supplied by the plaintiffs 
were sufficient and acceptable to the B.L.M. in both form and 
content and that the plaintiffs' filing on the property remain 
valid and therefore the claims were not subject to relocation by 
the defendants. Therefore, defendants' cross-claim is moot. 
4. With regard to the failure to file the assessment claims 
with the County, the Court finds that failure to file proofs of 
labor where the work is actually done does not render the claims 
subject to relocation. 
DATED this ^? / day of June, 1989. 
3 Q012Gx 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
for 
I he reby 
UJUU 
ing, 
certify that on the IfA day of 
, 1989, I mailed a true and correqt copy of the 
postage prepaid, to: 
Harotd A. Hintze 
Attorney for Defendants 
3319 North University Avenue 
#200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
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FREDERICK A. JACKMAN, #1632 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
(801) 225-1632 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY 
GORDON GRIFFIN and RED DOME, 
INC- , 
Plaintiffs, 
JUDGMENT 
v, 
SANDRA MEMMOTT, RALPH 
MEMMOTT, SUE BUSHNELL, 
SHEREE BUSHNELL, JIM 
BUSHNELL, BRETT SANDERS, 
PAM SANDERS, and CRAIG 
SANDERS, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. CV 7975 
The Court, having conducted a bench trial in this matter, 
and having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
now makes and enters the following: 
JUDGMENT 
1. The plaintiffs are entitled to have title to the "Red 
Dome" mining claims more particularly described in the exhibits 
"A" - lfIlf attached to this Judgment quieted in them. 
2. That defendants1 cross-claim is dismissed with 
001*1 
Du 
prejudice. 
DATED this ^27 day of June, 1989. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
certify that on the IJ^/) day of 
1989, I mailed a true and correjct copy of the 
postage prepaid, to: 
Harold A. Hintze 
Attorney for Defendants 
3319 North University Avenue 
#200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
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RED DOME //l PLACER MINING CLAIM 
MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH 
1) Notice of Location recorded at Book 11 page 449 on September 5, 
1946. 
2) Claim located September 5, 1946 
3) Legal Description 
Lot 1; & beg. 10 chains West of the Southeast corner 
of the Northeast 1/4 running thence West 40 chains, 
thence North 20 chains, thence East 40 chains, thence 
South 20 chains to beg., all in Sec 26, Township 21 
South, Range 6 West, S.L.B. & M. 
4) Owners are 
Red Dome, Inc 
SR Box 125 
Fillmore, UT 84631 
Fillmore Products, Inc 
Lessee 
SR Box 125 
Fillmore, UT 84631 
W*l 58765 
UMC stiir 
EXHIBIT "A' 
REO DOME HZ PLACER MINING CLAIM 
MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH 
1) Notice of Location recorded at Book 9 page 5<*3 on July 21, 1936. 
2) Claim located on July 21, 1936. 
3) An amendment recorded at Book 9 page 580 on April U, 1937. 
<0 Legal Description 
The East one-fifth (1/5) of Lot 1, all of Lot 2, and 
all of Lot 3 in Section 23, Township 21 South, Range 
6 West, Salt Lake Base & Meridian. Lot 2, Section 26 
Tounship 21 South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base & 
Meridian, 
5) Ouners: 
Red Dome, Inc. 
SR Box 125 
Fillmore, UT 8^631 
Fillmore Products, Inc. 
Lessee 
SR Box 125 
Fillmore, UT 6^631 
l^—SSSESS—-"" 
M * 1 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
RED DAME //3 PLACER MINING CLAIM 
MILLARD CUUNTY, UTAH 
1) Notice of Loaction recorded at Book 9 page 5*»*» on July 21, 1936. 
2) Claim located on July 21, 1936. 
3) An amendment recorded at Book 9 page 500 on April 6, 1937. 
4) Legal Description 
The South three-fourths (3A) of the West four-fifths 
V*/5) of Lot 1, in Section 23, Township 21 South, 
Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base & Meridian, and all of 
Lot k in Section 26, Township 21 South, Range 6 West, 
Salt Lake Base & Meridian, 
5) Owners: 
Red Dome, Inc. 
SR Box 125 
Fillmore, UT 8^631 
Fillmore Products, Inc. 
Lessee 
SR Box 125 
Fillmore, LIT 8^631 
VJ ^0 58770 
EXHIBIT VC" 
RED DOME //<• PLACER MINING CLAIM 
MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH 
1) Notice of Location recorded at Book 9 page 560 on October 26, 1936. 
2) Claim located on October 19, 1936. 
3) Legal Description 
The North quarter of the West four-fifths (*»/5) of 
Lot 1 and commencing at the Northwest corner of Lot 
1 and running thence North 16 chains; thence East 
18 chains; thence South 16 chains; snd thence West 
18 chains; B11 in Section 23, Township 21 South, 
Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base & Meridian. 
*•) Owners: 
Red Dome, Inc. 
SR Box 125 
Fillmore, UT 8<*631 
Fillmore Products, Inc. 
Lessee 
SR Box 125 
Fi l lmore, UT 8*»631 
\3 •0*r 58771 
EXHIBIT »D" 
RED DOME //5 PLACER MINING CLAIMS 
MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH 
1) Notice of Location recorded at Book 9 page 560 
2) Claim located on October 19f 1936. 
3) Legal Description 
*».5 Acres heing part of the Northeast 1 A of the South 
east 1 A of Section 27, and also part of the tot 5t 
Section 26 Tounship 21 South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake 
Base & Meridian and more particularly described as 
fallows: 
Commencing 3 chains UJest of the East 1 A corner of 
Section 27, Tounship 21 South, Range 6 [Jest, Salt 
Lake Base & Meridian, and running thence South 5 
chains; thence East 9 chains; thence North 5 chains 
thence West 9 chains to the point of beginning. 
<») Owners: 
Red Dome, Inc. 
SR Box 125 
Fillmore, UT 0<»631 
Fillmore Products, Inc. 
Lessee 
SR Box 125 
Fillmore, UT 6<*631 
xs? - $ & 
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EXHIBIT "E" 
RED DOME #6 PLACER MINING CLAIM 
MILLARD CUUNTY, UTAH 
1) Notice of Location recorded at Book 10 page 265 on July 1 9 1938. 
2) Claim located on July 19 1938. 
3) Amendment recorded at Book 10 page 318 on June 2B9 1939* 
*•) Legal Description 
The Northeast 1 A of the Southwest 1/U of Section 23, 
Township 21 South9 Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base & 
Meridian. 
5) Owners: 
Red Dome, Inc. 
SR 8ox 125 
Fillmore, UT 8<i631 
Fillmore ProductB, Inc 
Lessee 
SR Box 125 
Fillmore, UT 8^631 
U MC 
EXHIBIT "F" 
RED DOME ill PLACER MINING CLAIM 
MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH 
1) Notice of Location recorded at Book 10 page 265 on July 1, 193B* 
2) Claim located on July 1, 1936. 
3) Legal Description 
Lot 1 and the North three-fourths (3/*0 of Lot 2f 
Section 279 Tounship 21 South, Range 6 (Jest, Salt 
Lake Base & Meridian, 
U) Ouners: 
Red Dome, Inc. 
SR Box 125 
Fillmore, UT 8^631 
Fillmore Products, Inc. 
Lessee 
SR Box 125 
Fil lmore, UT 8<i631 
U M C 58774 
EXHIBIT "G" 
RED DOME NEW DISCOVERY PLACER MINING CLAIM 
MILLARO COUNTY, UTAH 
1) Notice of Location recorded at Book 12 page 339 on June 29 1950. 
2) Claim located on June 21, 1950. 
3) Legal Description 
Beginning at the Southeast corner of Section 22f 
Toynship 21 South, Ranqe 6 Ulest, Salt Lake Base & 
Meridian nnd running thence West flO rods; thence 
North BO rods; thence East 00 rods; thence South 
80 rods to the point of beg, 
*•) Owners: 
Red Dome, Inc. 
SR Box 125 
Fillmore, UT B«»631 
Fillmore Products, Inc. 
Lessee 
SR Box 125 
Fillmore, UT B<»631 
<utt<L 59192 
EXHIBIT »H" 
001273 
RED DOME PLACER MINING CLAIM 
MILLARO COUNTY, UTAH 
1) Notice of location recorded at Book 9 page 3B4 on June 10, 1935. 
2) Claim located May ZU9 1935. (This claim uaa completely overlapped 
by Red Dome //2 and //3.) 
3) Amendment recorded at Book 9 page 5**3 on July 20, 1936. 
*•) Legal Description 
Commencing at a point approximately one half mile 
Northeast of U.S. Geological Survey Bench mark MY" 
1931 to Red Dome Placer Claim Stake No* 1; thence 
Southeasterly twenty chains to Red Dome Placer Claim 
Stake No. 2; thence Northeasterly thirty chaina to 
Red Dome Placer Claim Stake No. 3; thence Northwesterly 
twenty chains to Red Dome Placer Claim Stake No. U; 
thence Southwesterly thirty chaina to point of begin-
ning. The above described Claim is located in and 
is part of the South half of Section 23, and part of 
the North half of Section 26, in Township 21 South 
Range 6 West, S.L.B. & M. 
5) Owners 
Red Dome, Inc. 
SR Box 125 
Fillmore, UT B4631 
Fillmore Products, Inc. 
Lessee 
SR Box 125 
Fillmore, UT 
mWtyi< 
81*631 
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ft EX-OFHCIO CLfcftK OF THE 
DISTRICT COURT 
M"LLAI1D COUNTY 
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FREDERICK A. JACKMAN, #1632 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
(801) 225-1632 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY 
GORDON GRIFFIN and RED DOME, 
INC., 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SANDRA MEMMOTT, RALPH 
MEMMOTT, SUE BUSHNELL, 
SHEREE BUSHNELL, JIM 
BUSHNELL, BRETT SANDERS, 
PAM SANDERS, and CRAIG 
SANDERS, 
Civil No. CV 7975 -
Defendants
- Qtvip % f o ^ . 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED ACTION having come on regularly for trial 
on May 22, 1989, before this court sitting without a jury with 
Frederick A. Jackman appearing as attorney for plaintiffs, and 
Harold A. Hintze appearing as attorney for defendants; the 
respective parties hereto having introduced evidence both oral 
and documentary; the Court having heard and considered the 
evidence and arguments of counsel; and the Court having filed its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; now, therefore; 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED AS follows: 
1. Plaintiff, Red Dome, Inc., is the owner in fee simple 
and entitled to the possession of certain Red Dome mining claims 
situated in Millard County, State of Utah, described as follows: 
1. RED DOME BLANKET CLAIM 
Commencing at a point approximately one half mile 
Northeast of U.S. Geological Survey Bench Mark 
"Y" 1931 to Red Dome Placer Claim Stake No. 1; 
thence southeasterly twenty chains to Red Dome 
Placer Claim Stake No. 2; thence Northeasterly 
thirty chains to Red Dome Placer Claim Stake No. 
3; thence Northwesterly twenty chains to 
^e& XtoKve Placer cl^i.™ No. ^ 'ttraft^  &o>*ttaifestfexV; 
thirty chains to point of beginning. The above 
described claim is located in and is part of the 
South half of Section 23, and part of the North 
half of Section 26, in Township 21 South, Range 6 
West, S.L.B. & M. 
2. RED DOME CLAIM NO. 1 
Lot 1; and Beg. 10 chains West of the Southeast 
corner of the Northeast 1/4 running thence West 
40 chains; thence North 20 chains; thence East 
40 chains; thence South 20 chains to beginning; 
all in Sec. 26, Township 21 South, Range 6 West, 
S.L.B.M. containing 120 acres. 
3. RED DOME CLAIM NO. 2 
The East one-fifth of Lot 1, containing 10.31 
acres and all of Lot 2, containing 53.92 acres, 
and all of Lot 3, containing 53.92 acres, all in 
Section Twenty-three (23), Township 21 South, 
Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and 
all of Lot 2, containing 40.62 acres, in Section 
Twenty-six (26) Township 21 South, Range 6 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
4 . RED DOME CLAIM NO. 3 
2 0012V 
The South Three-fourths of the West Four-fifths 
of Lot 1, containing 30.95 acres, in Section 
Twenty-three (23), Township 21 South, Range 6 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and all of Lot 
3, containing 40.95 acres, and all of Lot 4, 
containing 48.02 acres, in Section Twenty-six 
(26), Township 21 South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian. 
5. RED DOME CLAIM NO. 4 
The North One-fourth of the West Fourth-fifth of 
Lot 1, containing 10.30 acres and Commencing at 
the NW corner of Lot 1, thence North 16 chains; 
thence East 18 chains; thence South 16 chains; 
thence West 18 chains to beginning, containing 
28.8 acres, all in Section 23, Township 21 South, 
Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; 
containing a total of 39.1 acres. 
6. RED DOME CLAIM NO. 5 
4.5 acres, being part of the NE1/4 of the SE1/4 
of Section 27, and also part of the NW1/4 of the 
SW1/4 of Section 26, Township 21 South, Range 6 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; more 
particularly described as follows: 
Commencing 3 chains West of the East One-fourth 
corner of Section 27, Township 21 South, Range 6 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, more 
particularly described as follows: 
7. RED DOME CLAIM NO. 6 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 3, 
running thence East 20 chains; thence 
Northwesterly 22 chains; thence in a southerly 
direction 10.5 chains, more or less, to the place 
of beginning; also the Northwest 1/4 of the 
Southeast, and the Northeast 1/4 of the Southwest 
1/4, all situated in Section 23, Township 21 
South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Meridian. 
3 OQ:2V^ 
Amended Location Notice Recorded In: Book 10, 
page 318 
Recorded June 28, 1939, 9:10 a.m. 
The Northeast 1/4 of the Southwest 1/4 of Section 
23, Township 21 South of Range 6 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian. 
8. RED DOME CLAIM NO. 7 
Lot 1, containing 46.83 acres; the North 3/4 of 
Lot 2, containing 35.14 acres; all situated in 
Section 27, Township 21 South, Range 6 West, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian. 
9. RED DOME CLAIM NEW DISCOVERY 
Commencing at the S.E. cor. of Sec. 22, Twp. 21 
South, Range 6 West, S.L.B.&M. running thence 
West 80 rods; thence North 80 rods; thence East 
80 rods; thence South 80 rods more or less to the 
point of beginning. Containing 40 acres. 
2. The claims of defendants Sandra Memmott, Ralph Memmott, 
Sue Bushnell, Sheree Bushnell, Jim Bushnell, Brett Sanders, Pam 
Sanders, and Craig Sanders and all who claim title under them in 
and to said real property are without any right whatever, and 
said defendants have no estate, right, title, lien, or interest 
whatever in or to said mining claims or any part thereof; 
3. Defendants Sandra Memmott, Ralph Memmott, Sue Bushnell, 
Sheree Bushnell, Jim Bushnell, Brett Sanders, Pam Sanders, and 
Craig Sanders and al persons claiming under them are hereby 
permanently enjoined from asserting any estate, right, title, 
lien, or interest in or to said real property or any part 
4 ooi2v;, 
thereof; and 
4. Plaintiffs shall recover from defendant Sandra Memmott, 
Ralph Memmott, Sue Bushnell, Sheree Bushnell, Jim Bushnell, Brett 
Sanders, Pam Sanders, and Craig Sanders cost of court. 
5. The defendants' Counterclaim is dismissed with 
prejudice. 
DATED this /^T day/f f^C^K^K , 1989, 
0 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the LJ^L day of 
<[Uf\J , 1989, I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregbing/ postage prepaid, to: 
Harold A. Hintze 
Attorney for Defendants 
3319 North University Avenue 
#200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
-(afaf.Um} 
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FREDERICK A. JACKMAN, #1632 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
(801) 225-1632 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY 
GORDON GRIFFIN and RED DOME, 
INC., 
Plaintiffs, 
ORDER 
v. 
SANDRA MEMMOTT, RALPH 
MEMMOTT, SUE BUSHNELL, 
SHEREE BUSHNELL, JIM 
BUSHNELL, BRETT SANDERS, 
PAM SANDERS, and CRAIG 
SANDERS, 
Civil No. CV 7975 
Defendants. Judge Ray Harding 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED ACTION having come on regularly for trial 
on May 22, 1989, before this court sitting without a jury with 
Frederick A. Jackman appearing as attorney for plaintiffs, and 
Harold A. Hintze appearing as attorney for defendants; the 
respective parties hereto having introduced evidence both oral 
and documentary; the Court having heard and considered the 
evidence and arguments of counsel; and the Court having filed its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; and the matter having 
come on before the Court for further proceedings on the 23rd day 
of June, 1989, for purposes of considering attorney's fees and/or 
rf^ftdc^L-—.. -.-
00123. 
contempt; now, therefore; 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED AS follows: 
1.. Plaintiff, Red Dome, Inc., is the owner in fee simple 
and entitled to the possession of certain Red Dome mining claims 
situated in Millard County, State of Utah, described as follows: 
1. RED DOME BLANKET CLAIM 
Commencing at a point approximately one half mile 
Northeast of U.S. Geological Survey Bench Mark 
"Y" 1931 to Red Dome Placer Claim Stake No. 1; 
thence southeasterly twenty chains to Red Dome 
Placer Claim Stake No. 2; thence Northeasterly 
thirty chains to Red Dome Placer Claim Stake No. 
3; thence Northwesterly twenty chains to Red Dome 
Placer claim No. 4; Thence Southwesterly thirty 
chains to point of beginning. The above 
described claim is located in and is part of the 
South half of Section 23, and part of the North 
half of Section 26, in Township 21 South, Range 6 
West, S.L.B. & M. 
2. RED DOME CLAIM NO, 1 
Lot 1; and Beg. 10 chains West of the Southeast 
corner of the Northeast 1/4 running thence West 
40 chains; thence North 20 chains; thence East 
40 chains; thence South 20 chains to beginning; 
all in Sec. 26, Township 21 South, Range 6 West, 
S.L.B.M. containing 120 acres. 
3. RED DOME CLAIM NO. 2 
The East one-fifth of Lot 1, containing 10.31 
acres and all of Lot 2, containing 53.92 acres, 
and all of Lot 3, containing 53.92 acres, all in 
Section Twenty-three (23), Township 21 South, 
Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and 
2 
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all of Lot 2, containing 40.62 acres, in Section 
Twenty-six (26) Township 21 South, Range 6 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
RED DOME CLAIM NO, 3 
The South Three-fourths of the West Four-fifths 
of Lot 1, containing 30.95 acres, in Section 
Twenty-three (23), Township 21 South, Range 6 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and all of Lot 
3, containing 40.95 acres, and all of Lot 4, 
containing 48.02 acres, in Section Twenty-six 
(26), Township 21 South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian. 
RED DOME CLAIM NO. 4 
The North One-fourth of the West Fourth-fifth of 
Lot 1, containing 10.30 acres and Commencing at 
the NW corner of Lot 1, thence North 16 chains; 
thence East 18 chains; thence South 16 chains; 
thence West 18 chains to beginning, containing 
28.8 acres, all in Section 23, Township 21 South, 
Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; 
containing a total of 39.1 acres. 
RED DOME CLAIM NO. 5 
4.5 acres, being part of the NE1/4 of the SE1/4 
of Section 27, and also part of the NW1/4 of the 
SW1/4 of Section 26, Township 21 South, Range 6 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; more 
particularly described as follows: 
Commencing 3 chains West of the East One-fourth 
corner of Section 27, Township 21 South, Range 6 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, more 
particularly described as follows: 
RED DOME CLAIM NO. 6 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 3, 
running thence East 20 chains; thence 
3 
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Northwesterly 22 chains; thence in a southerly 
direction 10.5 chains, more or less, to the place 
of beginning; also the Northwest 1/4 of the 
Southeast, and the Northeast 1/4 of the Southwest 
1/4, all situated in Section 23, Township 21 
South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Meridian. 
Amended Location Notice Recorded In: Book 10, 
page 318 
Recorded June 28, 1939, 9:10 a.m. 
The Northeast 1/4 of the Southwest 1/4 of Section 
23, Township 21 South of Range 6 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian. 
8. RED DOME CLAIM NO. 7 
Lot 1, containing 46.83 acres; the North 3/4 of 
Lot 2, containing 35.14 acres; all situated in 
Section 27, Township 21 South, Range 6 West, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian. 
9* RED DOME CLAIM NEW DISCOVERY 
Commencing at the S.E. cor. of Sec. 22, Twp. 21 
South, Range 6 West, S.L.B.&M. running thence 
West 80 rods; thence North 80 rods; thence East 
80 rods; thence South 80 rods more or less to the 
point of beginning. Containing 40 acres. 
2. The claims of defendants Sandra Memmott, Ralph Memmott, 
Sue Bushnell, Sheree Bushnell, Jim Bushnell, Brett Sanders, Pam 
Sanders, and Craig Sanders and all who claim title under them in 
and to said real property are without any right whatever, and 
said defendants have no estate, right, title, lien, or interest 
whatever in or to said mining claims or any part thereof; 
3. Defendants Sandra Memmott, Ralph Memmott, Sue Bushnell, 
Sheree Bushnell, Jim Bushnell, Brett Sanders, Pam Sanders, and 
4 00125.-
Craig Sanders and al persons claiming under them are hereby 
permanently enjoined from asserting any estate, right, title, 
lien, pr interest in or to said real property or any part 
thereof; and 
4. Plaintiffs shall recover from defendant Sandra Memmott, 
Ralph Memmott, Sue Bushnell, Sheree Bushnell, Jim Bushnell, Brett 
Sanders, Pam Sanders, and Craig Sanders cost of court• 
5. That any contempt proceedings for violation of a Court 
order in another case would be more appropriately handled in that 
case and before that Judge. 
6. That there is no statutory or contracted basis for 
awarding attorney's fees to either party and therefore each party 
shall bear their own fees and costs. 
7. The defendants' Counterclaim is dismissed with 
prejudice. 
DATED this ^?^?, day^f^ {^Z^^<As& ^ 1989. 
5 0012Su 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
/ \ I . h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t on t h e _ j ^ L _ d a y o f 
jj^^C^ LjjCiyt^ r 1989, I mailed a true and c o r r e c t copy of the 
f o f e g o ^ g , postage prepaid, t o : 
Harold A, Hintze 
Attorney for Defendants 
3319 North U n i v e r s i t y Avenue 
#200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
'Mil Miffftf/m///, 
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IN REPLY REFER TO: 
•JSA>\ United States Department of the Interior 
OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
INTERIOR BOARD OF LAND APPEALS 
4015 WILSON BOULEVARD 
ARL2NCTON. VIRCINIA 22203 
CLEO MAY FRESH 
MARJORIE P. DETERTS 
IBLA 80-325 Decided October 16, 1980 
Appeal from the decision of the Colorado State Office, Bureau of 
Land Management, returning various documents relating to mining claim, 
CMC 150396, and declaring the claim abandoned. 
Affirmed. 
1. Mining Claims: F.L.P.M.A.—Abandonment—Affi.invit of Assess-
ment Work—Location Prior to October 21, 1976—Notice o£ 
Intention to Hold a Mining Claim—Recordation of Mining Claims; 
LOCATION PROCEDURES—Relocation; REGULATIONS—Applicability-
Interpretation. 
Under sec. 314 of the Federal Land Policy 
and Management Act of 1976, A3 U.S.C. 
§ 1744 (1976), and 43 CFR 3833, the owner 
of a mining claim located before Oct. 21, 
1976, must file a copy of the official 
record of the notice of location for the 
claim and related documents with the proper 
Bureau of Land Management Office on or 
before Oct. 22, 1979. Failure to so file 
is deemed conclusively to constitute an 
abandonment of the claim by the owner. 
APPEARANCES: Carl H. Noel, Esq., Denver, Colorado, for appellants. 
OPINION EY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE BURSKI 
Cleo May Fresh and Marjorie P. Deterts have appealed from the 
decision of the Colorado State Office, Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM), dated December 7, 1979, returning various documents relating to 
the Cleo May placer claim, CMC 150396, as insufficient for purposes of 
recordation under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 
(FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. § 1744 (1976). 
TNDI-X CODE: 
43 CFR 3833.0-5(1) 
43 CFR 3833.1-2(q) 
4 3 CFR 3833.2-1(a) 
43 CFR 3833.5(f) 
50 IBLA 363 CFS(Ml\<) 230(1980) 
3 
On September 27, 1979, appellants submitted to BLM a copy of a 
quitclaim deed dated May 2, 1961, transferring the Behan placer mining 
claim to appellants, a mapf and an affidavit of value of labor and 
improvements for the period from September 1, 1979, to September 1, 
1980. The affidavit, which was recorded with the county recorder on 
August 3, 1979, and the map indicate that the Cleo May claim and Behan 
claim are one and the same* 
In its decision, BLM indicated that appellants did not file a 
certificate of location before October 22, 1979, as required by FLPMA 
and enclosed a copy of the pertinent regulations. On January 11, 
1980, counsel for appellants appeared at the BLM office and attempted 
to submit* the original certificate of location for the Cleo May placer 
claim* BLM would not accept it. A copy of the certificate of loca-
tion attached to appellants' statement of reasons indicates that the 
appellants located the Cleo May claim on April 18, 1949. 
In their statement of reasons, appellants first point out that 
the definition of ~[c]opy of the official record of the notice of cer-
tificate of location" found at A3 CFR 3833.0-5(1) includes: "other 
evidence, acceptable to the proper BLM office, of such instrument of 
recordation.'* Appellants argue that such evidence was offered and 
accepted by ELM prior to October 22, 1979. Appellants" then contend 
that they should have been allowed to correct filings as they 
attempted to do, since they would have had ample time to submit the 
required certificate of location if BLM had not accepted their filings 
originally. They note that other claimants were informed that their 
filings were deficient before the October 22, 1979, cutoff and argue 
that they have been unfairly treated. 
[1] Section 314(b) of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1744(b) (1976), 
requires the owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim 
located prior to October 21, 1976, to file a copy of the official 
record of the notice of locr.tion for the claim in the BLM office des-
ignated by the Secretary of the Interior within the 3-year period fol-
lowing October 21, 1976. Section 314 also provides that failure to 
timely file such record shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an 
abandonment of the mining claim by the owner. 
The corresponding re^u]atlou, 43 CFR 3833.1-2(a), reads as 
follow!;: 
(§] 3833.1-2 Manner of recordation—Federal Lands 
(a) The owner of an unpatented mining claim, mill 
site or tunnel site located on or before October 21, 1976, 
on Federal lands, * * * .shall file (file shall mean being 
received and date st.'impt'd by the proper BLM Office) on or 
before October 22, 1979, in LIIU proper BLM Office, a copy 
of the official record of the notice or certificate of 
location of the claim or site filed under state law. 
50 IELA 364 
IBLA 80-325 
Section 314(a) of FLPMA and Departmental regulations at 43 CFR 
3833.2-l(a) also require the owner of such a mining claim to file evi-
dence of annual assessment work performed during the preceding assess-
ment year or a notice of intention to hold the mining claim on or 
before October 22, 1979, or on or before December 30 of each calendar 
year following the calendar year of recording. 
Thus, on or before October 22, 1979, appellants were required to 
have filed a copy of the certificate of location for the Cleo May 
claim and evidence of assessment work for the .preceding assessment 
year or a notice of intention to hold the claim. 
The failure of BLM to notify appellants upon filing that their 
submissions did not meet the requirements of FLPMA does not prevent 
BLM from later doing so* 43 CFR 3833.5(f). Nor do noncomplying sub-
missions become -acceptable" because BLM takes receipt of them. The 
quitclaim deed submitted by appellants did not constitute "other evi-
dence" of the certificate of location as it in no manner refers to the 
location of the claim or the recording of that claim in the county 
recorder's office. JL/ In any event, the provision of the regulations 
concerning the submission of "other evidence" only applies when the 
notice of location is no longer obtainable or when a claimant purports 
to hold a claim under 30 U.S.C. § 38 (1976). Herein, appellants had a 
copy of the location notice. They merely failed to send it to ELM. 
Cf. Philip Saver, 42 IBLA 296 (1979).;l Additionally, we note that the 
affidavit of assessment work was also unacceptable because it related 
to the coming assessment year rather than the preceding year. 
The responsibility for complying with the recordation require-
ments rested with appellants and appellants must bear the consequences 
of their failure to do so. BLM has no authority to waive compliance 
or accept late filings. Although it is undoubtedly true that BLM was 
able to review and reject some noncomplying filings before the 
October 22, 1979, filing date, there is no evidence that BLM did not 
properly process appellants' filings. Glen J. McCrorey, 46 IBLA 355 
(1980). » 
As noted in the BLM decision, appellants may relocate these 
claims for locatable minerals and file notice with BLM within 90 days 
of location as provided in 43 CFR 3833.1 subject to any intervening 
rights of third parties and assuming no intervening closure of the 
land to mining location. 
1/ It was unexplained and we find it curious that the quitclaim deed 
purporting to transfer ownership of the claim at issue to appellants 
has a later date than the certificate of location evidencing appel-
lants1 location of the claim. 
n) CFS(MIN) 69(1979) 
b) CFS(MiN) 61(1980) 
50 IBLA 365 
<:i-\S(MIN) 2 50(1'J80) 
IBLA 80-325 
Therefore, pursuant to the authority delegated to the Board of 
Land Appeals by the Secretary of the Interior, A3 CFR A.l, the 
decision appealed from is affirmed. 
We concur: 
J^mes L. 
WA++4* XT /MUMA*. 
Burskl 
Administrative Judge 
iderick Fishman 
Administrative Judge 
Administrative Judge 
50 IBLA 366 
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IN REPLY REFER TO: 
United States Department of the Interior 
OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
INTERIOR BOARD OF LAND APPEALS 
4015 WILSON BOULEVAJU) 
ARUNOTON, VIROINU 22203 
JOHN J. VBCARCTK 
GEOKGE W. VRABLE 
IBIA 81-530 Decic3ed October 21, 1981 
Appeal from decision of the California State Office, Bureau 
of Land Management, rejecting recordation of certain mining claims. 
CA MC 54975 through CA MC 54978. 
Affirmed as modified, 
1. Mining Claims: F.L.P.M.A.—Abandonment—Location Prior to 
October 21, 1976—Recordation of Mining Claims; REGULATIONS— 
Applicability. 
Under sec. 314 of the Federal Land Policy 
and Management Act of 1976, A3 U.S.C. 
§ 1744 (1976), and 43 CFR 3833.1-2, the 
owner of a mining claim located before 
Oct. 21, 1976, must file a copy of the 
official record of the notice of location 
for the claim with the proper Bureau of 
Land Management office on or before 
Oct. 22, 1979. Failure to so file is 
deemed conclusively to constitute an 
abandonment of the claim by the owner. 
2. Mining Claims: F.L.P.M.A.—Recordation of Mining Claims; 
REGULATIONS—Applicability; WORDS AND PHRASES—Copy of the 
Official Record of the Notice or Certificate of Location. 
"Copy of the official record of the 
notice or cert iflcate of location11 means 
a legible reproduction or duplicate, 
except microfilm, of the original instru-
ment of recordation of an unpatented min-
ing claim which was or will be filed in 
the local jurisdiction where the claim is 
located or other evidence, acceptable to 
the proper Bureau of Land Management 
office, of such instrument or recordation. 
It also includes an exact reproduction, 
duplicate, or other acceptable evidence 
except microfilm, of an amended instru-
ment which may change or alter the 
description of the claim. A quitclaim 
deed is not an acceptable substitute in 
the absence of a showing that the certifi-
cates of location were unavailable. 
I.NDJ-M C0D1£ 
43 CFR 3833.0-5(i) 58 IBLA 377 GFS(MIN) 370(19S1) 
43 CFR 3833.1-2 
./-
IBIA 81-530 
APPEARANCES: Robert C Coates, Esq., for appellants. 
OPINICN BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE LEWIS 
John J* VikarciJc and George W. Vtable have appealed from the 
March 10, 1981, decision of the California State Office, Bureau of Lard 
Management (BLM), rejecting recordation of certain mining claims held by 
appellants including the Bedrock (CA HC 54975), Warlock (CA HC 54976), 
Neptune (CA MC 54977), and Shamrock (CA MC 54978) mining claims* 1/ 
Appellants filed maps, quitclaim deeds, and proofs of labor for these 
claims with BLM on October 20, 1979. No copies of the original loca-
tion notices, however, were filed. Cn January 30, 1981, the California 
State Office notified appellants that the claims could not be recorded 
in the absence of original location notices,"and allowed appellants 
30 days in which to submit the copies. 2/ Appellants neither sent 
copies nor explained why copies were not available. On March 10, 1981, 
BLM issued its decision rejecting the filings. 
[1] Section 314(b) of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
(FLPMA), 43 O.S.C. 5 1744(b) (1976), requires the owner of an unpat-
ented lode or placer mining claim located prior to October 21, 1976f to 
file a copy of the official record of the notice of location for the 
claim in the BLH office designated by the Secretary of the Interior 
within the 3-year period following October 21, 1976. Section 314 also 
provides that failure to file timely such record shall be deemed con-
clusively to constitute an abandonment of the mining claim by the 
owner. William E. Talbott, 52 IBLA 12 (1981). a 
[2] "Copy of the official record of the notice of location" is 
defined by 43 CFR 3833.0-5(i) to include: 
(A] legible reproduction or duplicate, except microfilm, 
of the original instrument of recordation of an unpatented 
mining claim, mill or tunnel site which was or will be 
filed in the local jurisdiction where the claim or site is 
located or other evidence acceptable to the proper BLM 
office, of such instrument of recordation* It also includes 
an exact reproduction, duplicate or other acceptable evi-
dence, except microfilm, of an amended instrument which may 
change or alter the description of the claim or site. 
The purpose of the recordation requirements of FLPMA is to give notice 
to BLM of the existence of mining claims on Federal lands so that this 
information may be considered in the management of those lards. Tae 
17 This appeal concerns only the four claims named above, although the 
Hecision below also affected a number of other claims. 
2/ See n.3, infra. 
GFSOfTN) 27(1981) 
IBLA 81-530 
date of location is important for establishing the date from which a 
claimant's rights to a particular claim arise. William E. T&lbott, 
supra. 
The quitclaim deeds submitted by appellants do not constitute 
"other evidence" of the certificate of location under the above regula-
tion as the deed in no-way refers to the location of the claim or its 
recordation in the county recorder's office. Cleo May Fresh, 50 IBLA 
363 (1980)? The provision in the regulation concerning the submission 
of "other evidence" applies only when the notice of location is no 
longer obtainable or when a claimant purports to hold a claim under 
30 U.S.C. S 38 (1976). Jd. 3/ Although appellants were given 30 days 
to submit copies of the original location notices, they did not submit 
them and, further, gave no explanation as to why they did not. In 
these circumstances, we cannot assutte that the notices of location are 
no longer obtainable or that appellants purport to hold claims under 
30 U.S.C. § 38 (1976) (entitled "Evidence of possession and vrork to 
establish right to patent"). Accordingly, appellants' submission of 
maps and quitclaim deeds was not sufficient to effect the recordation 
of their claims. See Marvin E. Brown, supra at n.3. 
Appellants do not allege compliance with the statutory and regu-
latory provisions. Instead, they argue that these requirements are 
unconstitutional. They assert that unpatented mining claims are 
valuable property rights requiring constitutional due process protec-
tion; that the Government may not alter prior vested rights by subse-
quent legislation; that there is no public welfare•interest nor an 
emergency authorizing taking without just compensation; that the stat-
utory irrebuttable presumption of abandonment is arbitrary and capri-
cious; and that there has been no notice or opportunity to be heard 
before forfeiture. In Lynn Keith, 53 IBLA 192, 197-98, 88 I.D. 369, 
372 (1981)£we responded to similar objections to the constitutionality 
of the statute as follows: 
37 While quitclaim deeds may be acceptable if a claimant demonstrates 
that the certificates of location are not available, the State Office's 
letter of Jan. 30, 1981, purported to extend the time for filing the 
documents which the statute required to be filed by Oct. 22, 1979. In 
Lynn Keith, infra, we noted that Congress did not vest the Secretary of 
trie Interior with the authority to waive or excuse noncompliance with 
the statute. Although Organic Act Directive (QAD) 80-19 (Feb. 25, 1980) 
refers to the submission of quitclaim deeds as a substitute for certifi-
cates of location, we do not read this as approving acceptability of 
quitclaim deeds in all situations. See D. Estremado, 55 IBLA 49 n.l 
(1981 )il The OAD 80-19 refers to OAD 79-7 (NDV. 24, 1978)# which indi-
cated that quitclaim deeds may be accepted if the mining claimant 
demonstrates that the certificates of location were unavailable. See 
Marvin E. Brown, 52 IBLA 44 (1981 )• e 
b) CFS(MIN) 250(1980) 
c) GFS(MIN) 86(1981) 
d) CFS(MIN) 161(1981) 
e) GFS(MIN) 28(1981) 
58 IBLA 379 GFS(MIX) 370(1981) 
IBLA 81-530 
Appellant's challenge of the statute and regulations 
cannot be sustained here. Essentially, the regulations 
merely mirror the statute and, to the extent that they have 
been considered by the courts, they have been upheld. See 
Tbpaz Beryllium Co. v. United States, 479 F. Supp. 309 
(D. Utah 1979) (appeal pending); Northwest Citizens for 
Wilderness Mining Co., Inc. v. Bureau of Land Management, 
[Civ. No. 78-46 M. (D. tont. June 19, f979)T In any 
event, i t has frequently been held that am appeals board of 
th is Department has no authority to declare a duly promul-
gated regulation invalid. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 45 IBLA 313 
(1980) ^cf . Garland Coal and Mining Co., sTiBIA 60 (1981).S 
Nsr may such a regulation be waiveci by the Department* 
Marvin E. Brown, 52 IBLA 44 (1981), ard cases therein 
c i ted. With reference to the s tatute , th i s Board adheres 
to i t s earl ier holdings that the Department of the 
Interior, being an agency of the executive branch of the 
Government, i s not the proper forum to decide whether an 
act of Congress i s constitutional. Alex Pinkham, 52 IBLA 
149 (1981),iand cases therein c i ted. Jurisdiction of such 
an issue i s reserved exclusively to the judicial branch. 
In answer to appellants' objection that there has been no opportunity 
to be heard, we note that no hearing i s required in the absence of a 
disputed issue of material fact . See United States v. Consolidated 
Mines & ar«eltinq CO., Ltd,, 455 F."5T432, 453 (9th Cir. 1971). NcT 
such issue arises as appellants do not dispute their failure to f i l e 
the documents necessary to prevent their claims frcrn being deemed 
abandoned under FLPMA. 
We note that appellants may relocate these claims and f i l e notice 
of this as provided in 43 CFR 3833.1, subject to any intervening rights 
of third part ies , and assuming no intervening closure of the land to 
mining location. 
Therefore, pursuant to the authority delegated to the Board of 
Land Appeals by the Secretary of the Interior, 43 CFR 4.1 the decision 
appealed from i s affirmed. 
fafifa 
Anne Foindexter Lewis 
Administrative Judge 
f) CFS(OCS) 71(1980) 
fern2rd'v." P a ^ e ^ " " 8> CFS(MIN) 32(1981) 
Suef Administrative Judge »0 GFS(MTN) 28(1981) 
r Y
 i ) GFS(MIN) 39(1981) 
Douglas) E. Henriques 
Administrative Judge 
'aU± 
53 IBLA 380 
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IN REPLY KZJTR TO: 
United States Department of the Interior 3833 (723) 
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20240 
Organic Act D i r e c t i v e No. 79-7 
November 24, 1978 
To: AFO's 
From: Associate Director 
Subject: Recordation Under Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
Where Local Recordation Cannot be Established 
There have already been instances where claimants, wishing to record 
their mining claims with 3LM, have been unable to supply copies of 
location notices, or certificates of location, which they believe to 
have been recorded in the local recording office. Such cases normally 
involve claims dating back to the turn of the century or before. 
The Bureau recognizes that over the years many documents may become 
lost or misplaced. A number of recording offices have been destroyed 
by fire. Other types of casualties are known to have occurred. 
The purpose of section 314 of FLPMA is to ensure that all mining 
claims, mill sites, and tunnel sites are reflected in the land 
records. Where a search of the local (county or recording district) 
records, therefore, does not reveal the original filing, but does 
show that there is reason to believe that a recording may have been 
made, secondary evidence will be accepted. Evidence leading to a 
belief that a recording may have been made includes, but is not 
limited to, such things as a history of annual assessment work re-
cordings, recorded grants to the present owner, or wills showing that 
the claim was inherited by the present owner or a predecessor in 
interest. The above items are described in 43 CT& 3362.1-4. In 
43 CFR 3862.3-1 the means of establishing a right by occupancy is 
described. Where the above described documents cannot be produced, 
a right by occupancy will be accepted. 
We expect that if this situation is to become acute, it will happen 
during the last two or three months before October 22, 1979. In each 
case, the material will be accepted, along with the filing fee, and 
date stamped. Subsequent review of the material will determine 
whether or not it is sufficient. Any case where a decision cannot, be 
made as to its sufficiency will be referred to the Director (720) for 
a final decision. 
f Acting / 
EXHIBIT WC M 
. /. f 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FVH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VH. 
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NOTICE OP LOCATION f 
OP * 
, CINDER CRATER NO, EIGHT PLACER MINING CLAIM 
J KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that Merrill G. Memmott and Marie S# Memmott, of • 
'! • t 
| Salt Lake City, Utah, and Ralph C. Memmott and Grace K. Memmott, of Sclpio, Utah, all citizens j, 
'' of the United States, having complied v/ith all of the requirements of law and the local rules 
, and customs, claim by right of discovery and location a valuable bed or deposit of volcanic 
!» I 
jj cinders or ash and other minerals, which placer mining ground or claim the undersigned have ' 
i! 
J, name the "CINDER CRATER NO. EIGHT." Said claim contains 46.73 acres, is situated in unorganized 
i' 
J mining district, Millard County, State of Utah, and is described as follows: 
I Lot Five of Section 26, Township 21 South, 
| Range 6 West, Salt Lake Meridian. t 
This claim lies about 4 miles North of White Mountain and about 10 miles West of 
Fillmore, Utah. 
^he undersigned have erected at the point of discovery a monument about three feet!* 
.1 
high above the ground situated about 50 feet South and 985 feet West from the North East corner 
« »• 
•i 
of this claim upon which monument this notice la conspicuously posted. » 
The undersigned have distinctly marked each corner of this claim by erecting kt 
each corner a monument about three foet high above the ground so that the boundaries thereof ' 
--4 
-- w-.^ *o, .aixui uxtxovr irunmg ground or claim the undersigned have 
name the UCINDSB CRATER NO. EIGHT/1 Said claii ntains 46.73 acres, is situated in unorganized 
mining district, Millard County, State of Utah, and is described as follows: 
Lot Five of Section 26, Tov/nship 21 South, 
Range 6 West, Salt Lake Meridian. 
This claim lies about 4 miles North of White Mountain and about 10 miles West of 
Fillmor*, Utah. 
The undersigned have erected at the point of discovery a monument about three feet 
high above the ground situated about 50 feet South and 985 feet West from the North East corner 
of this claim upon which monument this notice is conspicuously posted* 
The undersigned have distinctly marked each corner of this claim by erecting &t 
each corner a monument about three feet high above the ground so that the boundaries thereof 
can be readily traced. 
Date of Location: March 5th, 1947. 
MERRILL G. MEMMOTT 
Witnesses to posting of notice and marking of boundaries: MARIE S. MEMMOTT 
Merrill G# Memmott RALPH C. MEMMOTT 
Ralph Memmott. GRACE K. MEMMOTT 
Locators 
By: Edward B. Jones, Agent. 
Pi led for record March 10, 1947 at 9:00 A. M. Pi le No.#60157 
Camilla Hunter. County Recorder. 
Tab 14 
1T0TICE OF LOCATIOl 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned having complied with the require- // s A 
ments of Section 2524 of the Revised "Statutes of the United States and the Local 
Laws, Customs and Regulations of this District, has located fifteen hundred feet in '^  v \>' • 
length by Six Hundred feet in width, on this, the Elwood No, 1. Lode, Vein or Deposit, 
bearing gold, silver, copper, lead and other valuable minerals, situate in Tintic 
Mining District Juab County, State of Utah, the location being described and marked on the 
ground as follows, to-wit: 
Beginning at this discovery and running about S. 6° W. 1000 feet, and about N. 28° 
E. 500 feet, and claiming all ground within 300 feet on each side of this the lode 
line, excepting conflicts with Sur, Nos. 2945, 3295, 4014, 2955, 5393 and 6015. 
The £ Cor. between Sees. 25 and 36, T. 10 S. , B 2 W. bears about N. 89° 30' E. 312 feet. 
The above described Mining Claim shall be known as the Elwood No. 1. 
Located this 1st day of July. 1930. 
NAMES OF LOCATORS: 
Yfitness Jesse Haws 
Jos N. Elsinor 
Filed for Record July 1, 1930 at 2:55 P. M. H. M. Nay lor, Recorder A. Naylor Deputy 
Recorded Book 14 page 273. 
No. 45745 Recorded at the request of Jesse Haws, July 3, 1930, at 10 A. M. 
C o un-ty-fti2#r6 r der 
WOTTOF. OF LOCATION 
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA 
Filed b>. The Anaconda ComDany 
555 17th Street 
Denver, CO 80217 
For ana on behalf of the owners: 
Owner(s): AJcxth CLUJ mtnrng Pnmpnnr) (fr>rrr\pr(^ d/yyyre /XL/US GcfULfom 
C/0-The 
Address: ^ T ^ / " l ^ J ^ r p r f 
J^nuer{ CO ^ 0 < ^ 7 
Wh 
Mh 
SDi 
SUh 
• *V> th (o 
County of 
State of 
i £ i -
Section 
^ 4 x _ 
v3G> 
2LS 
c3S-
Meridian 
\JLJUSL£> 
UL<JOU£^ 
Township Range 
(OS Q i O 
lets <3cD 
/ / )JT 
T / j M ^ / j r OF-:\CF. ROCKY FORD PLACER CLAIM No.2 . 
•ql3 MB 20 $ «Q;57 NOTICE OF LOCATION OF PLACER CLAIM. 
urn or r-nj-^E TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
uu
 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned citizens of the United States over the age 
of Bl years .have this day located under and in pursuance of and having complied with Sections 
2329,2330,2331 of the revised Statutes of the United States, and the laws of the State of 
Utah and the local laws and customs and regulations of this District .have this day located 
the following described Placer Mining Ground,situated in the Unorganized Mining District, of 
Juab County,State of Utah,viz: 
E£ Lots 4 and 5 North 344 feet of Lot 12; South .976 ft.of the West & of Lot 5 all in 
Section 4.T.15S.R.3 V/.S.L.B.& M. Containing 60 acres. 
This claim is'located upon a valuable vein or deposit.bearing gold.limestone, and other 
precious metals, situated in Juab County.Utah. 
This claim shall be known as the Rockv Ford Placer No.2 Placer Mining Claim, and we in-r O* 
tend to work the same in accordance with the local customs and rules of miners in said mining "'; 
district, and each of the undersigned have an undivided 1/3 interest therein. { 
Located this 2nd day of June 1926. 
NAMES OF LOCATORS 
Geo.u.Chaffin^> Horace Burkinshaw ;— 
D.V/. Jennings. *• ' v± 
No.37489 Recorded a t the r e q u e s t of Horace Burkinshaw.June 23,1926 a t 11 :30 A.M. 
_^&-#<m*L~ 
CoC ;v~ -"..reorder. 
¥ LiiMii'^n 
N O T I C E I S K E R J S E n r G I V E N , That the undersigned, having complied 
with the requirements of SECTION 2 3 2 4 of the REVISED STATUTES of tho 
United States , and t h e Local Laws, Customs and Regulations of this District, 
h a located Fifteen hundred feet in length by 6 0 0 feet in width, on this 
ftiiM Lode, Ve»n orJDeposit, 
bearing Gold 
T T n e n 
H 12. XL An? 
, Si lver, 
1 ^ i T-I n o 
- S ^ = _ ! i i 
Co 
cs-i 
! i . 
PP< 
- « - » • . 
n f 
^r, 
O •*-
s 
Lead 
^ 
o r . 
-t -n 
"* 
and 
^v>,=> 
" T^ 
other 
T " o - n 
_S.JL 
val 
-P c; 
i 2 _ 
j a b ! e 
n o / 
w . s. 
minerals , 
—"—• • ' i t . - ^ — » > . m i T 
s i tuated 
v "ZZ~ 
in the_ 
UP^c^rr . . . 
.County, State of. 
Mining" District, 
the location being descr ibed and marked on the ground as fo l lows, to-wit: 
SI / ID feet C*^~c3c Beginning . of this location (Discovery) 
Monument, at the ! V \ />. ho< 
thence, 
thence 
thence. 
\.A\«fi»o3~ 
TxtrJT^ 
t h e n c e . 
t h e n c e . 
Vi cnJd^ 
Cjr\*zX 
t h e n c e . ArnAiMrN. 
end center monument , and running 
. 3QQfftfttto O »LZ corner m o n u m e n t No . 1; 
. 1500 fee t t o _ . .corner m o n u m e n t No . 2 ; 
. 3 0 0 f ee t t o . . end center m o n u m e n t : 
. 3 0 0 f e e t t o _ . .corner m o n u m e n t No . 3 : 
. 1500 fee t to /Vt U- c o m a r m o n u m e n t No. 4 ; 
_ 3 0 0 fee t to place of beginning; including all Dips, 
Spurs , Angles and Variatinna cvX^-Q /C^XQi-^w^ U q X v ^ o "UXjg, Q A j a 
U^Jr. vfi^rA, 
o>-e^7 A ^ P A s~ ¥ S aS -7T$(7 , ^ 4 ^ ^ 
IT 
A * ~ \ ^ O ^ x " 
o^ocO 
The a b o v e described Mining Claim shall be known as the 
Located th i s . / T .day of. 4 
Note. 
•The small trp* on blank BnM Is mareJy * 
raid* for th# locator and i» BO p*rt of Jsi» 
not ice 
tDlAOU.lt: or Cuutt—Tba location (diaeorary 
poirt) and corner monument* thou Id b« desig-
nated on the accompanying diagram to make 
the Record of claim a o r * perfect. 
A mining elalm most not exe*«d 1500 feet in 
lenjrth along th» vtin or lode, by 600 feet in 
width. 300 feet on each sida of cantor of vein 
at surface. 
No location of a mining elalm can ba mads 
until the discovery of tbe vein or lode within 
the limits of tbe ground c la laed . 
Tbe claim mutt ba distinctly marVed on the 
ground, so i u boundaries c a s be readily traced. 
A eevere penalty Is provided by law for re-
m o \ n j or defacing the sUaes or monuments of 
a min ng c aim. 
Claims located on Sunday or holidays art 
legal. 
All valuable mineral deposits In lands of the 
Government mn locatable by eiUx#->« of the 
Uni'ed S'atea only, and thme who have de-
c ared their intentions to become tuna. 
Tbie location notice n i . i t be filed for R « o r d 
•»ith the County Peeor<*»r of tba county in 
which the cairn is located. 
t BUCUM of cum. 
4] 
.19 tt 
AMES O F LOCATORS: 
^Zs. J rJtJnjT)) 
,0, era? .11. 
"S--J7S0T 
f — ^r ^ 
FLOUNCE C.'COOK Ju-b Counh R a i d e r 
J f?) 
g. a 
Kpiul-HHH-y24 v r S 
-*TteUloK] 
i- il 
, v * •. 
^ f ^ V - ^ ^ ^ . ^ ' r f r : ^ ^ ^ . ^ ^ ^ . 1 ! ^ ^ . ! ^ i t faU-rrr^i—r^^ 
: .^.*":ixv/-o* ^rv/ofli'*! RV. ['frm*-;:? on* n<* JVj&!f;:ij fern L^cfnor^. 
. S r"' - i.*'" V"*--* 
m 
«f(i S£V7/oh*F*fi Il/vfl^ m]_»-rV £r:h::j»ri^nv:T>/jF> V/ML'.5 
: ^ c . c < . . - . - , . . . . ; ; . 
.&ioT.A0Ovi r-io h:r:.:AX 
/ / ^> 
i ®F L©Cai@M.-i 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, That the undersigned, having complied 
quirements of Section 2324 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, and the I oca! 
Laws, Customs and Regulations of this District, ha..^5... located fifteen hundred feel ir. 
length by ...LP.AA hundred feet in width, on this, the ....^fc:?u.. .j.r . J<..ui.\ 
Lode, Vein or Deposit, bearing Gold, Silver and other precious metals, situated ip 
...U^J&Mtetlh.... Mining District, ..JpAAzk. County, yl"(.f. {^ 
the location being described and markdc/on the ground as follows, to wit: 
. . . . . . .^?d^ Lk&JbJi 3 ^ ^ ^ ^ . 
.£kr^. . . . . .^ .p^y.^^^^ytuiu 
...rU*^^^v*Ck«<a; -A-iT. /Qt^r.X^ttitr&rLtf.. ^kl^*3-UuAjl*xAfe....4tte/..yj^/'L*l ±U f 
1.£~&J9^£L^^ £..<?.. ° 
^.-<^^^z..<^...-..^^......^i^ J2^jM<L<a Z«£ie.j> ^\ 
JL*^^A....Ca^^ . 9 ^ , < 2 ^ ^ 
^r?...<i^„0j!& J&?r.* C~L<*~^*% 
r3d^.„£A*SZ-
Zr^^iSfcfcy, /!!. 
^ The Mjjiina Claim above described shall be known as the 
'IAJL £jt^.-ZZi...Ifa&sA. £%^k±.l^r.„^S>Jr^ 
Located this.. ^ ..^^<^A day of L£<?.-.<C. 19 . . /^ 
NAMES OF LOCATORS 
^ ^Ls^c^ 
-fm^^.-»—i2lbr^i?.L ~ 
CE2ZTD SLCl-Z.Z.W&.klJl.Z^* BOfl 12? nz3 *A 
V;^T'"ZZZ^"±''^^j„^j J..1 -
f?L!a! J.L'.;. CfOJK.JwU^Mr Recorder 
(*Refer to Stakes or Monuments or Exterior lines and Discovery in this description 
(QUARTZ) 
' /"Y 1*1X10 
Tab 15 
IN REPLY REFER TO: 
United States Department of the Interior 
OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
INTERIOR BOARD OF LAND APPEALS 
4015 WILSON BOUUVAXD 
ARLINGTON, VDUnNJA 22203 
ELLIS BUSffiMAN 
IBIA 84-332 Decided June 26, 1985 
Appeal frcra a decision of the Oregon State Office, Bureau of Land Man-
agement, declaring the Lost Nugget mining claim abandoned and void. 
Affirmed. 
1. Federal Land Policy and Management Act cf 1976: 
Recordation of Mining Claims and Abandonment—Mining 
Claims: Recordation 
BLM may properly declare an unpatented mining claim 
abandoned and void for failure to file timely with BLM 
a ccpy of the notice cf location c£ the claim, pursuant 
to sec* 314 of the Federal Land Policy and Management 
Act cf 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1744 (1982).. 
APPEARANCES: Ellis Buschman, pro se. 
CPINICN BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE GRANT 
Ellis Buschman has appealed from a decision of the Oregon State Office, 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM), dated Jaruary 20, 1984, declaring the lost 
Nugget mining claim abandoned and void for failure to file timely with BLM a 
ccpy of the notice cf location of the claim, pursuant to section 314(b) of the 
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. S 1744(b) 
(1982). y 
On May 13, 1983, appellant filed a ccpy of his affidavit cf assessment 
work done between December 1, 1982, and March 11, 1983, on the Lost Nugget 
claim with BLM pursuant to section 314(a) of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. S 1744(a) 
(1982). The affidavit had been fi led with the Douglas County recorder on 
\/ Consideration cf th is appeal was s t ^ e d pending judicial review of the 
mining claim recordation provisions of FLPMA. The const i tut ionali ty cf these 
previsions was recently upheld by the Supreme Court. United States v. Locke, 
105 S. Ct. 1785 (1985). a 
INDEX CODE: 
43 CFR 3833.1-2(a) 
43 CFR 3833.4(a) 
a) GFS(MIN) JD-1(1985) 
87 IBLA 345 GFS(MIN) 103(1985) 
IBLA 84-332 
May 9, 1983, but did not indicate when the claim had been located. By letter 
dated June 28, 1983, BLM requested appellant to indicate the appropriate BLM 
serial number associated with the claim, in order to ensure proper fil ing of 
the affidavit. 2/ On July 11, 1983, appellant responded that he "do[es] not 
have a number fran B.L.M." 
In i t s Jaruary 1984 decision, BLM declared appellant's mining claim 
abandoned and void because i t had not been "recorded" with BLM, and rejected 
appellant1 s 1983 affidavit of assessment work filed for recordation. On 
appeal, appellant contends that he has a "right" to the claim because i t i s 
recorded with the county. 
[1] Section 314(b) of FLPMA requires the owner cf an unpatented 
mining claim to f i l e with BLM a copy of the notice of location of the claim 
within the 3-year period following October 21, 1976 (claims located prior to 
October 21, 1976), or within 90 days after the date of location of the claim 
(claims located after October 21, 1976). The record does not indicate when 
appellant's claim was located. It seems clear that the claim was located on 
or before December 1, 1982, the date on which appellant began assessment 
work. Hcwever, the record does not contain a copy of appellant's notice of 
location. Appellant has simply not conplied with section 314(b) of FLPMA. 3/ 
Under section 314(c) of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. S 1744(c) (1982), failure to 
f i l e the required instrument in accordance with the statute "shall be deemed 
conclusively to constitute an abandonment of the mining claim * * * by the 
owner." In such circumstances, the claim "shall be void." 43 CFR 3833.4(a). 
We have long held that the statute i s self-operative and that Congress did 
not invest the Secretary of the Interior with authority to waive or excuse 
noncompliance with the statute, or to afford claimants any relieftfrcm the 
statutory consequences. Homestake Mining Co., 77 IBLA 235 (1983), and cases 
cited therein. 
Accordingly, we conclude BLM prcperly declared appellant's mining 
claim abandoned and void.. Harold A. Hinkle, 77 IBIA 152 (1983)?°William E. 
Day, 72 IBIA 364 (1983). d 
2/ BLM also stated that: 
"If you do not have a BIM 'OR MC1 number, and have not recorded your 
claim with this office within the specified time periods prescribed, the 
claims are considered abandoned and \roid (reference enclosed Circular 
No. 2516A, 43 CFR 3833.4). 
"Abandoned claims may be relocated under applicable mining regulations 
subject to existing rights and provided the lands are open to mining. The 
instruments for your new claim should be recorded under state law and then 
must be fi led with BLM within 90 days after the date of location of the new 
claim under the requirements of 43 CFR 3833.1-2(a)." 
3/ Indeed, in his July 1983 letter to BLM appellant essentially admitted 
that a copy of the location notice for his claim had not been filed with BLM. 
b) GFS(MIN) 18(1984) 
c) GFS(MIN) 10(1984) 
d) GFS(MIN) 109(1983) 
87 IBLA 346 
IBIA 84-332 
There fore, pursuant to the authority delegated to the Board of Land 
Appeals by the Secretary of the Interior, 43 CFR 4.1 , the decision appealed 
from is affirmed. 
Administrative Judge 
We concur: 
Whu Philip Borton 
Chief Administrative Judge 
Administratis 
87 IBLA 347 
GFS(MIN) 103(1985) 
/?/? 
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o 
CD 
* H» * * • * + + * * * v * * «r * * •> +• + * ** * * *• * 
NOTICE OF L0CATI0H 
Of. p lacer i^ la im 
TO TillOM IT LAY COlJCEIUli 
NOTICE IS KENEDY 
havo thla day looated 
: of tho noviaea'3tatutc»uv..r,.v.„..*vv«.wvu -„..^ v..~ ~^ ..~ r. r 
j •.;••••• • t:«r.-^^z^f;• ^»^^V^K>-y>^4!v*t '> ; ' i \ ; . . /" +\>^^::.:*\z\ '• •» "... ; • v • 
\ lavjo and customs and rjr.ulatlona.;oi'; thlo'^dlatrlc 1 1 h vo t!;lG!i\ay, l o c a t o d - t h o follo%;inv: d o c -
' crluod Placer r.lnlivj Ground LtiititatedhlnVtho 1 l.llnln;; U i o t r i c t , ! .;il lard County, 
:S ta to of Utah, v i z : 
1 
« 
i 
t 
> 
'fill is c l a l a In locatod.u^vi'al 'valnr/j lc i 'ViCtroa I t , ; :jo:;rl:r; -;old'niid o .!vjr nrooiVomi r.to ta l i s , 
s i tua ted In ^ i l l a r u ' c o u n t y , U t a h ^ V ^ 
• •». • •.•
!
'*v.!:«v.^V:ivy»-A:f;«ftr;i:»»i — ..... -,.:. . . • • 
Vhic clalr.i s h a l l bo ;k!io\;:;'uo^th^^^ ln-e.id to work \ 
GAh.bid- B 
I 
: ;. ,:«,;.:• ;l • ^ 
•.the snnia In accord:c.C5 wi th local;«cuoto:.;o lor.dVrulorr ol' :i.t.l.;ur;.-j l;v. suid's.iittt'.i;; d i a l a l c t , u;ul 
j • • = • i^?:^,:-v|>sr:*fVf/fe^f,^;:if.. - v ; •••,:•.•.».:,•.!.•!;;..,:..••.•,...;.:.. s ' 
i c a c h o l tho u..dcrsi*;nod, Juivu. a.ij undivided .-oKO-.V.iird- lirlci*Q*JvI t'.iorolii. •-' 
Locatud thlo "a i^sh day o / Kuyv 1^3l> J*;*; 
; itecorded Ju.se 10, lV'oV. a t 11 VoO'A.. 1 
'Amelia lilucl;, County ilceordor'.-; 
.ov I.O;AV:!L. 
Lui'uyotto "orvlcoii 
i?'ora \A t t l o 
Av:*.o.ul 0 *duti 
O 
O 
O 
O 
&0JX f NOTICE1O? LOCmot! OF'PUvCEUCL/viu 
/'.**'J TOWHOM ITMAY'cOHCEnN: 
. . . :^V.-, ,{S- . : j ;v::; i -;-^. , . . . . . . ... 
HOTICE'IS'HERF.BY OIVEll,
 4 tha t the undersigned c i t i z e n s of the United S t a t e s , ovor the 
ago of 21vyoar3,*,hayo;;thi3 ;doy . l o c a t e d undor and • in pursuance of and having complied MI l th 
' '" "* * ~ " ~ ~
4
 " * " United Statoa and tho laws o f the 
Lone of t h i s d i s t r i c t , liavo t h i s 
Ground,"situated i n tho 
S e c t i o n s 2329 , !Z330 f : 233 i / of the nev i sed S t a t u t e s o f . t h o i 
;• ^ M i / H ' 1 ? - % . ; ^ ^ •" ' ; :" ' i ••;'••'••:;:••• •:••'• ' 
Stato.'of Utah,?iand; the!localV;laYis;.and customs and r e g u l a t l c 
day . l o c a t e d thor f o i lov i ing 'desor lbed . P l a c e r Mining Grc 
[Mining ;Ulstrlct'VMlllard ;:Cou(. \y ;';State o f - U t a h / v i z : 
Commencing'at ? a'point !approximate ly one h a l f mi le Horthoaat or U. 3 . G o o l l g i c n l 
Survey Bench'Mark "Y!1 1931' to Bod Dome plaoor Claim S t a t e Ho, 1 ; thcnco Southeaster ly 
tv/enty chains to Bod Dome P l a c e r Claim stake Ho. 2 ; thcnco Horthoastor ly t h i r t y 1 
chains' to Bod Domo p lacer c l a i m Stako Ho. 3 ; thonuo Morthvioatorly tvionty chains | 
to Bed Domo p l a c e r c la im s take Ho. •!; thonce Southwester ly t h i r t y chains lo point \ 
of beginning* Tho above .descr ibed claim i s ' l o c a t o d in ond i s p a r t of the South \ 
h a l f - o f S e c t i o n 2 3 , . and part of tho Horth ha l f of S e c t i o n 2G, In ToTinslilp 21 
South, Bange 6 Vlest,. S, L. B. k M. 
This c laim 18 loca ted .upon'a , va luablo d e p o s i t , bear ing gold and o ther proc lous m e t a l s , 
; •* • j ; . . . * • ; ••:•: • • * ; ' •'•! . ' ' ".' ' . i •- • ' 
s i t u a t e d in Mil lard;County, Utah, 
' * • •
 : :
 - ^ V V , "* •••.. 
This c laim s h a l l bo knovm as the Bod Dome Placer Mining Claim, and \io lutond lo tr^rk tho 
r - / •• • . . : • • • ; . • ! • - : ; . / • • • • • . .">•• «... . * i ' 
sauio! i n accordance i n i t h l . l o o a l customs and r u l e s of minors i n sa id mining d i s t r i c t , and each 
-.;.:. ••!^Ui.uv-::^v(vil>:;i-. '.•...:: ... / - : .<• . • • • - v •• . • • . 
of the undersignedihave an undivided*one t h i r d * i n t e r e s t t h e r e i n , 
• / • : . . . . / ; , ; . . ' • > t - i ? : , j H , •.:.:'.... . ' • . ' * ,;: •• :: ' 
Located t h i s ! lBth 'day or J u l y , .1936. 
MIMES OF L0CA.T0B3 
t lecorded-July-20 , '1936 |a t^9:15 11. M. Lafayot to l.'prrlcon , 
Amoliu Black) CountyNpeoorder Fera L I t t i o 
Armond Ogdon 
— *>* "inc,\Tion OF PLACEB CLAIM 
o 
O 
c:> 
o 
TO vaiow 
., '" ' •*• •
 -
 ' .-, ,'' ; "* - * -1— : * NOTICE'OF LOCATION 
, "; • • ' M>: .'•i,,,!:»'70P I'LACEI! CLAIM 
IT MM COKGETOIr \ J ^ l ^ ^ tfj. V "V! 
• • ill' . •• i • u.?> r i > A • . i' v i L . 
NOTICE IS'KENEDY 01VEN that*, the! underslgnod'.cl tlzons of the United Statoa, ovor tho ago 
or 21 years, have, this'day located, undorf'ai d* In pursuance 'of and having compiled with Soctlor 
2329, 2330, 2331, of' tho Hevlsed Statutes of'tho United Statos, and tho lawo of tho State -6f 
Utah and the local.laws and-customs .Jand ^ regulations of' this district, have this day located 
•»• i 
the following described Placor 'Mining! Ground, * situated In' tho !un-najnod Mining District Mlllord. 
County, Stato oT Utah, viz* • ' I . : 
Lot 1 ; and Dcg^lO chains West of tho South East cornor of tho* North-
• East- 1/4 running, thence West 40 c h a i n s , thenco North 20 chains , thenco 
Eaot 40 chains Jr thenco South 2 0 ' c h a i n s ' t o beg inning , a l l In Soc • 26 , 
Township'21 South, Nange 6 Yiost, S.L.13.M, conta in ing 120 acroa. 
This claim contains valuable v o l c a n i c c lndors and othor valuablo 
minera l - to w i t : - . ? ; v: • • , * > • 
•: •.;.,.., ...i^.vr- • • 
This claim la located upon a'.valuable deposit, bearing gold and.other precious motala, 
situated In Ml liar d County,, Utah1|.V.s.!i • •••! •-,*.' . .'•'.• .. 
Thla claim shall bo known as4,the Red; Dome Wo.lt Placer Mining Claim, and ne Intend to 
• I •• • : «,*; t-;,*t-.\..:,.-l ..V- • • • " : * 
work tho samo In accordance ".with'.local* cuatoma and ruloo. of minora In said mining district, 
v •, f •*.[ ;.1 j jj'm. at »M* . - • . ! • • . 
and each of the undersigned have1anundlvldcd ono'olxth Interest thoroln. 
.•,.-. , • , .-•. • \ *'.\w : ' ' 
Located this 5th, day .of September, • 1946. 
. •• .l,};,'.NAMES* OF" LOCATONQ 
II. Si 'Morrison-'/ 
LaVonne'.Morrison 
Lafayotto Morrison 
Cora S, Morrison 
Ralph Vf. Morrison 
Calllo C. Morrison 
Delta-Utah, 
llecordod September 5, 194G* atr*3!00'P .M. F l l o //G0586 
- ' ^ ^ ^ M 
TO YIHOM IT MAY. CONCERN 
, . ; : ; : NOTICE H.OF # LOCATION ',, OF PLACER . CLAIM .;• *•; 
NOTICE IS'UEIIEDY GlVHHithat t h o ; unders igned o i t l z e n s f i f t h e U n i t e d S t a t o s , ove r t h e 
; ; . . . - , . . . . ••:• = ••• j-?. i •,»!».-.-.I... • ! . - . .. . • ? : ".V .* , . ;;*»: \ l • i 
ago of 21 years,1 have this' day; located under and in pursuanco of and having, complied with 
Sections 2329, 2*630, 2331 of the ltevisod Statutes of .the United States, and the lavia of tho 
State or Utah and the local laws and customs and regulations of this dls tr iot , huve this 
day located the following described Placer Mining Ground,situated in tho _ 
Mining District, Millard County ,*State of Utah , viz:
 #. * 
!The East ono fifth1 of Lot 19;containing 10.31 acres and All or Lot 2, containing 
53,92 acres and All*or Lot 3, containing 53,92 acres, a l l in Section Twenty-throe 
123), Township 21.South,.Hang o 6 \lest> Salt Lako Base and Merldlun, and 
All or Lot 2, contalning'40.62 acrc3 and All or Lot 3,* containing 40.95 acres, in 
Soctlon .tvienty-six-(20) ,:':Township 21 South, Range 0 Yloot, Salt Lako Baso and 
; M e r i d i a n , ; - , .v:.^:;;r;^vl:.:^:^.;VK fr V—5 !-'l-; • ;'••'••!:••• •: : ' 
This claim is located'.upon a'valuablo deposit, bearing £pld and other precious metals 
. . ' • » * • • . ' •
 :
 • • • ' • '
, i - . • • • • : • • • • " « • • • . ' , • . ' . • . • , ; . » i • • • • • ' t 
' « • • ' • ' . » " • ' i t - . . ; • • • ' • • • . • ' ; . ' ' • • * • 
situated in Millard County J.Utah. vv : .'.• .' ;• ••'•'• « .• • 
.
 j
 . • • •> . ,.; * 
This c l a i m s h a l l bo known ' a s ; the* Rod Dome placor Claim No* 2,-Placer Mining Claim, and 
wo Intend to work the same in accordance viith* local customs and rules or minors in said 
mining d i s t r i c t , and'each o f { t h e undersigned have'an unalvided one- tenth i n t e r e s t t h e r e i n . 
Located t h i s 2 1 s t ' d a y of, Ju lyy '1936 , 
WlMES OF LOCVfORS 
Cora S. Morrison 
Arinond Ogden 
D e l i l a h U* O&dcn 
Fera L i t t l e 
Verda L i t t l e 
hecovded July 2 1 , 1936 a t . l i : o u * . M. 
Ajnclie Black, County Recorder 
Lafayet te Morrison 
Hlchard S . Morrleou 
La Yonne Horrl ton 
Duvld 11. Dybee 
Verda Byboe 
J llOTICK:.OFi,..LOOATI01l;l!J.?;--:"' " "~ '" 
TO WHOM I T MAY CONCERN 
HOTICEiOFi CATIOH;. Jf ^ ./|. OF PLACER.CLAIM . ; 
" Mining d i s t r i c t ; 
Itie *>outh 'Hirco Fourths of the'Yieot Four - f l f tha of Lot 1 , containing 30 .95 acrea f 
In Soc t lon 23, Township 21 S o u t h / Rango 6 VJeat, S a l t Lako DQSO and Meridian, and I 
A l l of Lot 4, containing 48 .02 a c r e s , l n : S e c t l o n 2 0 , Township 21 ^outh, Ilan^o 0 J 
V?e3t, S a l t Lake Base and. Meridian/ . * • . 
This claim I s located'upon a , v a l u a b l e d e p o s l t , : bearing gpld and other prec ious meta l s 
s i t u a t e d in Millard County . .Utahjr jy••:^^V^ •^;l!^ •^ /;:••^ ;^ ;;:.•.|:>'' " '--^ • 
. • - V " • • i v : ^ ^ ! ; i i ^ n f v l ^ •.-•;:••:•,. •• • • • : • 
This c laim s h a l l be knovm.as ;the.| Red* Dome Placer Claim Mo. 3 . Placer Mining Claim, and vo 
intend to vrork tho: sairo. In'. accordeitce .with' loca 1 cu 3 to no and ruloa of minora .In sa id mining ] 
d i s t r i c t , and eacli of tho under s igned j have'en; undivided one- fourth I n t e r e s t t l o r e l n * : 
Located t h i s 21ot day of .July ,v .1936 *i* ^ -* ^ : * -^i *' •!-:* ^';. /• * 
, 1; NA!v!ES; 0F; L0GA0TRS .-/ 
Recorded July 2 1 , 1936 at* 11:30 A.;M. . 
Amelia Dlack, County Recorder f' 
Ralph V/# Morrison 
C a l l l o C. Morrison 
Ben B. Hal l 
Y/lnlfred S. Hall 
• MnrnTHT? r-~._T.OCAY.lOH 
f
 l!OTICECoFli% LOCATE 
;1:r OF* PLACEH ClAIM \\\ '•'*'. 
EH.that
 §the-undorsl^ncdl c i t i z e n s : o f i t b e . United S t a t e s , over the 
a r s , have t h i s .day(located^undor^andvlnipursuance'of' .and having* complied viith 
r - ; ' - \ * k * : I ^ V * ^ ^ "• . • • • - • • • • • • - - . 
Sect ions 2329 , 2630, 2331 of the -Rev i sed S t a t u t e s ' o f the 'Uni ted S t a t e s , and the' lavis of the 
State of Utah and the local!; lavi3' and1 customs land ! r e g u l a t i o n s ,of . t h i s d i s t r i c t , have t h i s day 
located the f o l l o w i n g descr ibed P lacer Mining Ground, s i t u a t e d i n ' t h e ' Mining 
D i s t r i c t , Millard County , S ta te 'o f : Utah, ^yi^:.-j^ j : f •:; \',v .:•*••. , : ..: .'•?.. •. 
TO V.110W IT l'u\Y C0NCEIU4: 
NOTICE I S HEREBY. CIV 
age of 21 ye 
TV.e North one- fourth o f ' the Vloati-four-fl f ths of Lot l'f c o n t a i n i n g 1 0 . 3 0 acres and 
Commencing:, a t the MYI corner or'*Lot 1 , thence Uorth 10 c h a i n s ; thence East ,113 
c h a i n s ; thence South'1G1 c h o i n o ; . thonco Most 10 cha ins t o b e g i n n i n g , conta in ing 
213.8 a c r e s , o i l * in Sect ion* 2 3 , Tovmship 21Uouth , Rang* 0 West, S a l t Lake Dnuo 
and Meridian, c o r i t a i n i n g o / t o t o l : of 39 ? 1 a c r e s . ,:• 
This c laim i s located 
3ituutcd in r . i l lard Coun 
;uponf a. va luable d e p o s i t
 f
l
.buaring (;old and other prec ious metals 
t y ^ u t a h / ! ; l ; - j ^ ^ ;,. :•:;*>.;•'';<>'-: ... { . 
This c laim s h a l l bo knoviii as* the i«od Dome, P lacer Claim Ho. 4 P lacer Mining Claim, and 
vie intend to work the sane i n accordance n i th ; l o c a l customs and r u l e s of miners in sa id mining, 
d i s t r i c t , and each of the undersigned hovo*an undivided one-ha l f i n t e r e s t t h e r e i n . 
Located t h i s 19th day of October ' 1 9 3 6 . ' j 
I'.NM&S'pF LOC/tTOIlS 
Recorded October 2 0 , 193 G at 4:50 p . w. Von Ut ley 
,»iin in« r v r.onntv hocordor Zola* IItiny 
i:'l;JMOTXCIS •' OF . ILOCATIOt l > 
. ^ : - ! : | . : y . . ' | V ^ . : . V : ; - , , i - ^ . ,«.-•;; 
OF;PL/WCKR cLAir/:^!.; 
TO V;I;OJ.: IT >'AY CONCERN? 
HOTICE 13 HERISHY GIVEN'that the vundorsigned - c i t i z e n s of lithe', United S t a t e s / ovor the age 
of 21 yuara, have th 
2329, 2330, 2331 of'.' 
Utuh and the l o c a l 1 avis 
i s duy located' under !aiid<iin*Spursuaneo -of Jand having complied with S e c t i o n s j 
the Revised, 3tatuto3|:of |:the,Unltedj S ta tes , ; ; and the :laws of the S ta to of. { 
rs aiid : ,c:istoma-and-re^ulatioiio'vof: t h i s ; d i s t r i c t , : have t h i s day loca ted I 
the fo l lowing descr ibed Placer;MiniiiG<OroundVvsi.tuutod i n i t h o , ' ' v Mining D i s t r i c t , l i l l l a r d 
County, Stato of Utah, v i z ; ; \ . conta in ing 
4 .0 Acres', being par f 'o f : the i HE£'*of the SE£ of S e c t i o n 27, a n d a l s o part of 
the W\/£ of the • SW-J o f S o c t i o n 20, Township 21 South, Hange G West, S a l t Lake 
base and !.:eridifin, more -par t i cu lar ly descr ibed 1 as f o l l o w s •• • 
Coininencln,- 3 .'chain;; vv/oi:t of the* East one Fourth* corner of Sec t ion 27, 
Twp. 21 South , llango p \ i e s t , ;and'riuuiln^'thonce'South *o chains; thence Enst 
M cha ins ; thence l:ortii. l>: chains;': thence V/est 9 chains to the point of 
beginning. 
This claim i s l oca ted upon«ar ;valuablejdoposi t f :' bearing gold and other procio 
s i tuated in Millard County,}.Utah; 
This .o.la 
we intend to 
us motnls 
lm ahul l bo known as <the ;lled;Doine ;Plaoor Claim.No. 15,' Placer Mining Claim, and 
Viork'tho .sa^lo^ln!accorcIancQ^\/lth!;local , customs! and r u l e s of miners in sa id mining-
d i s t r i c t , and each of ;the: undorsigncd,have an : :undivided.one-half i n t e r e s t t h e r e i n . . .' 
Located thia 19th day.Vor(0ctobor,.ia930; ; ; ' 
IllA^S {OF LOCATORS I:1 
Recorded October 20- 193u';r. t|;:4:150 iF.!M, 
Amelia Dlack, County Recorder/ ' 
Von Utlcy 
ZOLA UTLKY 
P. 5 00 
Tab 17 
R£D DOME PLACER MINING CLAIM 
MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH 
1) Notice of location recorded at Book 9 page 38k on June 10, '1935. 
2) Claim located May 2U, 1935. (This claim yas completely overlapped 
by Red Dame ifl and #3.) 
3) Amenoment recorded at Book 9 page 5^3 on July 20, 1936. 
*0 Legal Description 
Commencing at a point approximately one half mile 
Northeast of U.S. Geological Survey Bench mark MYrt 
1931 to Re^ Oome Placer Claim Stake No. 1; thence 
Southeasterly twenty chains to Red Dome Placer Claim 
Stake No. 2; thence Northeasterly thirty chains to 
Red Dome Placer Claim Stake No. 3; thence Northwesterly 
twenty chains to Red Dome Placer Claim Stake No. k; 
thence Southwesterly thirty chains to point of begin-
ning. The above described Claim is located in and 
is part of the South half of Section 23, and part of 
the North half of Section 2S, in Township 21 South 
Range 6 iiiest, S.L.3. I M. 
5) Owners 
Red Dome, Inc. 
SR Box 125 
Fillmore, UT 8^531 
Fillmore Products, Inc. 
Lessee
 n(uA in^s 
SR Box 125 'is *i n 
Fillmore, UT fi<*631 
...... M M microfilmed. 1 
•tf 1IC58767 
U MC 5*7 (=1 
RED DOME ill PLACER MINING CLAIM 
MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH 
1) Notice of Location recorded at Sock 11 page 449 on September 5, 
19^6. 
2) Claim located September 5, 1946 
3) Legal Description 
Lot 1; & beg. 10 chains West of the Southeast corner 
of the Northeast 1/4 running thence West 40 chains, 
thenca North 20 chains, thence East 40 chains, thenca 
South 20 chains to beg., all in Sec 26, Township 21 
South, Range 6 bleat, S.L.S. & M. 
4) Owners are 
Red Dame, Inc 
SR Sox 125 
Fillmore, UT e463I 
Fillmore Products, Inc 
Lessee 
SR Sax 125 
Fillmore, UT 8^631 
, » * • ' " * ' " * 
>Ulwd 5 8 7 o o 
TJMC Sin? 
'•J Vi \J '± J 
RED DOME U2 PLACES MINING CLAIM 
MILLARO COUNTY, UTAH 
1) Notica of Location rscorded at eook 9 page 5<»3 on July 21, 1936. 
2) Claim located an July 21, 1936. 
3) An amendment recorded at Book 9 page 5SQ on April U, 1937. 
<0 Legal Description 
The East one-fifth (1/5) of Lot 1, all of Lot 2, and 
all of Lot 3 in Section 23, Township 21 South, Range 
6 viiest, Salt Lake Base & Meridian. Lot 2, Section 26 
Township 21 South, Range 6 Idesi, Salt Laka Base Z. 
Meridian. 
5) Owners: 
Red Dome, Inc. 
SR Sox 125 
Fillmore, UT 8^631 
Fillmore Products, Inc. 
Lessee 
SR Box 125 
Fillmore, UT e<f631 
f ? £ f ST.w « "'an automated 
^ 
5S<e5 
U M wrc St^l 
L* V** O i -A-
RED DOME »2 PLACER MINING CLAIM 
MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH 
1) Notice of Laaction recorded at 8ook 9 page 544 an July 21, 1936« 
2) Claim located on July 21, 1936. 
3) An amendment recorded at Soak 9 page 580 on April 6, 1937. 
4) Legal Description 
The South three-fourths (3/4) of the West four-fifths 
(4/5) of Lot 1, in Section 23, Township 21 South, 
Range 6 blest9 Salt Lake Base I Meridian, and all of 
Lot 4 in Section 25, Township 21 South, Range 6 West, 
Salt Lake Base l Meridian. 
5) Owners: 
Red Dome, Inc. 
SR Sox 125 
Fillmore, UT 84631 
Fillmore Products, Inc. 
Lessee 
SR Sox 125 
Fillmore, UT 84631 
BLM uwjdocument 
I'"'**"* l ^ n ^ n automated! Oata 
Inas 1 
V>T$0 58T70 
RED DOME »h PLACER MINING CLAIM 
MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH 
1) Notice of Location recorded at Book 9 page 560 on October 26, 1936. 
2) Claim located on October 19, 1936. 
3) Legal Description 
The North quarter of the Uest four-fifths (V5) of 
Lot 1 and commencing at the Northwest corner of Lot 
1 and running thence North 16 chains; thence East 
18 chains; thence South 16 chains; and thence West 
18 chains; all in Section 23, Township 21 South, 
Range 6 West, Salt Lake Sase I Meridian, 
U) Owners: 
Red Dome, Inc. 
SR Sox 125 
Fillmore, UT 8<*631 
Fillmore Products, Inc. 
Lassee 
SR Sox 125 
Fillmore, UT 8<*631 
\3 • $ & 58771 
RED DOME 115 PLACES MIMING CLAIMS 
MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH 
) Notice of Location recorded at Book 9 page 560 
) Claim located on October 19, 1936. 
) Legal Description 
4.5 Acres being part of the Northeast 1/4 of the South 
east 1/4 of Section ^7, and also part of the lot 5, 
Section 26 Township 21 South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake 
Sase I Meridian and more particularly described as 
fallows: 
Commencing 3 chains lilest of the East 1/4 corner of 
Section 27, Township 21 South, Range 6 Uest, Salt 
Lake Sase I Meridian, and running thence South 5 
chains; thence East 9 chains; thence North 5 chains 
thence West 9 chains to the point of beginning. 
) Owners: 
Red Dame, Inc. 
SR Sox 125 
Fillmore, UT G4631 
Fillmore Products, Inc« 
Lessee 
SH Box 125 
Fillmore, UT 84631 
v> i& 
58772 
RED DOME #b 
MILLAR 
j£^ ^INING CLAIM 
, . - » raw 
page 2S3 an 2i 
3j.t> urt June 2B, 1939. 
--. Rescript ion 
.* .* w a of the Southwes b L U at bastion c.jf j«Mea3t !/<» or w e -u"
 q lt Lake QasB i Tin 21 South, Range o West, bai- w 
5) Owners: 
Reel Ocme, Inc.. 
SR Sox 125 
Fillmore, UT 8^631 
Fillmore Products, Inc 
Lessee 
SR Sax 125 
Fillmore, UT 8**631 
u«e sema 
RED DOME }P PLACER MINING CLAIM 
MILLARD COUNTY, UTAH 
1) Natica of Location recorded at eook 10 page 2S5 on July 1, 1938. 
2) Claim located on July 1, 1938. 
3) Legal Description 
Lot 1 and the North three-fourths (3A) of Lot 2', 
Section 27, Township 21 South, Range 6 West, Salt 
Lake Sase & Meridian. 
k) Owners: 
Red Dame, Inc. 
SR Box 125 
Fillmara, UT 8U631 
Fillmore Products, Inc. 
Lessee 
SR Sox 125 
Fillmore, UT 8<*S31 
XJ M<C 58774 
RED DOME rC'jJ DISCOVERY P U i Z H I M I M I I ;, '« i 
MILLARD CCUIMTY, UTAH 
1) Not ice of Locat ion recorded at Ekioki ] 2 page 339 an Juna Hf I'jbU, 
2) Claim located an jtjni I11 , J, 950, 
3) Legal Descr ip t ion 
Beginning at the Southeast corner of Section 22, 
Township 21 South, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base & 
Meridian and running thence We3t 80 rnds; thence 
North SO rods; thence East 30 rods; thence South 
80 rods to the point of deg. 
<0 Owner s: 
Red Dome, If iin: 
SH 3ox 125 
Fillmore, Ul BU 631 
Fillmore P r a d t i c t s, Inc.. 
Lessee 
SR Box 125 
Fillmore, UT 8U631 
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84 OCTOBER TERM, 1984 
Syllabus 471 U. S. 
UNITED STATES ET AL. V. LOCKE ET AL. 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF NEVADA 
No. 83-1394. Argued November 6, 1984—Decided April 1, 1985 
Section 314 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 
(FLPMA) establishes a federal recording system that is designed to rid 
federal lands of stale mining claims and to provide federal land man-
agers with up-to-date information that allows them to make informed 
land management decisions. Section 314(b) requires that mining claims 
located prior to FLPMA's enactment be initially recorded with the Bu-
reau of Land Management (BLM) within three years of the enactment, 
and § 314(a) requires that the claimant, in the year of initial recording 
and "prior to December 31" of every year after that, file with state 
officials and the BLM a notice of intention to hold a claim, an affidavit of 
assessment work performed on the claim, or a detailed reporting form. 
Section 314(c) provides that failure to comply with either of these re-
quirements "shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment'' 
of the claim. Appellees, who had purchased mining claims before 1976, 
complied with the initial recording requirement but failed to meet 
on time their first annual filing requirement, not filing with the BLM 
until December 31. Subsequently, the BLM notified appellees that 
their claims had been declared abandoned and void due to their tardy 
filing. After an unsuccessful administrative appeal, appellees filed an 
action in Federal District Court, alleging that § 314(c) effected an uncon-
stitutional taking of their property without just compensation and denied 
them due process. The District Court issued summary judgment in 
appellees' fkvor, holding that § 314(c) created an impermissible irrebutta-
ble presumption that claimants who fail to make a timely filing intended 
to abandon their claims. Alternatively, the court held that the 1-day 
late filing "substantially complied" with § 314(a) and the implementing 
regulations. 
Held: 
1. Section 314(a)'s plain language—"prior to December 31"—read in 
conjunction with BLM regulations makes clear that the annual filings 
must be made on or before December 30. Thus, the BLM did not act 
ultra vires in concluding that appellees' filing was untimely. Pp. 93-96. 
2. Congress intended in § 314(c) to extinguish those claims for which 
timely filings were not made. Specific evidence of intent to abandon is 
made irrelevant by § 314(c); the failure to file on time, in and of itself, 
causes a claim to be lost. Pp. 97-100. 
UNITED STATES v. LOCKE 85 
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3. The annual filing deadline cannot be complied with, substantially or 
otherwise, by filing late—even by one day. Pp. 100-102. 
4. Section 314(c) is not unconstitutional. Pp. 103-110. 
(a) Congress was well within its affirmative powers in enacting the 
filing requirement, in imposing the penalty of extinguishment in § 314(c), 
and in applying the requirement and sanction to claims located before 
FLPMA was enacted. Pp. 104-107. 
(b) Appellees' property loss was one they could have avoided with 
minimal burden; it was their failure to file on time, not Congress' action, 
that caused their property rights to be extinguished. Regulation of 
property rights does not "take" private property when an individual's 
reasonable, investment-backed expectations can continue to be realized 
as long as he complies with reasonable regulations. Pp. 107-108. 
(c) FLPMA provides appellees with all the process that is their 
constitutional due. The Act's recording provisions clearly afford those 
within the Act's reach a reasonable opportunity both to familiarize them-
selves with the general requirements imposed and to comply with those 
requirements. As the Act constitutes purely economic regulation, 
Congress was entitled to conclude that it was preferable to place a 
substantial portion of the burden on claimants to make the national 
recording system work. Pp. 108-110. 
573 F. Supp. 472, reversed and remanded. 
MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, 
C. J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. 
O'CONNOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 110. POWELL, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion, post, p. 112. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, 
in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 117. 
Carolyn F. Corurin argued the cause for appellants. With 
her on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attor-
ney General Habicht, Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne, 
David C. Shilton, and Arthur E. Gowran. 
Harold A. Swafford argued the cause for appellees. With 
him on the brief was John W. Hoffman.* 
*Laurens H. Silver and John Leshy filed a brief for the Sierra Club 
as amicus curiae urging reversal 
Briefs of amid curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of 
Nevada by Brian McKay, Attorney General, and James C. Smith, Deputy 
Attorney General; for the Alaska Miners Association et al. by Ranald A. 
Zumbrun and Robin L. Rivett; for the Colorado Mining Association by 
86 OCTOBER TERM, 1984 
Opinion of the Court 471 U. S. 
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The primary question presented by this appeal is whether 
the Constitution prevents Congress from providing that hold-
ers of unpatented mining claims who fail to comply with the 
annual filing requirements of the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43 U. S. C. § 1744, shall 
forfeit their claims, 
I 
From the enactment of the general mining laws in the 19th 
century until 1976, those who sought to make their living by 
locating and developing minerals on federal lands were virtu-
ally unconstrained by the fetters of federal control The 
general mining laws, 30 U. S. C. §22 et seq., still in effect 
today, allow United States citizens to go onto unappropri-
ated, unreserved public land to prospect for and develop cer-
tain minerals. "Discovery" of a mineral deposit, followed by 
the minimal procedures required to formally "locate" the de-
posit, gives an individual the right of exclusive possession of 
the land for mining purposes, 30 U. S. C. § 26; as long as $100 
of assessment work is performed annually, the individual 
may continue to extract and sell minerals from the claim 
without paying any royalty to the United States, 30 U. S. C. 
§ 28. For a nominal sum, and after certain statutory con-
ditions are fulfilled, an individual may patent the claim, 
thereby purchasing from the Federal Government the land 
and minerals and obtaining ultimate title to them. Patent-
ing, however, is not required, and an unpatented mining 
claim remains a fully recognized possessory interest. Best 
v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U. S. 334, 335 (1963). 
By the 1960's, it had become clear that this 19th-century 
laissez-faire regime had created virtual chaos with respect to 
the public lands. In 1975, it was estimated that more than 
Randy L. Parcel; for Mobil Oil Corp. by Stephen D. Alfers and William A. 
Hillhou8e II; and for the Mountain States Legal Foundation by K. Preston 
Oade, Jr. 
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6 million unpatented mining claims existed on public lands 
other than the national forests; in addition, more than half 
the land in the National Forest System was thought to be 
covered by such claims. S. Rep. No. 94-583, p. 65 (1975). 
Many of these claims had been dormant for decades, and 
many were invalid for other reasons, but in the absence of a 
federal recording system, no simple way existed for deter-
mining which public lands were subject to mining locations, 
and whether those locations were valid or invalid. Ibid. As 
a result, federal land managers had to proceed slowly and 
cautiously in taking any action affecting federal land lest the 
federal property rights of claimants be unlawfully disturbed. 
Each time the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) proposed 
a sale or other conveyance of federal land, a title search in 
the county recorder's office was necessary; if an outstanding 
mining claim was found, no matter how stale or apparently 
abandoned, formal administrative adjudication was required 
to determine the validity of the claim.1 
After more than a decade of studying this problem in 
the context of a broader inquiry into the proper manage-
ment of the public lands in the modern era, Congress in 
1976 enacted FLPMA, Pub. L. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (codi-
fied at 43 U. S. C. § 1701 et seq.). Section 314 of the 
Act establishes a federal recording system that is designed 
both to rid federal lands of stale mining claims and to 
provide federal land managers with up-to-date informa-
tion that allows them to make informed land management 
decisions.2 For claims located before FLPMA's enact-
1See generally Strauss, Mining Claims on Public Lands: A Study of 
Interior Department Procedures, 1974 Utah L. Rev. 185, 193, 215-219. 
'The text of 43 U. S. C. § 1744 provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
"Recordation of Mining Claims 
"(a) Filing requirements 
"The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim located prior to 
October 21, 1976, shall, within the three-year period following October 21, 
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ment,3 the federal recording system imposes two general 
requirements- First, the claims must initially be registered 
with the BLM by filing, within three years of FLPMA's 
enactment, a copy of the official record of the notice or cer-
1976 and prior to December 31 of each year thereafter, file the instruments 
required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection. . . . 
"(1) File for record in the office where the location notice or certificate is 
recorded either a notice of intention to hold the mining claim (including but 
not limited to such notices as are provided by law to be filed when there has 
been a suspension or deferment of annual assessment work), an affidavit 
of assessment work performed thereon, on a detailed report provided by 
section 28-1 of title 30, relating thereto. 
"(2) File in the office of the Bureau designated by the Secretary a copy 
of the official record of the instrument filed or recorded pursuant to para-
graph (1) of this subsection, including a description of the location of the 
mining claim sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground. 
u(b) Additional filing requirements 
"The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim or mill or tunnel 
site located prior to October 21, 1976 shall, within the three-year period 
following October 21, 1976, file in the office of the Bureau designated by 
the Secretary a copy of the official record of the notice of location or certifi-
cate of location, including a description of the location of the mining claim 
or mill or tunnel site sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground. 
The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim or mill or tunnel 
site located after October 21, 1976 shall, within ninety days after the date 
of location of such claim, file in the office of the Bureau designated by the 
Secretary a copy of the official record of the notice of location or certificate 
of location, including a description of the location of the mining claim or mill 
or tunnel site sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground. 
a(c) Failure to file as constituting abandonment; defective or untimely 
filing 
"The failure to file such instruments as required by subsections (a) and 
(b) of this subsection shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an aban-
donment of the mining claim or mill or tunnel site by the owner; but it shall 
not be considered a failure to file if the instrument is defective or not timely 
filed for record under other Federal laws permitting filing or recording 
thereof, or if the instrument is filed for record by or on behalf of some but 
not all of the owners of the mining claim or mill or tunnel site." 
SA somewhat different scheme applies to claims located after October 
21, 1976, the date the Act took effect. 
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tificate of location* 90 Stat. 2743, § 314(b), 43 U. S. C. 
§ 1744(b). Second, in the year of the initial recording, and 
"prior to December 31" of every year after that, the claimant 
must file with state officials and with BLM a notice of inten-
tion to hold the claim, an affidavit of assessment work per-
formed on the claim, or a detailed reporting form. 90 Stat. 
2743, § 314(a), 43 U. S. C. § 1744(a). Section 314(c) of the 
Act provides that failure to comply with either of these 
requirements "shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an 
abandonment of the mining claim . . . by the owner." 43 
U. S. C. § 1744(c). 
The second of these requirements—the annual filing ob-
ligation—has created the dispute underlying this appeal. 
Appellees, four individuals engaged "in the business of op-
erating mining properties in Nevada,"4 purchased in 1960 and 
1966 10 unpatented mining claims on public lands near Ely, 
Nevada. These claims were major sources of gravel and 
building material: the claims are valued at several million 
dollars,5 and, in the 1979-1980 assessment year alone, appel-
lees' gross income totaled more than $1 million.6 Through-
out the period during which they owned the claims, appellees 
complied with annual state-law filing and assessment work 
requirements. In addition, appellees satisfied FLPMA's 
initial recording requirement by properly filing with BLM a 
notice of location, thereby putting their claims on record 
for purposes of FLPMA. 
At the end of 1980, however, appellees failed to meet on 
time their first annual obligation to file with the Federal Gov-
ernment. After allegedly receiving misleading information 
from a BLM employee,7 appellees waited until December 31 
4
 Complaint 12. 
'Id., 115. 
•573 F. Supp. 472, 474 (1983). From 1960 to 1980, total gross income 
from the claims exceeded $4 million. Ibid. 
7
 An affidavit submitted to the District Court by one of appellees' 
employees stated that BLM officials in Ely had told the employee that the 
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to submit to BLM the annual notice of intent to hold or proof 
of assessment work performed required under § 314(a) of 
FLPMA, 43 U. S. C. § 1744(a), As noted above, that sec-
tion requires these documents to be filed annually "prior to 
December 31.* Had appellees checked, they further would 
have discovered that BLM regulations made quite clear that 
claimants were required to make the annual filings in the 
proper BLM office "on or before December 30 of each calen-
dar year." 43 CFR §3833.2-l(a) (1980) (current version at 
43 CFR §3833.2-l(b)(l) (1984)). Thus, appellees' filing was 
one day too late. 
This fact was brought painfully home to appellees when 
they received a letter from the BLM Nevada State Office in-
forming them that their claims had been declared abandoned 
and void due to their tardy filing. In many cases, loss of a 
claim in this way would have minimal practical effect; the 
filing could be made at the BLM Reno office "on or before December 31, 
1980." Affidavit of Laura C. Locke 13. The 1978 version of a BLM ques-
tion and answer pamphlet erroneously stated that the annual filings had to 
be made "on or before December 31* of each year. Staking a Mining 
Claim on Federal Lands 9-10 (1978). Later versions have corrected this 
error to bring the pamphlet into accord with the BLM regulations that 
require the filings to be made "on or before December 30." 
JUSTICE STEVENS and JUSTICE POWELL seek to make much of this 
pamphlet and of the uncontroverted evidence that appellees were told a 
December 31 filing would comply with the statute. See post, at 117, 122, 
128. However, at the time appellees filed in 1980, BLM regulations and 
the then-current pamphlets made clear that the filing was required "on or 
before December 30." Thus, the dissenters' reliance on this pamphlet 
would seem better directed to the claim that the United States was equita-
bly estopped from forfeiting appellees' claims, given the advice of the BLM 
agent and the objective basis the 1978 pamphlet provides for crediting the 
claim that such advice was given. The District Court did not consider this 
estoppel claim. Without expressing any view as to whether, as a matter 
of law, appellees could prevail on such a theory, see Heckler v. Community 
Health Services of Crawford County, Inc., 467 U. S. 51 (1984), we leave 
any further treatment of this issue, including fuller development of the 
record, to the District Court on remand. 
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claimant could simply locate the same claim again and then 
rerecord it with BLM. In this case, however, relocation of 
appellees' claims, which were initially located by appellees' 
predecessors in 1952 and 1954, was prohibited by the Com-
mon Varieties Act of 1955, 30 U. S. C. §611; that Act pro-
spectively barred location of the sort of minerals yielded by 
appellees' claims. Appellees' mineral deposits thus es-
cheated to the Government. 
After losing an administrative appeal, appellees filed the 
present action in the United States District Court for the 
District of Nevada. Their complaint alleged, inter alia, 
that § 314(c) effected an unconstitutional taking of their prop-
erty without just compensation and denied them due process. 
On summary judgment, the District Court held that § 314(c) 
did indeed deprive appellees of the process to which they 
were constitutionally due. 573 F. Supp. 472 (1983). The 
District Court reasoned that § 314(c) created an impermissi-
ble irrebuttable presumption that claimants who failed to 
make a timely filing intended to abandon their claims. 
Rather than relying on this presumption, the Government 
was obliged, in the District Court's view, to provide individ-
ualized notice to claimants that their claims were in danger of 
being lost, followed by a post-filing-deadline hearing at which 
the claimants could demonstrate that they had not, in fact, 
abandoned a claim. Alternatively, the District Court held 
that the 1-day late filing "substantially complied" with the 
Act and regulations. 
Because a District Court had held an Act of Congress un-
constitutional in a civil suit to which the United States was 
a party, we noted probable jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1252. 467 U. S. 1225 (1984).8 We now reverse. 
'That the District Court decided the case on both constitutional and 
statutory grounds does not affect this Court's obligation under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1252 to take jurisdiction over the case; as long as the unconstitutionality 
of an Act of Congress is one of the grounds of decision below in a civil suit 
92 OCTOBER TERM, 1984 
Opinion of the Court 471 U. S. 
II 
Appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1252 brings before this Court 
not merely the constitutional question decided below, but the 
entire case. McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U. S. 21, 31 
(1975); United States v. Raines, 362 U- S. 17, 27, n. 7 (1960). 
The entire case includes nonconstitutional questions actually 
decided by the lower court as well as nonconstitutional 
grounds presented to, but not passed on, by the lower court. 
United States v. Clark, 445 U. S. 23, 27-28 (1980).9 These 
principles are important aids in the prudential exercise of our 
appellate jurisdiction, for when a case arrives here by appeal 
under 28 U. S. C. § 1252, this Court will not pass on the con-
stitutionality of an Act of Congress if a construction of the 
Act is fairly possible, or some other nonconstitutional ground 
fairly available, by which the constitutional question can be 
avoided. See Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U. S. 728, 741-744 
(1984); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 366-367 (1974); 
cf. United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 
335 U. S. 106, 110 (1948) (appeals under former Criminal 
Appeals Act); see generally Ashwander v. TVA} 297 U. S. 
288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Thus, we turn 
first to the nonconstitutional questions pressed below. 
to which the United States is a party, appeal lies directly to this Court. 
United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U. S. 533, 541 (1939). 
Another District Court in the West similarly has declared § 314(c) uncon-
stitutional with respect to invalidation of claims based on failure to meet 
the initial recordation requirements of § 314(a) in timely fashion. Rogers 
v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 4 (Mont. 1982). 
•When the nonconstitutional questions have not been passed on by the 
lower court, we may vacate the decision below and remand with instruc-
tions that those questions be decided, see Youakim v. Miller, 425 U. S. 
231 (1976), or we may choose to decide those questions ourselves without 
benefit of lower court analysis, see United States v. Clark. The choice 
between these options depends on the extent to which lower court 
factfinding and analysis of the nonconstitutional questions will be necessary 
or useful to our disposition of those questions. 
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A 
Before the District Court, appellees asserted that the 
§ 314(a) requirement of a filing "prior to December 31 of each 
year" should be construed to require a filing "on or before 
December 3L" Thus, appellees argued, their December 31 
filing had in fact complied with the statute, and the BLM 
had acted ultra vires in voiding their claims. 
Although the District Court did not address this argument, 
the argument raises a question sufficiently legal in nature 
that we choose to address it even in the absence of lower 
court analysis. See, e. g., United States v. Clark, supra. 
It is clear to us that the plain language of the statute simply 
cannot sustain the gloss appellees would put on it. As even 
counsel for appellees conceded at oral argument, § 314(a) 'Is a 
statement that Congress wanted it filed by December 30th. 
I think that is a clear statement. . . ." Tr. of Oral Arg. 27; 
see also id., at 37 ("A literal reading of the statute would 
require a December 30th filing . . ."). While we will not 
allow a literal reading of a statute to produce a result 
"demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters," 
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U. S. 564, 571 
(1982), with respect to filing deadlines a literal reading of 
Congress' words is generally the only proper reading of those 
words. To attempt to decide whether some date other than 
the one set out in the statute is the date actually "intended" 
by Congress is to set sail on an aimless journey, for the 
purpose of a filing deadline would be just as well served by 
nearly any date a court might choose as by the date Congress 
has in fact set out in the statute. "Actual purpose is 
sometimes unknown," United Slates Railroad Retirement 
Board v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 180 (1980) (STEVENS, J., 
concurring), and such is the case with filing deadlines; 
as might be expected, nothing in the legislative history sug-
gests why Congress chose December 30 over December 31, 
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or over September 1 (the end of the assessment year for 
mining claims, 30 U. S. C. §28), as the last day on which 
the required filings could be made. But "[deadlines are 
inherently arbitrary,,, while fixed dates "are often essential 
to accomplish necessary results." United States v. Boyle, 
469 U. S. 241, 249 (1984). Faced with the inherent arbi-
trariness of filing deadlines, we must, at least in a civil case, 
apply by its terms the date fixed by the statute. Cf. United 
States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, supra, at 179.l0 
Moreover, BLM regulations have made absolutely clear 
since the enactment of FLPMA that "prior to December 31" 
means what it says. As the current version of the filing 
regulations states: 
"The owner of an unpatented mining claim located on 
Federal lands . . . shall have filed or caused to have been 
filed on or before December 30 of each calendar year . . . 
evidence of annual assessment work performed during 
the previous assessment year or a notice of intention to 
hold the mining claim." 43 CFR §3833.2-l(b)(l) (1984) 
(emphasis added). 
See also 43 CFR § 3833.2-l(a) (1982) (same); 43 CFR § 3833.2-
1(a) (1981) (same); 43 CFR §3833.2-l(a) (1980) (same); 43 
CFR §3833.2-l(a) (1979) (same); 43 CFR §3833.2-l(a)(l) 
(1978) ("prior to" Dec. 31); 43 CFR § 3833.2-l(a)(l) (1977) 
("prior to" Dec. 31). Leading mining treatises similarly 
* Statutory filing deadlines are generally subject to the defenses of 
waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. See Zipes v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 392-398 (1982). Whether this general principle 
applies to deadlines that run in favor of the Government is a question on 
which we express no opinion today. In addition, no showing has been 
made that appellees were in any way "unable to exercise the usual care and 
diligence" that would have allowed them to meet the filing deadline or to 
learn of its existence. See United States v. Boyle, 469 U. S. 241, 253 
(1985) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). Of course, at issue in Boyle was an ex-
plicit provision in the Internal Revenue Code that provided a reasonable-
cause exception to the Code's filing deadlines, while FLPMA contains no 
analogous provision. 
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inform claimants that "[i]t is important to note that the filing 
of a notice of intention or evidence of assessment work must 
be done prior to December 31 of each year, i. e., on or before 
December 30." 2 American Law of Mining § 7.23D, p. 150,2 
(Supp. 1983) (emphasis in original); see also 23 Rocky Moun-
tain Mineral Law Institute 25 (1977) (same). If appellees, 
who were businessmen involved in the running of a major 
mining operation for more than 20 years, had any questions 
about whether a December 31 filing complied with the stat-
ute, it was incumbent upon them, as it is upon other business-
men, see United States v. Boyle, supra, to have checked the 
regulations or to have consulted an attorney for legal advice. 
Pursuit of either of these courses, rather than the submission 
of a last-minute filing, would surely have led appellees to the 
conclusion that December 30 was the last day on which they 
could file safely. 
In so saying, we are not insensitive to the problems posed 
by congressional reliance on the words "prior to December 
31." See post, p. 117 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). But the 
fact that Congress might have acted with greater clarity or 
foresight does not give courts a carte blanche to redraft stat-
utes in an effort to achieve that which Congress is-perceived 
to have failed to do. "There is a basic difference between 
filling a gap left by Congress* silence and rewriting rules that 
Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted." Mobil 
Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U. S. 618, 625 (1978). Nor 
is the Judiciary licensed to attempt to soften the clear import 
of Congress' chosen words whenever a court believes those 
words lead to a harsh result. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. 
v. Transport Wvrkers, 451 U. S. 77, 98 (1981). On the con-
trary, deference to the supremacy of the Legislature, as well 
as recognition that Congressmen typically vote on the lan-
guage of a bill, generally requires us to assume that "the 
legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of 
the words used." Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1, 9 
(1962). "Going behind the plain language of a statute in 
search of a possibly contrary congressional intent is 'a step to 
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be taken cautiously' even under the best of circumstances." 
American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S. 63, 75 (1982) 
(quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U. S. 1, 
26 (1977)). When even after taking this step nothing in the 
legislative history remotely suggests a congressional intent 
contrary to Congress' chosen words, and neither appellees 
nor the dissenters have pointed to anything that so suggests, 
any further steps take the courts out of the realm of inter-
pretation and place them in the domain of legislation. The 
phrase "prior to" may be clumsy, but its meaning is clear.11 
Under these circumstances, we are obligated to apply the 
"prior to December 31" language by its terms. See, e. g., 
American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, supra, at 68; Consumer 
Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 
102, 108 (1980). 
The agency's regulations clarify and confirm the import 
of the statutory language by making clear that the annual 
filings must be made on or before December 30. These regu-
lations provide a conclusive answer to appellees' claim, for 
where the language of a filing deadline is plain and the agen-
cy's construction completely consistent with that language, 
the agency's construction simply cannot be found ^sufficiently 
unreasonable" as to be unacceptable. FEC v. Democratic 
Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U. S. 27, 39 (1981). 
We cannot press statutory construction "to the point of dis-
ingenuous evasion" even to avoid a constitutional question. 
Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373, 379 (1933) 
(Cardozo, J.).12 We therefore hold that BLM did not act 
ultra vires in concluding that appellees' filing was untimely. 
11
 Legislative drafting books are filled with suggestions that the phrase 
"prior to" be replaced with the word "before," see, e. g., R. Dickerson, 
Materials on Legal Drafting 293 (1981), but we have seen no suggestion 
that "prior to" be replaced with "on or before"—a phrase with obviously 
different substantive content. 
* We note that the United States Code is sprinkled with provisions that 
require action "prior to" some date, including at least 14 provisions that 
contemplate action "prior to December 31." See 7 U. S. C. § 609(b)(5); 12 
U. S. C. § 1709(o)(l)(E); 12 U. S. C. § 1823(g); 12 U. S. C. § 1841(a)(5)(A); 
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Section 314(c) states that failure to comply with the filing 
requirements of §§ 314(a) and 314(b) "shall be deemed conclu-
sively to constitute an abandonment of the mining claim." 
We must next consider whether this provision expresses a 
congressional intent to extinguish all claims for which filings 
have not been made, or only those claims for which filings 
have not been made and for which the claimants have a 
specific intent to abandon the claim. The District Court 
adopted the latter interpretation, and on that basis concluded 
that § 314(c) created a constitutionally impermissible irrebut-
table presumption of abandonment. The District Court rea-
soned that, once Congress had chosen to make loss of a claim 
turn on the specific intent of the claimant, a prior hearing 
and findings on the claimant's intent were constitutionally 
required before the claim of a nonfiling claimant could be 
extinguished. 
In concluding that Congress was concerned with the spe-
cific intent of the claimant even when the claimant had failed 
22 U. S. a § 3784(c); 26 U. S. C. § 503(d)(1); 33 U. S. C. § 1319(a)(5)(B); 
42 U. S. C. §415(a)(7)(E)(ii) (1982 ed., Supp. Ill); 42 U. S. C. §1962(d>-
17(b); 42 U. S. C. § 5614(b)(5); 42 U. S. C. § 7502(a)(2); 42 U. S. C. § 7521 
(b)(2); 43 U. S. C. § 1744(a); 50 U. S. C. App. § 1741(b)(1). Dozens of state 
statutes and local ordinances undoubtedly incorporate similar "prior to 
December 31" deadlines. In addition, legislatures know how to make ex-
plicit an intent to allow action on December 31 when they employ a December 
31 date in a statute. See, e.g., 7 U. S. C. § 609(b)(2); 22 U. S. C. §§ 3303 
(b)(3)(B) and (c); 43 U. S. C. § 256a. 
It is unclear whether the arguments advanced by the dissenters are 
meant to apply to all of these provisions, or only to some of them; if the 
latter, we are given little guidance as to how a court is to go about the 
rather eclectic task of choosing which "prior to December 31" deadlines 
it can interpret "flexibly." Understandably enough, the dissenters seek 
to disavow any intent to call all these "prior to December 31" deadlines 
into question and assure us that this is a "unique case," post, at 117, n. 4 
(POWELL, J., dissenting), involving a "unique factual matrix,** post, at 
128 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). The only thing we can find unique about 
this particular December 31 deadline is that the dissenters are willing 
to go through such tortured reasoning to evade it. 
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to make the required filings, the District Court began from 
the fact that neither § 314(c) nor the Act itself defines the 
term "abandonment" as that term appears in § 314(c). The 
District Court then noted correctly that the common law of 
mining traditionally has drawn a distinction between "aban-
donment" of a claim, which occurs only upon a showing of the 
claimant's intent to relinquish the claim, and "forfeiture" of a 
claim, for which only noncompliance with the requirements of 
law must be shown. See, e. g.,2 American Law of Mining 
§8.2, pp. 195-196 (1983) (relied upon by the District Court). 
Given that Congress had not expressly stated in the statute 
any intent to depart from the term-of-art meaning of "aban-
donment" at common law, the District Court concluded that 
§ 314(c) was intended to incorporate the traditional common-
law distinction between abandonment and forfeiture. Thus, 
reasoned the District Court, Congress did not intend to cause 
a forfeiture of claims for which the required filings had not 
been made, but rather to focus on the claimant's actual in-
tent. As a corollary, the District Court understood the fail-
ure to file to have been intended to be merely one piece of 
evidence in a factual inquiry into whether a claimant had a 
specific intent to abandon his property. 
This construction of the statutory scheme cannot withstand 
analysis. While reference to common-law conceptions is 
often a helpful guide to interpreting open-ended or undefined 
statutory terms, see, e. g., NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 
U. S. 322, 329 (1981); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 
U. S. 1, 59 (1911), this principle is a guide to legislative 
intent, not a talisman of it, and the principle is not to be 
applied in defiance of a statute's overriding purposes and 
logic. Although § 314(c) is couched in terms of a conclusive 
presumption of "abandonment," there can be little doubt that 
Congress intended § 314(c) to cause a forfeiture of all claims 
for which the filing requirements of §§ 314(a) and 314(b) had 
not been met. 
To begin with, the Senate version of § 314(c) provided that 
any claim not properly recorded "shall be conclusively pre-
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sumed to be abandoned and shall be void." S. 507, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess., §311 (1975).13 The Committee Report 
accompanying S. 507 repeatedly indicated that failure to 
comply with the filing requirements would make a claim 
"void." See S. Rep. No. 94-583, pp. 65, 66 (1975). The 
House legislation and Reports merely repeat the statutory 
language without offering any explanation of it, but it is 
clear from the Conference Committee Report that the undis-
puted intent of the Senate—to make "void" those claims for 
which proper filings were not timely made—was the intent of 
both Chambers. The Report stated: "Both the Senate bill 
and House amendments provided for recordation of mining 
claims and for extinguishment of abandoned claims." H. R. 
Rep. No. 94-1724, p. 62 (1976) (emphasis added). 
In addition, the District Court's construction fails to give 
effect to the "deemed conclusively" language of § 314(c). If 
the failure to file merely shifts the burden to the claimant to 
prove that he intends to keep the claim, nothing "conclusive" 
is achieved by § 314(c). The District Court sought to avoid 
this conclusion by holding that § 314(c) does extinguish 
automatically those claims for which initial recordings, as 
opposed to annual filings, have not been made; the District 
Court attempted to justify its distinction between initial 
recordings and annual filings on the ground that the domi-
nant purpose of § 314(c) was to avoid forcing BLM to the 
"awesome task of searching every local title record" to estab-
lish initially a federal recording system. 573 F. Supp., at 
477. Once this purpose had been satisfied by an initial re-
cording, the primary purposes of the "deemed conclusively" 
language, in the District Court's view, had been met. But 
the clear language of § 314(c) admits of no distinction between 
u
 The Senate bill required only initial recordings, not annual filings, but 
this factor is not significant in light of the actions of the Conference Com-
mittee; the clear structure of the Senate bill was to impose the sanction of 
claim extinguishment on those who failed to make whatever filings federal 
law required. 
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initial recordings and annual filings: failure to do either "shall 
be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment." 
And the District Court's analysis of the purposes of § 314(c) 
is also misguided, for the annual filing requirements serve a 
purpose similar to that of the initial recording requirement; 
millions of claims undoubtedly have now been recorded, and 
the presence of an annual filing obligation allows BLM to 
keep the system established in §314 up to date on a yearly 
basis. To put the burden on BLM to keep this system cur-
rent through its own inquiry into the status of recorded 
claims would lead to a situation similar to that which led 
Congress initially to make the federal recording system self-
executing. The purposes of a self-executing recording sys-
tem are implicated similarly, if somewhat less substantially, 
by both the annual filing obligation and the initial recording 
requirement, and the District Court was not empowered to 
thwart these purposes or the clear language of § 314(c) by 
concluding that § 314(c) was actually concerned with only 
initial recordings. 
For these reasons, we find that Congress intended in 
§ 314(c) to extinguish those claims for which timely filings 
were not made. Specific evidence of intent to abandon is 
simply made irrelevant by § 314(c); the failure to file on time, 
in and of itself, causes a claim to be lost. See Western 
Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F. 2d 618, 628 (CA9 1981). 
C 
A final statutory question must be resolved before we turn 
to the constitutional holding of the District Court. Relying 
primarily on Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp., 400 U. S. 48 (1970), 
the District Court held that, even if the statute required a 
filing on or before December 30, appellees had "substantially 
complied" by filing on December 31. We cannot accept this 
view of the statute. 
The notion that a filing deadline can be complied with by 
filing sometime after the deadline falls due is, to say the 
UNITED STATES v. LOCKE 101 
84 Opinion of the Court 
least, a surprising notion, and it is a notion without limiting 
principle. If 1-day late filings are acceptable, 10-day late 
filings might be equally acceptable, and so on in a cascade of 
exceptions that would engulf the rule erected by the filing 
deadline; yet regardless of where the eutoff line is set, some 
individuals will always fall just on the other side of it. Filing 
deadlines, like statutes of limitations, necessarily operate 
harshly and arbitrarily with respect to individuals who fall 
just on the other side of them, but if the concept of a filing 
deadline is to have any content, the deadline must be en-
forced. "Any less rigid standard would risk encouraging 
a lax attitude toward filing dates," United States v. Boyle, 
469 U. S., at 249. A filing deadline cannot be complied 
with, substantially or otherwise, by filing late—even by one 
day. Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp., supra, does not support a 
contrary conclusion. Hickel suggested, although it did not 
hold, that failure to meet the annual assessment work re-
quirements of the general mining laws, 30 U. S. C. §28, 
which require that "not less than $100 worth of labor shall 
be performed or improvements made during each year," 
would not render a claim automatically void. Instead, if 
an individual complied substantially but not fully with the 
requirement, he might under some circumstances be able to 
retain possession of his claim. 
These suggestions in Hickel do not afford a safe haven to 
mine owners who fail to meet their filing obligations under 
any federal mining law. Failure to comply fully with the 
physical requirement that a certain amount of work be per-
formed each year is significantly different from the complete 
failure to file on time documents that federal law commands 
be filed. In addition, the general mining laws at issue in 
Hickel do not clearly provide that a claim will be lost for fail-
ure to meet the assessment work requirements. Thus, it 
was open to the Court to conclude in Hickel that Congress 
had intended to make the asbessment work requirement 
merely an indicium of a claimant's specific intent to retain a 
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claim. Full compliance with the assessment work require-
ments would establish conclusively an intent to keep the 
claim, but less than full compliance would not by force of law 
operate to deprive the claimant of his claim. Instead, less 
than full compliance would subject the mine owner to a case-
by-case determination of whether he nonetheless intended to 
keep his claim. See Hickel, supra, at 56-57. 
In this case, the statute explicitly provides that failure to 
comply with the applicable filing requirements leads auto-
matically to loss of the claim. See Part II-B, supra. Thus, 
Congress has made it unnecessary to ascertain whether the 
individual in fact intends to abandon the claim, and there is 
no room to inquire whether substantial compliance is indica-
tive of the claimant's intent—intent is simply irrelevant if the 
required filings are not made. Hickel's discussion of sub-
stantial compliance is therefore inapposite to the statutory 
scheme at issue here. As a result, Hickel gives miners no 
greater latitude with filing deadlines than other individuals 
have.14 
"Since 1982, BLM regulations have provided that filings due on or 
before December 30 will be considered timely if postmarked on or before 
December 30 and received by BLM by the close of business on the follow-
ing January 19. 43CFR§3833.0-5(m)(1983). Appellees and the dissent-
ers attempt to transform this regulation into a blank check generally au-
thorizing "substantial compliance" with the filing requirements. We 
disagree for two reasons. First, the regulation was not in effect when 
appellees filed in 1980; it therefore cannot now be relied on to validate a 
purported "substantial compliance" in 1980. Second, that an agency has 
decided to take account of holiday mail delays by treating as timely filed a 
document postmarked on the statutory filing date does not require the 
agency to accept all documents hand-delivered any time before January 19. 
The agency rationally could decide that either of the options in this sort of 
situation—requiring mailings to be received by the same date that hand-
deliveries must be made or requiring mailings to be postmarked by that 
date—is a sound way of administering the statute. 
JUSTICE STEVENS further suggests that BLM would have been well 
within its authority to promulgate regulations construing the statute to 
allow for December 31 filings. Assuming the correctness of this sugges-
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IV 
Much of the District Court's constitutional discussion nec-
essarily falls with our conclusion that § 314(c) automatically 
deems forfeited those claims for which the required filings 
are not timely made. The District Court's invalidation of the 
statute rested heavily on the view that § 314(c) creates an 
"irrebuttable presumption that mining claims are abandoned 
if the miner fails to timely file" the required documents—that 
the statute presumes a failure to file to signify a specific 
intent to abandon the claim. But, as we have just held, 
§ 314(c) presumes nothing about a claimant's actual intent; 
the statute simply and conclusively deems such claims to be 
forfeited. As a forfeiture provision, § 314(c) is not subject to 
the individualized hearing requirement of such irrebuttable 
presumption cases as Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441 (1973), 
or Cleveland Bd. of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632 
(1974), for there is nothing to suggest that, in enacting 
§ 314(c), Congress was in any way concerned with whether a 
particular claimant's tardy filing or failure to file indicated an 
actual intent to abandon the claim. 
There are suggestions in the District Court's opinion that, 
even understood as a forfeiture provision, § 314(c) might be 
unconstitutional. We therefore go on to consider whether 
automatic forfeiture of a claim for failure to make annual 
filings is constitutionally permissible. The framework for 
analysis of this question, in both its substantive and pro-
cedural dimensions, is set forth by our recent decision in 
Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U. S. 516 (1982). There we 
upheld a state statute pursuant to which a severed mineral 
interest that had not been used for a period of 20 years auto-
matically lapsed and reverted to the current surface owner of 
the property, unless the mineral owner filed a statement of 
tion, the fact that two interpretations of a statute are equally reasonable 
suggests to us that the agency's interpretation is sufficiently reasonable as 
to be acceptable. See FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Commit-
tee, 454 U. S. 27, 39 (1981). 
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claim in the county recorder's office within 2 years of the 
statute's passage. 
A 
Under Texaco, we must first address the question of 
affirmative legislative power whether Congress is author-
ized to "provide that property rights of this character shall 
be extinguished if their owners do not take the affirmative 
action required by the" statute. Id., at 525. Even with 
respect to vested property rights, a legislature generally has 
the power to impose new regulatory constraints on the way 
in which those rights are used, or to condition their continued 
retention on performance of certain affirmative duties. As 
long as the constraint or duty imposed is a reasonable restric-
tion designed to further legitimate legislative objectives, the 
legislature acts within its powers in imposing such new con-
straints or duties. See, e. g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty, Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926); Turner v. New York, 168 
U. S. 90, 94 (1897); Vance v. Vance, 108 U. S. 514, 517 
(1883); Terry v. Andersen, 95 U. S. 628 (1877). "[Legis-
lation readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful solely 
because it upsets otherwise settled expectations." Usery v. 
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1, 16 (1976) (citations 
omitted). 
This power to qualify existing property rights is particu-
larly broad with respect to the "character" of the property 
rights at issue here. Although owners of unpatented mining 
claims hold fully recognized possessory interests in their 
claims, see Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U. S. 
334, 335 (1963), we have recognized that these interests are a 
"unique form of property." Ibid. The United States, as 
owner of the underlying fee title to the public domain, main-
tains broad powers over the terms and conditions upon which 
the public lands can be used, leased, and acquired. See, 
e. g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U. S. 529, 539 (1976). 
"A mining location which has not gone to patent is of no 
higher quality and no more immune from attack and in-
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vestigation than are unpatented claims under the home-
stead and kindred laws. If valid, it gives to the claimant 
certain exclusive possessory rights, and so do homestead 
and desert claims. But no right arises from an invalid 
claim of any kind. All must conform to the law under 
which they are initiated; otherwise they work an unlaw-
ful private appropriation in derogation of the rights of 
the public." Cameron v. United States, 252 U. S. 450, 
460 (1920). 
Claimants thus must take their mineral interests with the 
knowledge that the Government retains substantial regu-
latory power over those interests. Cf. Energy Reserves 
Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U. S. 400, 413 
(1983). In addition, the property right here is the right to a 
flow of income from production of the claim. Similar vested 
economic rights are held subject to the Government's sub-
stantial power to regulate for the public good the conditions 
under which business is carried out and to redistribute the 
benefits and burdens of economic life. See, e. g., National 
Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. 
Co., 470 U. S. 451, 468-469 (1985); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn 
Mining Co., supra; see generally Walls v. Midland Carbon 
Co., 254 U. S. 300, 315 (1920) ("[I]n the interest of the com-
munity, [government may] limit one [right] that others may 
be enjoyed"). 
Against this background, there can be no doubt that Con-
gress could condition initial receipt of an unpatented mining 
claim upon an agreement to perform annual assessment work 
and make annual filings. That this requirement was applied 
to claims already located by the time FLPMA was enacted 
and thus applies to vested claims does not alter the analysis, 
for any "retroactive application of [FLPMA] is supported by 
a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means." 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. R. A. Gray & 
Co., 467 U. S. 717, 729 (1984). The purposes of applying 
FLPMA's filing provisions to claims located before the Act 
was passed—to rid federal lands of stale mining claims and to 
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provide for centralized collection by federal land managers 
of comprehensive and up-to-date information on the status of 
recorded but unpatented mining claims—are clearly legiti-
mate. In addition, § 314(c) is a reasonable, if severe, means 
of furthering these goals; sanctioning with loss of their claims 
those claimants who fail to file provides a powerful motiva-
tion to comply with the filing requirement, while automatic 
invalidation for noncompliance enables federal land managers 
to know with certainty and ease whether a claim is currently 
valid. Finally, the restriction attached to the continued 
retention of a mining claim imposes the most minimal of 
burdens on claimants; they must simply file a paper once a 
year indicating that the required assessment work has been 
performed or that they intend to hold the claim.15 Indeed, 
15
 Appellees suggest that Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U. S. 516 (1982), 
further requires that the restriction imposed be substantively reasonable 
in the sense that it adequately relate to some common-law conception of the 
nature of the property right involved. Thus, appellees point to the fact 
that, in Texaco, failure to file could produce a forfeiture only if, in addition, 
the mineral interest had lain dormant for 20 years; according to appellees, 
conjunction of a 20-year dormancy period with failure to file a statement 
of claim sufficiently indicated abandonment, as that term is understood 
at common law, to justify the statute. 
Common-law principles do not, however, entitle an individual to retain 
his property until the common law would recognize it as abandoned. Leg-
islatures can enact substantive rules of law that treat property as forfeited 
under conditions that the common law would not consider sufficient to in-
dicate abandonment. See Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 5 Pet. 457, 467 
(1831) ("What is the evidence of an individual having abandoned his rights 
or property? It is clear that the subject is one over which every com-
munity is at liberty to make a rule for itself"). As long as proper notice 
of these rules exists, and the burdens they impose are not so wholly dis-
proportionate to the burdens other individuals face in a highly regulated 
society that some people are being forced "alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, must be borne by the public as a whole," 
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960), the burden imposed is 
a reasonable restriction on the property right. Here Congress has chosen 
to redefine the way in which an unpatented mining claim can be lost 
through imposition of a filing requirement that serves valid public objec-
UNITED STATES u LOCKE 107 
84 Opinion of the Court 
appellees could have fully protected their interests against 
the effect of the statute by taking the minimal additional step 
of patenting the claims. As a result, Congress was well 
within its affirmative powers in enacting the filing require-
ment, in imposing the penalty of extinguishment set forth in 
§ 314(c), and in applying the requirement and sanction to 
claims located before FLPMA was passed. 
B 
We look next to the substantive effect of § 314(c) to deter-
mine whether Congress is nonetheless barred from enacting 
it because it works an impermissible intrusion on constitu-
tionally protected rights. With respect to the regulation of 
private property, any such protection must come from the 
Fifth Amendment's proscription against the taking of private 
property without just compensation. On this point, how-
ever, Texaco is controlling: "this Court has never required 
[Congress] to compensate the owner for the consequences of 
his own neglect." 454 U. S., at 530. Appellees failed to 
inform themselves of the proper filing deadline and failed to 
file in timely fashion the documents required by federal law. 
Their property loss was one appellees could have avoided 
with minimal burden; it was their failure to file on time— 
not the action of Congress—that caused the property right 
to be extinguished. Regulation of property rights does not 
'take" private property when an individual's reasonable, 
investment-backed expectations can continue to be realized 
as long as he complies with reasonable regulatory restrictions 
the legislature has imposed. See, e. g., Miller v. Schoeney 
276 U. S. 272, 279-280 (1928); Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S., 
at 632-633; cf. Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 5 Pet. 457, 465 
tives, imposes the most minimal of burdens on property holders, and takes 
effect only after appellees have had sufficient notice of their need to comply 
and a reasonable opportunity to do so. That the filing requirement meets 
these standards is sufficient, under Texaco, to make it a reasonable restric-
tion on the continued retention of the property right. 
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(1831) ("What right has any one to complain, when a reason-
able time has been given him, if he has not been vigilant in 
asserting his rights?")-
C 
Finally, the Act provides appellees with all the process 
that is their constitutional due. In altering substantive 
rights through enactment of rules of general applicability, a 
legislature generally provides constitutionally adequate proc-
ess simply by enacting the statute, publishing it, and, to the 
extent the statute regulates private conduct, affording those 
within the statute's reach a reasonable opportunity both to 
familiarize themselves with the general requirements im-
posed and to comply with those requirements. Texaco, 454 
U. S., at 532; see also Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 
321 U. S. 233, 243 (1944); Nmih Laramie Land Co. v. Hoff-
man, 268 U. S. 276, 283 (1925). Here there can be no doubt 
that the Act's recording provisions meet these minimal re-
quirements. Although FLPMA was enacted in 1976, owners 
of existing claims, such as appellees, were not required to 
make an initial recording until October 1979. This 3-year 
period, during which individuals could become familiar with 
the requirements of the new law, surpasses the 2-year grace 
period we upheld in the context of a similar regulation of 
mineral interests in Texaco. Moreover, the specific annual 
filing obligation at issue in this case is not triggered until the 
year after which the claim is recorded initially; thus, every 
claimant in appellees' position already has filed once before 
the annual filing obligations come due. That these claimants 
already have made one filing under the Act indicates that 
they know, or must be presumed to know, of the existence of 
the Act and of their need to inquire into its demands.16 The 
* As a result, this is not a case in which individual notice of a statutory 
change must be given because a statute is "sufficiently unusual in char-
acter, and triggered in circumstances so commonplace, that an average 
citizen would have no reason to regard the triggering event as calling for 
a heightened awareness of one's legal obligations.19 Texaco, 454 U. S., at 
547 (BRENNAN, J M dissenting). 
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requirement of an annual filing thus was not so unlikely to 
come to the attention of those in the position of appellees as 
to render unconstitutional the notice provided by the 3-year 
grace period.17 
Despite the fact that FLPMA meets the three standards 
laid down in Texaco for the imposition of new regulatory 
restraints on existing property rights, the District Court 
seemed to believe that individualized notice of the filing dead-
lines was nonetheless constitutionally required. The Dis-
trict Court felt that such a requirement would not be "overly 
burdensome" to the Government and would be of great 
benefit to mining claimants. The District Court may well be 
right that such an individualized notice scheme would be a 
sound means of administering the Act.18 But in the regula-
tion of private property rights, the Constitution offers the 
courts no warrant to inquire into whether some other scheme 
might be more rational or desirable than the one chosen by 
Congress; as long as the legislative scheme is a rational way 
of reaching Congress' objectives, the efficacy of alternative 
routes is for Congress alone to consider. "It is enough to 
say that the Act approaches the problem of [developing a 
national recording system] rationally; whether a [different 
notice scheme] would have been wiser or more practical 
under the circumstances is not a question of constitutional 
dimension." Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining, 428 U. S., 
at 19. Because we deal here with purely economic legisla-
tion, Congress was entitled to conclude that it was preferable 
17
 BLM does provide for notice and a hearing on the adjudicative fact of 
whether the required filings were actually made, and appellees availed 
themselves of this process by appealing, to the Department of Interior 
Board of Land Appeals, the BLM order that extinguished their claims for 
failure to make a timely filing. 
18
 In the exercise of its administrative discretion, BLM for the last sev-
eral years has chosen to mail annual reminder notices to claimants several 
months before the end of the year, according to the Government, these 
notices state: a[Y]ou must file on or before 12/30 [of the relevant year]. 
Failure to file timely with the proper BLM office will render your claim 
abandoned." Brief for Appellants 31-32, n. 22. 
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to place a substantial portion of the burden on claimants to 
make the national recording system work. See ibid.; Wein-
berger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975); Mourning v. Fam-
ily Publications Service, Inc., 411 U. S. 356 (1973). The 
District Court therefore erred in invoking the Constitution 
to supplant the valid administrative scheme established by 
Congress. The judgment below is reversed, and the case 
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring. 
I agree that the District Court erred in holding that 
§ 314(c) of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 
1976 (FLPMA), 43 U. S. C. § 1744(c), violates due process 
by creating an "irrebuttable presumption" of abandonment. 
Whatever the force of Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U. S. 441 (1973), 
beyond the facts underlying that case, I believe that § 314(c) 
comports with due process under the analysis of our later de-
cision in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975). Because 
I also believe that the statute does not otherwise violate the 
Fifth Amendment and that the District Court-erred in its 
alternative holding that substantial compliance satisfies the 
filing requirements of § 314 and corresponding regulations, I 
agree that the judgment below must be reversed. Nonethe-
less, I share many of the concerns expressed in the dissenting 
opinions of JUSTICE POWELL and JUSTICE STEVENS. If the 
facts are as alleged by appellees, allowing the Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM) to extinguish active mining claims that 
appellees have owned and worked for more than 20 years 
would seem both unfair and inconsistent with the purposes 
underlying FLPMA. 
The Government has not disputed that appellees sought in 
good faith to comply with the statutory deadline. Appellees 
contend that in order to meet the requirements of § 314, they 
contacted the BLM and were informed by agency personnel 
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that they could file the required materials on December 31, 
1980. Appellees apparently relied on this advice and hand-
delivered the appropriate documents to the local BLM office 
on that date. The BLM accepted the documents for filing, 
but some three months later sent appellees a notice stating 
that their mining claims were "abandoned and void" because 
the filing was made on, rather than prior to, December 31, 
1980. Although BLM regulations clarify the filing deadlines 
contained in §314, the existence of those regulations does not 
imply that appellees were unjustified in their confusion con-
cerning the deadlines or in their reliance on the advice pro-
vided by BLM's local office. The BLM itself in 1978 issued 
an explanatory pamphlet stating that the annual filings were 
to be made "on or before December 31" of each year. Ante, 
at 89-90, n. 7. Moreover, the BLM evidently has come to 
understand the need to clarify the nature of the annual filing 
requirement, because it now sends reminder notices every 
year to holders of recorded mining claims warning them that 
the deadline is approaching and that filings must be made on 
or before December 30. 
The unusual facts alleged by appellees suggest that the 
BLM's actions might estop the Government from relying on 
§ 314(c) to obliterate a property interest that has provided a 
family's livelihood for decades. The Court properly notes 
that the estoppel issue was not addressed by the District 
Court and will be open on remand. Ante, at 89-90, n. 7. In 
this regard, I merely note that in my view our previous deci-
sions do not preclude application of estoppel in this con-
text. In Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford 
County, Inc., 467 U. S. 51 (1984), we expressly declined to 
adopt "a flat rule that estoppel may not in any circumstances 
run against the Government." Id., at 60. Such a rule was 
unnecessary to the decision in that case, and we noted our 
reluctance to hold that "there are no cases in which the public 
interest in ensuring that the Government can enforce the law 
free from estoppel might be outweighed by the countervail-
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ing interest of citizens in some minimum standard of decency, 
honor, and reliability in their dealings with their Govern-
ment. " Id., at 60-61 (footnote omitted). 
Although "it is well settled that the Government may not 
be estopped on the same terms as any other litigant," id., at 
60 (footnote omitted), we have never held that the Govern-
ment can extinguish a vested property interest that has been 
legally held and actively maintained for more than 20 years 
merely because the private owners relied on advice from 
agency personnel concerning a poorly worded statutory dead-
line and consequently missed a filing deadline by one day. 
Thus, if the District Court ultimately determines that appel-
lees reasonably relied on communications from the BLM in 
making their annual filing on December 31, 1980, our previ-
ous decisions would not necessarily bar application of the doc-
trine of equitable estoppel. Accordingly, the fact that the 
Court reverses the decision of the District Court does not es-
tablish that appellees must ultimately forfeit their mining 
claims. 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
I agree with much of JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent. I write 
separately only because under the special circumstances of 
this case I do not believe it necessary to decide what Con-
gress actually intended. Even if the Court is correct in 
believing that Congress intended to require filings on or be-
fore the next-to-the-last day of the year, rather than, more 
reasonably, by the end of the calendar year itself, the statu-
tory deadline is too uncertain to satisfy constitutional re-
quirements. It simply fails to give property holders clear 
and definite notice of what they must do to protect their 
existing property interests. 
As the Court acknowledges, ante, at 86, the Government 
since the 19th century has encouraged its citizens to discover 
and develop certain minerals on the public lands. Under the 
general mining laws, 30 U. S. C. §22 et seq., an individual 
who locates a mining claim has the right of exclusive posses-
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sion of the land for mining purposes and may extract and 
sell minerals he finds there without paying a royalty to 
the Federal Government. § 26. After making a valuable 
mineral discovery, the claimant may hold the claim so long as 
he performs $100 worth of assessment work each year. § 28. 
If he performs certain additional conditions, the claimant 
may patent the claim for a nominal sum and thereby obtain 
further rights over the land and minerals. See § 29. Until 
recently, there were no federal recordation requirements. 
Faced with the uncertainty stale mining claims had created 
as to property rights on public lands, Congress enacted §314 
of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 
90 Stat. 2769, 43 U. S. C. § 1744.l This provision required 
existing claimholders to record their claims in order to retain 
them. More specifically, it required that "within the three-
year period following October 21,1976 and prior to December 
31 of each year thereafter," § 1744(a), claimholders file with 
1
 Section 314(a), 43 U. S. C. § 1744(a), states in its entirety: 
"Recordation of Mining Claims 
"(a) Filing requirements 
"The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim located prior to 
October 21, 1976, shall, within the three-year period following October 21, 
1976 and prior to December 31 of each year thereafter, file the instruments 
required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection. The owner of an 
unpatented lode or placer mining claim located after October 21,1976 shall, 
prior to December 31 of each year following the calendar year in which the 
said claim was located, file the instruments required by paragraphs (1) and 
(2) of this subsection: 
"(1) File for record in the office where the location notice or certificate is 
recorded either a notice of intention to hold the mining claim (including but 
not limited to such notices as are provided by law to be filed when there has 
been a suspension or deferment of annual assessment work), an affidavit of 
assessment work performed thereon, on [sic] a detailed report provided by 
section 28-1 of title 30, relating thereto. 
"(2) File in the office of the Bureau designated by the Secretary a copy 
of the official record of the instrument filed or recorded pursuant to para-
graph (1) of this subsection, including a description of the location of the 
mining claim sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground." 
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the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) a copy of a notice of 
intention to retain their claims, an affidavit of assessment 
work, or a special form, §§ 1744(a)(1) and (2). Failure to 
make either the initial or a subsequent yearly filing was to 
"be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment of the 
mining claim . . . ." § 1744(c). 
Appellees (the Lockes) are owners of 10 unpatented mining 
claims on federal land in Nevada. Appellees' predecessors 
located these claims in 1952 and 1954, and appellees have, 
since they purchased the claims in 1960, earned their liveli-
hood by producing gravel and other building materials from 
them. From 1960 to the present, they have produced ap-
proximately $4 million worth of materials. During the 
1979-1980 assessment year alone, they produced gravel and 
other materials worth more than $1 million. In no sense 
were their claims stale. 
The Lockes fully complied with §314,s initial recordation 
requirement by properly filing a notice of location on October 
19, 1979. In order to ascertain how to comply with the sub-
sequent yearly recordation requirements, the Lockes sent 
their daughter, who worked in their business office, to the 
Ely, Nevada, office of the BLM. There she inquired into 
how and when they should file the assessment notice and was 
told, among other things, that the documents should be filed 
at the Reno office "on or before December 31, 1980." 573 
F. Supp. 472, 474 (Nev. 1983). Following this advice, the 
Lockes hand-delivered their documents at the Reno office on 
that date. On April 4, 1981, they received notice from the 
BLM that their mining claims were "abandoned and void," 
App. to Juris. Statement 22a, because they had filed on, 
rather than prior to, December 31.2 It is this 1-day differ-
*The notice from the BLM also stated that "[sjubject to valid intervening 
rights of third parties or the United States void or abandoned claims or 
sites may be relocated and, based on the new location date, the appropriate 
instruments may be refiled within the time periods prescribed by the regu-
lations." App. to Juris. Statement 22a. Unlike most claimants, however, 
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ence in good-faith interpretation of the statutory deadline 
that gives rise to the present controversy. 
JUSTICE STEVENS correctly points to a number of circum-
stances that cast doubt both on the care with which Congress 
drafted § 314 and on its meaning. Specifically, he notes that 
(i) the section does not clearly describe what must be filed, let 
alone when it must be filed; (ii) BLM's rewording of the dead-
line in its implementing regulations, 43 CFR §3833.2-l(a)(l) 
(1984), indicates that the BLM itself considered the statutory 
deadline confusing; (iii) lest there be any doubt that the BLM 
recognized this possible confusion, even it had described the 
section in a pamphlet distributed to miners in 1978 as requir-
ing filing "on or before December 31"; (iv) BLM, charged with 
enforcing the section, has interpreted it quite flexibly; and 
(v) irrationally requiring property holders to file by one day 
before the end of the year, rather than by the end of the year 
itself, creates "a trap for the unwary," post, at 123, As 
JUSTICE STEVENS also states, these facts, particularly the 
test, suggest not only that Congress drafted §314 inartfully 
but also that Congress may actually have intended to require 
filing "on or before," not "prior to," December 31. This is 
certainly the more reasonable interpretation of congressional 
intent and is consistent with all the policies of the Act,, 
I do not believe, however, that given the special circum-
stances of this case we need determine what Congress actu-
ally intended. As the Court today recognizes, the Takings 
Clause imposes some limitations on the Government's power 
to impose forfeitures. Ante, at 103-108. In Texaco, Inc. v. 
Short, 454 U. S. 516 (1982), we identified one of the most 
important of these limitations when we stated that "the State 
has the power to condition the permanent retention of [a] 
the Lockes were unable to relocate their claims because the Common Vari-
eties Act of 1955, 30 U. S. C. § 611 et seq., had withdrawn deposits of com-
mon building materials from coverage of the general mining laws. To 
them, forfeiture meant not relocation and refiling, but rather irrevocable 
loss of their claims—the source of their livelihood. 
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property right on the performance of reasonable conditions 
. • . ." Id., at 526 (emphasis added); accord, Jackson v. 
Lamphire, 3 Pet. 280, 290 (1830) ("Cases may occur where 
the [forfeiture] provisiofn]. . . may be so unreasonable as to 
amount to a denial of a right, and call for the interposition of 
the court. . ."). Furthermore, conditions, like those here, 
imposed after a property interest is created must also meet 
due process standards. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining 
Co., 428 U. S. 1, 16-17 (1976). These standards require, 
among other things, that there be no question as to what 
actions an individual must take to protect his interests. 
Texaco, Inc. v. Short, supra, at 532-533. Together the 
Takings and Due Process Clauses prevent the Government 
from depriving an individual of property rights arbitrarily. 
In the present case there is no claim that a yearly filing 
requirement is itself unreasonable. Rather, the claim arises 
from the fact that the language "prior to December 31" cre-
ates uncertainty as to when an otherwise reasonable filing 
period ends.3 Given the natural tendency to interpret this 
phrase as "by the end of the calendar year," rather than "on 
or before the next-to-the-last day of the calendar year," I 
believe this uncertainty violated the standard of certainty 
'The Court believes it is "obligated to apply the 'prior to December 31' 
language by its terms19 because "its meaning is clear." Ante, at 96. Such 
clarity, however, is not to be found in the words themselves. Courts, for 
example, have used these same words in similar contexts clearly to mean 
"by the end of the year," e. g.f AMF Inc. v. Jewett, 711 F. 2d 1096, 1108, 
1115 (CA11983); Bay State Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 689 P. 2d 1, 2 (CA1 
1982), or have contrasted them with other phrases such as "tf ]rom January 
1>" NYSA-ILA Vacation & Holiday Fund v. Waterfront Comm'n of New 
York Harbor, 732 F. 2d 292, 295, and n. 6 (CA2), cert denied, 469 U. S. 
852 (1984), or "after December 31," Peabody Coal Co. v. Lcrwis, 708 F. 2d 
266, 267, n. 3 (CA7 1983), in ways that strongly suggest this meaning. 
Various administrative agencies have also followed this same usage in 
promulgating their regulations. E.g., 24 CFR §570.423(b) (1984); 31 
CFR §515.560(i) (1984); 40 CFR §52.1174 (1984). 
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and definiteness that the Constitution requires. The state-
ment in at least one of the Government's own publications 
that filing was required "on or before December 31," Depart-
ment of the Interior, Staking a Mining Claim on Federal 
Lands 10 (1978), supports this conclusion. Terminating a 
property interest because a property holder reasonably be-
lieved that under the statute he had an additional day to sat-
isfy any filing requirements is no less arbitrary than termi-
nating it for failure to satisfy these same conditions in an 
unreasonable amount of time. Cf. Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 
U. S. 55, 62 (1902); Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628, 632-633 
(1877). Although the latter may rest on impossibility, the 
former rests on good-faith performance a day late of what 
easily could have been performed the day before. Neither 
serves a purpose other than forcing an arbitrary forfeiture of 
property rights to the State. 
I believe the Constitution requires that the law inform the 
property holder with more certainty and definiteness than 
did §314 when he must fulfill any recording requirements 
imposed after a property interest is created. Given the stat-
utory uncertainty here, I would find a forfeiture imposed for 
filing on December 31 to be invalid.4 
I accordingly dissent. 
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, 
dissenting. 
The Court's opinion is contrary to the intent of Congress, 
engages in unnecessary constitutional adjudication, and un-
justly creates a trap for unwary property owners. First, the 
choice of the language ''prior to December 31" when read in 
4
 Parties, of course, ordinarily are bound to the consequences of their fail-
ing strictly to meet statutory deadlines. This is true, for example, as to 
statutes of limitations and other filing deadlines clearly specified. Because 
of the special circumstances JUSTICE STEVENS identifies and the constitu-
tional concerns identified above, this case is unique. 
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context in 43 U. S. C. § 1744(a)1 is, at least, ambiguous, and, 
at best, 'the consequence of a legislative accident, perhaps 
caused by nothing more than the unfortunate fact that Con-
1
 The full text of 43 U. S. C. § 1744 reads as follows: 
"Recordation of Mining Claims 
u(a) Filing requirements 
"The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim located prior to 
October 21,1976, shall, within the three-year period following October 21, 
1976 and prior to December 31 of each year thereafter, file the instruments 
required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection. The owner of an 
unpatented lode or placer mining claim located after October 21,1976 shall, 
prior to December 31 of each year following the calendar year in which the 
said claim was located, file the instruments required by paragraphs (1) and 
(2) of this subsection: 
"(1) File for record in the office where the location notice or certificate is 
recorded either a notice of intention to hold the mining claim (including but 
not limited to such notices as are provided by law to be filed when there has 
been a suspension or deferment of annual assessment work), an affidavit of 
assessment work performed thereon, on a detailed report provided by sec-
tion 28-1 of title 30, relating thereto. 
"(2) File in the office of the Bureau designated by the Secretary a copy 
of the official record of the instrument filed or recorded pursuant to para-
graph (1) of this subsection, including a description of the location of the 
mining claim sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground. 
"(b) Additional filing requirements 
"The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim or mill or tunnel 
site located prior to October 21, 1976 shall, within the three-year period 
following October 21, 1976, file in the office of the Bureau designated by 
the Secretary a copy of the official record of the notice of location or certifi-
cate of location, including a description of the location of the mining claim 
or mill or tunnel site sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground. 
The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim or mill or tunnel 
site located after October 21, 1976 shall, within ninety days after the date 
of location of such claim, file in the office of the Bureau designated by the 
Secretary a copy of the official record of the notice of location or certificate 
of location, including a description of the location of the mining claim or mill 
or tunnel site sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground. 
"(c) Failure to file as constituting abandonment; defective or untimely 
filing 
"The failure to file such instruments as required by subsections (a) and 
(b) of this section shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandon-
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gress is too busy to do all of its work as carefully as it 
should." * In my view, Congress actually intended to au-
thorize an annual filing at any time prior to the close of busi-
ness on December 31st, that is, prior to the end of the calen-
dar year to which the filing pertains.3 Second, even if 
Congress irrationally intended that the applicable deadline 
for a calendar year should end one day before the end of the 
calendar year that has been recognized since the amendment 
of the Julian Calendar in 8 B.C., it is clear that appellees 
have substantially complied with the requirements of the 
statute, in large part because the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment has issued interpreting regulations that recognize sub-
ment of the mining claim or mill or tunnel site by the owner; but it shall not 
be considered a failure to file if the instrument is defective or not timely 
filed for record under other Federal laws permitting filing or recording 
thereof, or if the instrument is filed for record by or on behalf of some but 
not all of the owners of the mining claim or mill or tunnel site. 
a(d) Validity of claims, waiver of assessment, etc., as unaffected 
"Such recordation or application by itself shall not render valid any claim 
which would not be otherwise valid under applicable law. Nothing in this 
section shall be construed as a waiver of the assessment and other require-
ments of such law." 
1
 Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U. S. 73, 97 (1977) 
(STEVENS, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
'This view was expressed at the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute 
in July 1977: 
"It is plain that Congress intended the filing requirement to expire with 
the last day of the year, but inartful draftsmanship requires all filings 
under Subsection 314(a) of the Act to be made on or before December 30th. 
Such is the result of the unfortunate use of the words 'prior to December 
31/ And since December 31st bears no relationship to the assessment 
year, which ends at noon on September 1st of each year, the statutory re-
quirement that the locator shall file the necessary documents on or before 
December 30th of each year following the calendar year in which a claim 
was located, means that where a claim is located after noon on September 
1st in any calendar year, the locator must file in the next full calendar year 
a notice of intention to hold, because no assessment work requirement has 
yet arisen.'* Sherwood, Mining-claim Recordation and Prospecting under 
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 23 Rocky Mountain 
Mineral Law Institute 1, 25 (1977) (footnotes omitted). 
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stantial compliance. Further, the Court today violates not 
only the long-followed principle that a court should "not pass 
on the constitutionality of an Act of Congress if a construc-
tion of the statute is fairly possible by which the question 
may be avoided,"4 but also the principle that a court should 
"not decide a constitutional question if there is some other 
ground upon which to dispose of the case."6 
I 
Congress enacted §314 of the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act to establish for federal land planners and 
managers a federal recording system designed to cope with 
the problem of stale claims, and to provide "an easy way of 
discovering which Federal lands are subject to either valid or 
invalid mining claim locations."6 I submit that the appel-
lees' actions in this case did not diminish the importance of 
these congressional purposes; to the contrary, their actions 
were entirely consistent with the statutory purposes, despite 
the confusion created by the "inartful draftsmanship" of the 
statutory language.7 
A careful reading of §314 discloses at least three respects 
in which its text cannot possibly reflect the actual intent of 
Congress. First, the description of what must be filed in the 
initial filing and subsequent annual filings is quite obviously 
garbled. Read literally, § 314(a)(2) seems to require that a 
4
 United States v. Clark, 445 U. S. 23, 27 (1980). 
* Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U. S. 48, 51 (1984) (per cur-
iam); see also Ashwander v. TV A, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). 
•S. Rep. No. 94-583, p. 65 (1975). The Court agrees regarding the 
first purpose, but inexplicably and without citation concludes that another 
purpose of § 314 is "to provide federal land managers with up-to-date in-
formation that allows them to make informed management decisions." 
Ante, at 87. This latter statutory "purpose" is not mentioned in the leg-
islative history; rather, it is a variation of a "purpose," equally without 
citation, offered by appellants. See Brief for Appellants 45, 47. 
7
 See n. 3, supra. 
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notice of intent to hold the claim and an affidavit of assess-
ment work performed on the claim must be filed "on a de-
tailed report provided by § 28-1 of Title 30." One must sub-
stitute the word "or" for the word "on" to make any sense at 
all out of this provision. This error should cause us to pause 
before concluding that Congress commanded blind allegiance 
to the remainder of the literal text of § 314. 
Second, the express language of the statute is unambigu-
ous in describing the place where the second annual filing 
shall be made. If the statute is read inflexibly, the owner 
must "file in the office of the Bureau" the required docu-^  
ments.8 Yet the regulations that the Bureau itself has^  
drafted, quite reasonably, construe the statute to allow filing 
in a mailbox, provided that the document is actually received 
by the Bureau prior to the close of business on January 19th 
of the year following the year in which the statute requires 
the filing to be made.' A notice mailed on December 30, 
1982, and received by the Bureau on January 19, 1983, was 
filed "in the office of the Bureau" during 1982 within the 
meaning of the statute, but one that is hand-delivered to the 
office on December 31, 1982, cannot be accepted as a 1982 
"filing." 
The Court finds comfort in the fact that the implementing 
regulations have eliminated the risk of injustice. Ante, at 94. 
But if one must rely on those regulations, it should be appar-
ent that the meaning of the statute itself is not all that obvi-
•See 43 U . S . C . § 1744(a)(2). 
•Title 43 CFR §3833.0-5(m) (1984) provides: 
44
 Tiled or file* means being received and date stamped by the proper BLM 
office. For the purpose of complying with § 3833.2-1 of this title, timely 
filed' means being filed within the time period prescribed by law, or re-
ceived by January 19th after the period prescribed by law in an envelope 
bearing a clearly dated postmark affixed by the United States Postal Serv-
ice within the period prescribed by law. This 20 day period does not apply 
to a notice of location filed pursuant to §3833.1-2 of this title. (See 
§ 1821.2-2(e) of this title where the last day falls on a date the office is 
closed.)" 
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ous. To begin with, the regulations do not use the language 
"prior to December 31"; instead, they use "on or before 
December 30 of each year."l0 The Bureau's drafting of the 
regulations using this latter phrase indicates that the mean* 
ing of the statute itself is not quite as "plain," ante, at 93, as 
the Court assumes; if the language were plain, it is doubtful 
that the Bureau would have found it necessary to change the 
language at all. Moreover, the Bureau, under the aegis of 
the Department of the Interior, once issued a pamphlet 
entitled "Staking a Mining Claim on Federal Lands" that 
contained the following information: 
"Owners of claims or sites located on or before Oct. 21, 
1976, have until Oct. 22,1979, to file evidence of assess-
ment work performed the preceding year or to file a 
notice of intent to hold the claim or site. Once the claim 
or site is recorded with BLM, these documents must be 
filed on or before December 31 of each subsequent year.79' 
Id., at 9-10 (1978) (emphasis added). 
"Plain language," ante, at 93, indeed. 
There is a more important reason why the implementing 
regulations cannot be supportive of the result the Court 
reaches today: the Bureau's own deviation from the statutory 
language in its mail-filing regulation. See n. 9, supra. If 
the Bureau had issued regulations expressly stating that a 
*43 CFR S3833.2-l(b)(l) (1984). It is undisputed that the regulations 
did not come to the attention of the appellees. To justify the forfeiture in 
this case on the ground that appellees are chargeable with constructive 
notice of the contents of the Federal Register is no more acceptable to me 
today than it would have been to Justice Jackson in 1947. "To my mind, it 
is an absurdity to hold that every farmer who insures his crops knows what 
the Federal Register contains or even knows that there is such a publica-
tion. If he were to peruse this voluminous and dull publication as it is is-
sued from time to time in order to make sure whether anything has been 
promulgated that affects his rights, he would never need crop insurance, 
for he would never get time to plant any crops." Federal Crop Insurance 
Corporation v. Merrill, 332 U. S. 380, 387 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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December 31 filing would be considered timely—just as it has 
stated that a mail filing received on January 19 is timely—it 
is inconceivable that anyone would question the validity of its 
regulation. It appears, however, that the Bureau has more 
power to interpret an awkwardly drafted statute in an en-
lightened manner consistent with Congress' intent than does 
this Court.11 
In light of the foregoing, I cannot believe that Congress 
intended the words "prior to December 31 of each year" to be 
given the literal reading the Court adopts today. The statu-
tory scheme requires periodic filings on a calendar-year 
basis. The end of the calendar year is, of course, correctly 
described either as "prior to the close of business on Decem-
ber 31," or "on or before December 31," but it is surely 
understandable that the author of §314 might inadvertently 
use the words "prior to December 31" when he meant to refer 
to the end of the calendar year. As the facts of this case 
demonstrate, the scrivener's error is one that can be made in 
good faith. The risk of such an error is, of course, the great-
est when the reference is to the end of the calendar year. 
That it was in fact an error seems rather clear to me because 
no one has suggested any rational basis for omitting just one 
day from the period in which an annual filing may be made, 
and I would not presume that Congress deliberately created 
a trap for the unwary by such an omission. 
* "The Court, ante, at 102-103, n. 14, criticizes my citation of the BLM 
regulations to demonstrate that the agency has itself departed from the 
"plain" statutory language by allowing mail filings to be received by Janu-
ary 19th. In the same breath, the Court acknowledges that the agency is 
not bound by the "plain" language in "administering the statute." Ibid. 
The mail-delivery deadline makes it clear that the Court's judicially cre-
ated "up-to-date" statutory purpose is utterly lacking in foundation. The 
agency's adoption of the January 19 deadline illustrates that it does not 
need the information by December 30; that it is not bound by the language 
of the provision; and that substantial compliance does not interfere with 
the agency's statutory functions or with the intent of Congress. 
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It would be fully consistent with the intent of Congress to 
treat any filing received during the 1980 calendar year as a 
timely filing for that year. Such an interpretation certainly 
does not interfere with Congress' intent to establish a federal 
recording system designed to cope with the problem of stale 
mining claims on federal lands. The system is established, 
and apparently, functioning.12 Moreover, the claims here 
were active; the Bureau was well aware that the appellees 
intended to hold and to operate their claims. 
Additionally, a sensible construction of the statute does not 
interfere with Congress' intention to provide "an easy way of 
discovering which Federal lands are subject to either valid or 
" Several amid have filed materials listing numerous cases in which it is 
asserted that the Bureau is using every technical construction of the stat-
ute to suck up active mining claims much as a vacuum cleaner, if not 
watched closely, will suck up jewelry or loose money. See Brief for Moun-
tain States Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae 2 (claiming that an "over-
whelming number of mining claims have been lost to the pitfalls of section 
314"), 3 (claiming that from 1977 to 1984 "unpatented mining claimants lost 
almost 20,000 active locations due to the technical rigors and conclusive 
presumption of section 314"); App. 1-86 (listing cases); Brief for Alaska 
Miners Association, California Mining Association, Nevada Mining Associ-
ation, Miners Advocacy Council, and Placer Miners Association as Amid 
Curiae, Exhibit A (letter from Bureau's Utah State Office stating that well 
over 1,400 claims were invalidated from 1979-1983 because § 1744(aXD 
filings were made on December 31), Exhibit B (letter from Bureau's Bil-
lings, Montana Office stating that 198 claims were invalidated from 1979-
1983 because § 1744(a)(1) filings were made on December 31), Exhibit C 
(letter from Bureau's Wyoming State Office stating that 11 claims were 
invalidated in 1980-1982 because § 1744(aX2) filings were made on Decem-
ber 31), Exhibit D (letter from Bureau's Arizona State Office stating that 
"approximately 500 claims have been invalidated due to filing an affidavit 
one day late"); Brief for Mobil Oil Corporation as Amicus Curiae 2-4 
(claiming to be in a situation similar to the appellees'). According to 
the Bureau's own calculations, thousands of active mining claims have 
been terminated because filings made on December 31 were considered 
untimely. These representations confirm the picture painted by amid 
of a federal bureaucracy virtually running amok, and surely operating 
contrary to the intent of Congress, by terminating the valuable property 
rights of hardworking, productive citizens of our country. 
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invalid mining claim locations."13 The Bureau in this case 
was well aware of the existence and production of appellees' 
mining claims; only by blinking reality could the Bureau 
reach the decision that it did. It is undisputed that the 
appellees made the first 1980 filing on August 29, 1980, and 
made the second required filing on December 31, 1980; the 
Bureau did not declare the mining claims "abandoned and 
void" until April 4, 1981. Thus, appellees lost their entire 
livelihood for no practical reason, contrary to the intent of 
Congress, and because of the hypertechnical construction of a 
poorly drafted statute, which an agency interprets to allow 
"filings" far beyond December 30 in some circumstances, but 
then interprets inflexibly in others.14 Appellants acknowl-
edge that "[i]t may well be that Congress wished to require 
filing by the end of the calendar year and that the earlier 
deadline resulted from careless draftmanship." Brief for 
Appellants 42, n. 31. I have no doubt that Congress would 
have chosen to adopt a construction of the statute that filing 
take place by the end of the calendar year if its attention 
had been focused on this precise issue. Cf. DelCostello v. 
Teamsters, 462 U. S. 151, 158 (1983).16 
»S. Rep. No. 94-583, p. 65 (1975). 
14
 The Court suggests that appellees' failure to file by December 30 
"caused the property right to be extinguished." Ante, at 107. However, 
the Court, on the one hand, carefully avoids mentioning the 3-month period 
that elapsed after December 31 before the Bureau declared the appellees' 
mining claims abandoned, and, on the other hand, describes the Bureau as 
needing "up-to-date information that allows them to make informed land 
management decisions." Ante, at 87, 107. 
liThe Court, ante, at 96-97, n. 12, lists several provisions in the United 
States Code as supportive of its position that "prior to December 31" is 
somehow less ambiguous because of its occasional use in various statutory 
provisions. It then states that it 'Is unclear whether the arguments ad-
vanced by the dissenters are meant to apply to ail of the provisions, or only 
to some of them." Ibid. However, the provisions cited for support illus-
trate the lack of justification for the Court's approach, and highlight the 
uniqueness of the provision in this case. Eleven of the provisions refer to 
a one-time specific date; the provision at issue here requires specific action 
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II 
After concluding its constitutional analysis, the District 
Court also held that 'the standard to be applied to assess-
ment notice requirements is substantial compliance. Meas-
ured against this, the Lockes have satisfied their statutory 
duties under Section 1744 by filing their notices one day 
late."ls The District Court grounded its holding on this 
Court's analysis in Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp., 400 U. S. 48 
(1970). 
In Hickel, the Court construed 30 U. S. C. §28, which 
reads: 
"On each claim located after the 10th day of May 1872, 
and until a patent has been issued therefor, not less than 
$100 worth of labor shall be performed or improvements 
on a continual annual basis, thus involving a much greater risk of creating a 
trap for the unwary. Further, each of the specific dates mentioned in the 
11 provisions is long past; thus, contrary to the Court's premise, this deci-
sion would have no effect on them because they require no future action. 
See 7 U. S. C. § 609(b)(5) ("prior to December 31, 1937"); 12 U. S. C. 
§ 1709)(o)(l)(E) ("prior to December 31, 1976"); 12 U. S. C. § 1823(g) 
("prior to December 31, 1950"); 12 U. S. C. § 1841(a)(5)(A) ("prior to De-
cember 31, 1970"); 26 U. S. C. § 503(d)(1) ("prior to December 31, 1955"); 
33 U. S. C. §1319(aX5XB) ("prior to December 31, 1974"); 42 U. S. C. 
§41«aX7)(E)(ii) (198£ed., Supp. Ill) ("prior to December 31, 1983"); 42 
U. S. C. § 1962d-17(b) ("prior to December 31, 1969"); 42 U. S. C. § 5614 
(b)(5) ("after the first year following October 3, 1977, prior to December 
31"); 42 U. S. C. § 7502(a)(2) ("prior to December 31, 1982"); 42 U. S. C. 
§ 7521(b)(2) ("prior to December 31, 1970"); 50 U. S. C. App. § 1741(b)(1) 
("prior to December 31, 1946"). The remaining provision cited as author-
ity by the Court, 22 U. S. C. § 3784(c), states that the Panama Canal and 
certain other property "shall not be transferred to the Republic of Panama 
prior to December 31, 1999." The legislative history indicates that that 
language was added to make "clear that the President is not authorized to 
accelerate the final transfer of the Panama Canal in 1999, as provided by 
the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977." H. R. Con£ Rep. No. 96-473, p. 61 
(1979). The Panama Canal Treaty of 1977, Art. II, indicates that it "shall 
terminate at noon, Panama time, December 31,1999." Therefore, the lan-
guage of § 3784(c) was tailored to a unique treaty provision. 
li573 F. Supp. 472, 479 (Nev. 1983). 
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made during each year.. . . [UJpon a failure to comply 
with these conditions, the claim or mine upon which 
such failure occurred shall be open to relocation in the 
same manner as if no location of the same had ever been 
made, provided that the original locators, their heirs, 
assigns, or legal representatives, have not resumed work 
upon the claim after failure and before such location." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Recognizing that a claimant's "possessory title" should not be 
disturbed on "flimsy or insubstantial grounds," 400 U. S., at 
57, the Court wrote: 
"We agree . . . that every default in assessment work 
does not cause the claim to be lost. Defaults, however, 
might be the equivalent of abandonment; and we now 
hold that token assessment work, or assessment work 
that does not substantially satisfy the requirements of 30 
U. S. C. §28, is not adequate to 'maintain' the claims 
within the meaning of § 37 of the Leasing Act. To hold 
otherwise would help defeat the policy that made the 
United States, as the prospective recipient of royalties, a 
beneficiary of these oil shade claims. We cannot support 
\Wilbur v. Krushnic, 280 U. S. 306 (1930),] and [Ickes v. 
Virginia-Colorado Development Corp., 295 U. S. 639 
(1935)], on so broad a ground. Rather, their dicta to 
the contrary, we conclude that they must be confined to 
situations where there had been substantial compliance 
with the assessment work requirements. . . . " Ibid. 
Hickel thus demonstrates that the District Court was cor-
rect that substantial-compliance analysis was appropriate in 
this case, and that appellees substantially complied with the 
statute. Appellees earned their livelihood since 1960 by 
mining the 10 unpatented mining claims now in dispute.17 
They paid income taxes, and property and production taxes 
to the State of Nevada, which appears as an amicus in sup-
/d., at 474. 
128 OCTOBER TERM, 1984 
STEVENS, J., dissenting 471 U. S. 
port of appellees. The statute, passed in 1976, required 
appellees to register their mining claims 'In the office where 
the location notice or certificate is recorded" and 'in the office 
of the Bureau" by October 21, 1979; it is not disputed that 
appellees met the statute's two initial filing requirements.18 
Moreover, the statute required, within three years of Octo-
ber 21, 1976, that appellees file In the office of the Bureau 
designated by the Secretary a copy of the official record of 
the notice of location or certificate of location." w Appellees 
also met this third requirement, thus completely informing 
the Bureau of the existence, the sizes, the locations, and the 
ownership of appellees' active mining claims. After the 
three initial filing requirements, the statute required that 
appellees make two separate annual filings: (1) an initial filing 
with the county recorder; and (2) a copy of the official record 
of the first filing filed with the Bureau. Appellees made the 
first of these filings for the 1980 calendar year on August 29, 
1980. Because 1980 was generally the first year that claim-
ants—including appellees—had to comply with the annual 
filing requirements that the new legislation mandated, the 
Bureau began the practice of mailing reminder notices about 
the filing due in the Bureau's office. Appellants acknowl-
edge that appellees did not receive a reminder notice.20 Nev-
ertheless, appellees responsibly inquired about the date of 
filing with the Bureau for the 1980 calendar year; it is undis-
puted that Bureau personnel informed them that the filing 
was due "on or before December 31,1980. "n On December 
31, 1980, appellees made a 700-mile round trip from Ely to 
Reno, Nevada, to hand-deliver their filings to the Bureau. 
The Bureau accepted the filings on that date. 
In my view, this unique factual matrix unequivocally con-
tradicts the statutory presumption of an intent to abandon by 
"Ibid. 
"43U. S. C. § 1744(b). 
"Reply Brief for Appellants 13, n. 12. 
a
 Affidavit of Laura C. Locke 13. 
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reason of a late filing. In sum, this case presents an ambigu-
ous statute, which, if strictly construed, will destroy valuable 
rights of appellees, property owners who have complied with 
all local and federal statutory filing requirements apart from 
a 1-day "late" filing caused by the Bureau's own failure to 
mail a reminder notice necessary because of the statute's 
ambiguity and caused by the Bureau's information to appel-
lees that the date on which the filing occurred would be 
acceptable- Further, long before the Bureau declared a 
technical "abandonment," it was in complete possession of all 
information necessary to assess the activity, locations, and 
ownership of appellees' mining claims and it possessed all 
information needed to carry out its statutory functions. Fi-
nally, the Bureau has not claimed that the filing is contrary to 
the congressional purposes behind the statute, that the filing 
affected the Bureau's land-use planning functions in any man-
ner, or that it interfered 'in any measurable way" with the 
Bureau's need to obtain information.22 A showing of sub-
stantial compliance necessitates a significant burden of proof; 
appellees, whose active mining claims will be destroyed con-
trary to Congress' intent, have convinced me that they have 
substantially complied with the statute. 
I respectfully dissent. 
a
 Brief for Appellants 46. 
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43 §1743 PUBLIC LANDS Ch. 35 
Historical Note 
References in Text This Act, referred to Legislative History. For legislative history 
in subsec. (aXl). (2), is Pub.L. 94-579, Oct. and purpose of Pub.L. 94-579, see 1976 U.S. 
21, 1976, 90 Stat 2743, as amended, known Code Cong, and Adm.News, p. 6175. 
as the Federal Land Policy and Management 
Act of 1976. For complete classification of 
this Act to the Code, see Tables volume. 
West's Federal Forms 
Sentence and fine, see § 7531 et seq. 
§ 1744 , Recordation of mining claims 
(a) Filing requirements 
The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim located prior to 
October 21, 1976, shall, within the three-year period following October 21, 
1976, and prior to December 31 of each year thereafter, file the instruments 
required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection. The owner of an 
unpatented lode or placer mining claim located after October 21, 1976 shall, 
prior to December 31 of each year following the calendar year in which the 
said claim was located, file the instruments required by paragraphs (1) and 
(2) of this subsection: 
(1) File for record in the office where the location notice or certificate is 
recorded either a notice of intention to hold the mining claim (including but 
not limited to such notices as are provided by law to be filed when there has 
been a suspension or deferment of annual assessment work), an affidavit of 
assessment work performed thereon, on a detailed report provided by 
section 28-1 of Title 30, relating thereto. 
(2) File in the office of the Bureau designated by the Secretary a copy of 
the official record of the instrument filed or recorded pursuant to paragraph 
(1) of this subsection, including a description of the location of the mining 
claim sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground. 
(b) Additional filing requirements 
The owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim or mill or tunnel 
site located prior to October 21, 1976 shall, within the three-year period 
following October 21, 1976, file in the office of the Bureau designated by the 
Secretary a copy of the official record of the notice of location or certificate 
of location, including a description of the location of the mining claim or 
mill or tunnel site sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground. The 
owner of an unpatented lode or placer mining claim or mill or tunnel site 
located after October 21, 1976 shall, within ninety days after the date of 
location of such claim, file in the office of the Bureau designated by the 
Secretary a copy of the official record of the notice of location or certificate 
of location, including a description of the location of the mining claim or 
mill or tunnel site sufficient to locate the claimed lands on the ground. 
(c) Failure to file as constituting abandonment; defective or untimely filing 
The failure to file such instruments as required by subsections (a) and (b) 
of this section shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment of 
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patent under 30 U.S.C. 29 and 43 CFR 
Part 3860 has not been issued. 
(c) "Mill site" means any land locat-
ed under 30 U.S.C. 42 for which patent 
under 30 U.S.C. 42 and 43 CFR Part 
3860 has not been issued. 
(d) "Tunnel site" means a tunnel lo-
cated pursuant to 30 U.S.C. 27. 
(e) "Owner" means the person who 
is the holder of the right to sell or 
transfer all or any part of the unpa-
tented mining claim, mill or tunnel 
site. The owner shall be identified in 
the instruments required by these reg-
ulations by a notation on those instru-
ments. 
(f) "Federal lands" means any lands 
or interest in lands owned by the 
United States, except lands within 
units of the National Park System, 
which are subject to location under 
the General Mining Law of 1872, 
supra, including, but not limited to, 
those lands within forest reservations 
in the National Forest System and 
wildlife refuges in the National Wild-
life Refuge System. 
(g) "Proper BLM office" means the 
Bureau of Land Management office 
listed in § 1821.2-Kd) of this title as 
having jurisdiction over the area in 
which the claims or sites are located. 
Notwithstanding the requirements of 
§ 1821.2-Kd) of this title, filings made 
under this subpart in Alaska may be 
filed in either office in that State. 
(h) "Date of location" or "located" 
means the date determined by State 
law in the local jurisdiction in which 
the unpatented mining claim, mill or 
tunnel site is situated. 
(i) "Copy of the official record" 
means a legible reproduction or dupli-
cate, except microfilm, of the instru-
ment which was or will be filed under 
state law in the local jurisdiction 
where the claim or site is located. It 
also includes and exact reproduction, 
duplicate, except microfilm, of an 
amended instrument which may 
change or alter the description of the 
claim or site. 
(j) "Affidavit of assessment work" 
means the instrument required under 
state law that certifies that assess-
ment work required by 30 U.S.C. 28 
has been performed on, or for the ben-
efit of, a mining claim or, if state law 
does not require the filing of such an 
instrument, an affidavit evidencing 
the performance of such assessment 
work; and .,* 
(k) "Notice of intention to hold tt* 
mining claim" means an Instrument 
containing the information required Jn 
§ 3833.2-3 of this title which has been 
or will be filed under state law in the 
local jurisdiction indicating that the 
owner continues to have an interest-fa 
the claim. 
(1) "Notice of intention to hold a mill 
or tunnel site" means an instrument 
containing the information in the 
form required in § 3833.2-3 of this title 
indicating that the owner continues to 
hold an interest in the site. 
(m) "Filed or file" means being re-
ceived and date stamped by the proper 
BLM office. For the purpose of com-
plying with §3833.2-1 of this title, 
"timely filed" means being filed within 
the time period prescribed by law, or 
received by January 19th after the 
period prescribed by law in an enve-
lope bearing a clearly dated postmark 
affixed by the United States Postal 
Service within the period prescribed 
by law. This 20 day period does not 
apply to a notice of location filed pur-
suant to § 3833.1-2 of this title. (See 
§ 1821.2-2(e) of this title where the 
last day falls on a date the office is 
closed.) 
(n) "Assessment year" is defined in 
30 U.S.C. 28 and commences at 12 
o'clock noon on September 1st of each 
year. For the purpose of complying 
with the requirements of section 
314(a) of the Act, the calendar year in 
which the assessment year ends is the 
year for which the evidence of annual 
assessment work shall be filed. 
(0) "Filing year" for the purposes of 
complying with the Act begins on Jan-
uary 1st of each year and continues 
through December 30th. 
(p) "Amended location" means a lo-
cation that is in f urtherance of an ear-
lier valid location and that may or 
may not take in different or additional 
unappropriated ground. An amend-
ment may: 
(1) Correct or clarify defects or omis-
sions in the original notice or certifi-
cate of location; or 
(2) Change the legal description, 
mining claim name, position of discov-
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PATRICK J. GARVER (A1167) 
DEREK LANGTON (A4068) 
HAL J. POS (A4500) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MILLARD COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
GORDON GRIFFIN and RED DOME, 
INC., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SANDRA MEMMOTT, RALPH MEMMOTT, 
SUE BUSHNELL, SHEREE BUSHNELL, 
JIM BUSHNELL, BRETT SANDERS, 
PAM SANDERS, and CRAIG SANDERS, 
Defendants. 
ORDER VACATING PRIOR 
RULING AND JUDGMENT 
REGARDING PARTIES' CROSS 
MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 7975 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
* * * * * * * * 
The parties in the above-entitled action brought cross 
motions for summary judgment on the quiet title claims asserted 
by each party. On September 30, 1986, the Court, after having 
considered the pleadings, memoranda, affidavits, depositions, and 
responses to written discovery, issued a "Ruling on Plaintiffs' 
First and Second Motions for Summary Judgment and Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment", denying Plaintiffs' Motions for 
Summary Judgment and granting, in part, Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
Subsequently, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsider-
ation of said ruling, and the parties then submitted additional 
memoranda with respect thereto. On January 2, 1987, the Court, 
after having reviewed the additional memoranda, issued a "Ruling 
on Plaintiffs1 Motion for Relief From and Reconsideration of 
Ruling" in which the Court granted Plaintiffs' motion to set 
aside the Court's Ruling of September 30, 1986, pursuant to Rule 
60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, on the ground that 
the Court, in its Ruling of September 30, 1986, had improperly 
relied on the current version of the federal regulation defining 
"copy" as used in 43 U.S.C. S 1744 (i.e., 43 C.F.R. 
S 3833.0-5(i)), rather than the version of said regulation 
(hereinafter referred to as "the 1979 version" of said regula-
tion) that was in effect from March 16, 1979 through and includ-
ing October 21, 1979, which was the deadline for filing the 
documents required pursuant to 43 U.S.C. S 1744(b). 
In its Ruling of January 2, 1987, the Court set aside 
its earlier Ruling of September 30, 1986. Further, the Court 
denied Plaintiffs' First Motion for Summary Judgment, except that 
the Court determined that Plaintiffs had submitted "other evi-
dence, acceptable to the proper BLM office, of such instrument of 
recordation", in accordance with the 1979 version of 43 C.F.R. 
S 3833.0-5(i), and therefore, the Court found that Plaintiffs had 
-2-
complied with 43 U.S.C. S 1744(b), and, on that basis, granted 
partial summary judgment on Plaintiffs' First Motion for Summary 
Judgment as to that issue only. The Court further determined 
that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
Plaintiffs had complied with 43 U.S.C. S 1744(a) with respect to 
whether Plaintiffs have properly maintained their "Red Dome* 
mining claims by performing the required assessment work. The 
Court further found that there remained genuine issues of mate-
rial fact concerning Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and there-
fore, denied said motions. 
Subsequently, on February 17, 1987, Defendants filed 
their Motion to Vacate Ruling and Judgment Granting Partial 
Summary Judgment in Favor of Plaintiffs in which Defendants 
sought to have the Court vacate its Ruling of January 2, 1987 on 
a number of grounds. The parties then submitted additional 
memoranda with respect to said Motion. After full consideration 
of said memoranda, and good cause appearing therefor, the Court 
issued its Ruling [regarding Defendants' Motion to Vacate Ruling 
and Judgment Granting Partial Summary Judgment in Favor of 
Plaintiffs], dated April 20, 1987, which is on file in the 
records of this action and is incorporated herein by this refer-
ence. In accordance therewith 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defen-
dants' Motion to Vacate Ruling and Judgment Granting Partial 
-3-
Summary Judgment in Favor of Plaintiffs is hereby granted, and 
accordingly, the Court's Ruling of January 2, 1987, and the Order 
entered in connection therewith (denominated "Order of Relief 
From and Reconsideration of Ruling; Partial Summary Judgment"), 
dated February 5, 1987, are hereby vacated. Additionally, 
because the Court has determined, as set forth more particularly 
in its Ruling of April 20, 1987, that there are genuine issues of 
material fact regarding whether Plaintiffs have complied with the 
requirements of 43 U.S.C. S 1744(a) and (b), it is further 
ORDERED that Plaintiffs' First and Second Motions for Summary 
Judgment, and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, are hereby 
denied. y 
ENTERED this 1*3 day of / > ^ ^ . 1987. 
BY THE 
RAY M. HARDING 
District Court Judgl 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
The foregoing ORDER VACATING PRIOR RULING AND JUDGMENT 
REGARDING PARTIES' CROSS MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT was 
prepared by Derek Langton, of and for Parsons, Behle & Latimer, 
attorneys for Defendants, and was, prior to execution by the 
Court, submitted to the following by mailing a copy thereof, 
postage prepaid, this day of April, 1987: 
Dexter L. Anderson, Esq. 
S.R. Route 52 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 
Robert G. Pruitt, Jr., Esq. 
PRUITT, GUSHEE & FLETCHER 
36 South State Street 
Beneficial Life Tower Building 
Suite 1850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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OF PLACER CUklM 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN* that the undersigned located and now claim the 
following described placer mining ground* containmg__JL&i2£ acres* more 
or less* situated m unknown Mining District*___JLlllard County* 
State nf Utah and being more particularly described and marked on 
the ground as follows:* 
H 1/2 of NK 1/lt «4> g ^ , 26 and Stt l /2i rrf» ST?, ^ /k „r V » , 2 ? Townsh ip 71 Sr,n+R 
Ranya 6 Wgg-h fi.T-W.H. ^ n 4 a U 4 H C V f o , ? * a c r e s mnvft rvt» l ^ a . 
BJ1. ,.mw« »o '"' mum**. 
exiatem and ttnagna m <» 
I have been nw 
£5 (= 
5P 
* ^ ;o> v^ > — -*o 
This claim is located upon a placer deposit of valuable minerals. 
This claim is named the Fwa.th«r T.i+» y*j_ *\ 
Placer Mining Claim. 
Located this. 
Sandva f» ^ w r ^ i . 
.?nr ^iTahnftll 
J i n iiishnp.n 
Pa^ Sanctors-
r.V**rr «i.tnri»vg 
. d a y ftf Wnvnnihov 
NAMES OF LOCATORS 
ShrtTttt -Rn^hnnll 
^ 19 ft , 
Prftt.t, .Sanriprs 
Sandra Mernmcrfj-
fni/n*rr, UUh WW 
(*In this description* refer to some natural object or permanent monument and to 
stakes or monuments or exterior lines and discovery.) 
BLANK NO._2f—Q otM r ro . co — sais so 2«oo CAST — SALT UAHC CITY 
OF PLACER CLMM 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the undersigned located and now claim the 
following described placer mining ground* containing 125«*ffl acres, more 
or less, situated m unknown Mining District Finland County, 
State of Utah and being more particularly described and marked on 
the ground as follows:* 
SE l/b n f MV Ifo *nH M 1J9 n^ WW 1 Ai, r>f W ^ n n 9 * T n ^ M p 21 S m i t h 
R*ng» fs WAR*. S ^ L . H . M . ftftnt.a1wing t ^ . U f l a ^ > M movr> ny l e s s . 
.MUTsuR. Hi M Utah Stoto Office* 
This claim is located upon a placer deposit of valuable minerals. 
This claim is named *h* F^ath^r i.it« Mo. 2 
Placer Mining Claim. 
Located t h i s _ _ l i L .day of Noyfinber 
_ 1 9 _ S 3 - . 
Sandra, rftwwott. 
Snr> Piiwhnf.11 
jy» gushnell 
Pag Sandra 
Craig Sandors 
NAMES OF LOCATORS 
ShftVRR Bushmill 
firatt Sanrinrs 
2 9 ^ ^ ^ ^ description, refer to some natural object or permanent monument and to 
stakes or monuments or exterior lines and discovery.) 
B L A N K NO. 2»—O C»M rro co — axis so atoo «A»T — »ACT UAMK CITY 
OF PLACER CLAIM 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the undersigned located and now claim the 
following described placer mining ground* gnntaining lfrq.Ufl acres* more 
or less* situated m unknown Mining District* Millard County* 
State of Utah and being more particularly described and marked on 
the ground as follows:* 
S 1 / 2 Of SW 1/fr and NR l/U rrF Stf 1/U. „r g — T\ T ^ « M p 91 fl*n+h 
r M T ( = p t Q R BLM Utah State Office 
^ , r a n d images of al«docum«,.i.. 
have twan miorofflmwrtj. 
ra^** \rt 
* » * 
eP-1 
vF* 
:=. <=> iT02 
- • = - r n — u f T n 
«> fir 
This claim is located upon a placer deposit of valuable minerals. 
This claim is named the F^-hboy T ^ « iin. j 
Placer Mining Claim. 
Located this Ik . .day oL Nnvnnt'hgvt* ^ 19 ft? , 
Sandra K*mmn+/fc 
Su* 
J i m 
P a n 
Crai 
V i i s h n « n 
*-*uahn»11 
^ a nH *»i*« 
f S «*»*'"«« 
NAMES OF LOCATORS 
S h f t l H Pi ighnol l 
BrRt.t. fiarrlp?^ 
(*In this description* refer to some natural object or permanent monument and to 
stakes or monuments or exterior lines and discovery.) 
^ J « - A N K ^ I O . 2 t — - O OKM *YO. CO. — 31IS SO. 2«00 CAST — SACT IAKC CITY 
OF PLACER CLA1BW 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the undersigned located and now claim the 
following described placer mining ground, containing 126 • 85 acres, more 
or less, situated in_iinkiiQHi3 Mining District,, Klllart! County, 
State of Utah and being more particularly described and marked on 
the ground as follows:* 
HW 1ft of SW 1ft nf Sftr?, ?3 arti SE 1ft nf SK i f t of Sfin, ?2 anri NK 1f t 
Of NE 1 f t of Spft. 27 TnvnaMp 21 Snn+.h Bang* A tfA«+. S.T..-R.M. ^ t i t ^ n l n c 
126.8*1 acres mora or 1n«a. 
iNTFRlOR, BLM Utah State OTIice 
Data relative to this document 
hao been eiuww) into an automated 
,
S y S < e f n
-
a n d i m a g e s of a" docum»nt« 
iiava oeen microfilmed" 
- « -
50 m 
d _ Q -»i 5^ 
as 0 0 
- « 3 -
This claim is located upon a placer deposit of valuable minerals. 
This claim is named th« TPwKhor IA+.» H». h. 
Placer Mining Claim. 
Located this 1^_ . d a y of MnvotnVu>v» - , 1 9 _ S l . 
Sanflra BflMiott 
Sue Susfr.nll 
Jim R»shnftH 
?9n Sanrinra 
Cra1c ffanrifivs 
NAMES OF LOCATORS 
T*r»+.+. SanrlftrR 
31 (*In this description, refer to some natural object or permanent monument and to 
stakes or monuments or exterior lines and discovery.) 
m ^ * - ^ * * N ^ ^ 1 ' — O <»«" *TO. CO. — 3»l» SO. 2SOO CAST — SAUT UAH* CITY 
OF PLACER CLAISV8 
To Whom It May Concern: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned citizens of the United States, 
over the age of 21 years, have this day located under and in pursuance of and having com-
plied with Sections 2329, 2330, 2331, of the-Revised Statutes of the United States, and the 
laws of the State of Utah and the local laws and customs and regula-
tions of this district, have this day located the following described Placer Mining Ground, 
situated in the. unknown Mining District 
.Millard County, State of. U±ah
 f viz.: 
..?6..3)x0..a/2~a£J!E.^ 
This claim is located upon a valuable deposit, bearing gold and other precious metals, 
situated in.....Townahip.2L.SxMith..Bangfl..6..Waat _ 
This claim shall be known as the Keathcr..LU*..ao«...5. 
Placer Mining Claim, and we intend to work the same in accordance with local customs 
and rules uf miners in said mining district, and each of the undersigned have an undivided 
1/5. interest therein* 
Located this 1^ day of. November 19..J5Q. 
NAMES OF LOCATORS 
..8and3:a..ttemBiGt.fc | 
.SuR.Bus'an.ftU I 
...Jiw.Bushn.flU J 
_P^#Sa.ndejirs I 
tm.Cral£aaSanders. | 
Township X? 21 SouL 
2 
*f% 
N.rrsre
 t / 
/ / 
640 
7998 
&40 
ytarso*. "tr-Mre. 
7T.93 
640 
A 
640 
793**' /" > W 
\ 
6&o eao 
Harare 
7J.9S 
640 
misfit *o*t Mt*f9e*r«9 \*€rfO%£. *os* 
----- .ft. ' /* . 
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IN REPLY REFER TO: 
United States Department of the Interior 
OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
INTERIOR BOARD OF LAND APPEALS 
4015 WILSON BOULEVARD 
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22203 
SANDRA MEMMOTT 
(ON RECONSIDERATION) 
IBLA 84-888 
88 IBLA 379 Decided July 24, 1986 
Petition for reconsideration of Sandra Memmott, 88 IBLA 379 (1985), 
upon motion submitted by appellant. UMC 58767 through UMC 58774. 
Petition granted; BLM decision of August 21, 1984, vacated; 
88 IBLA 379, reaffirmed as modified. 
1. Contests and Protests: Generally—Mining Claims: Aban-
donment—Mining Claims: Contests—Mining Claims: Recor-
dation—Rules of Practice: Private Contests 
Jurisdiction over disputes between rival mining claim-
ants is reserved to the courts, and it is not for this 
Department to decide whether one claimant has a better 
right to a claim because of a rival claimant's alleged 
failure to file the documents required under sec. 314 
of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 
43 U.S.C. § 1744 (1982). A decision by BLM, written 
in response to a request by a rival claimant that 
claims be declared abandoned and void, and going to 
the merits of the rival claimant's allegations may 
properly be vacated by this Board. 
APPEARANCES: Patrick J. Garver, Esq., Salt Lake City, Utah, for appellant-
petitioner; David K. Grayson, Esq., Department of the Interior, Office of 
the Solicitor, Salt Lake City, Utah, for the Department of the Interior-
respondent; Dexter L. Anderson, Esq., Fillmore, Utah, for Red Dane, Inc., and 
Gordon Griffith-respondents. 
OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE MULLEN 
This is a reconsideration of a decision of this Board dismissing an 
appeal by Sandra Menmott (Memnott) from an August 21, 1984, decision by the 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) denying Memmott's request that certain claims 
owned by Red Dane, Inc. (Red Dane), be declared abandoned and void. The 
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determination by this Board that the appeal should be dismissed is found at 
Sandra Meiiitott, 88 IBLA 379 (1985). 
Appellant had initially requested a declaration that Red Dane's mining 
claims were conclusively deemed to be abandoned because of Red Dome's alleged 
failure to comply with 43 U.S.C. § 1744 (1982). The Board found the matter 
was not appropriate for consideration, as a private contest is not available. 
Conpliance with 43 U.S.C. § 1744 (1982) can be determined frcm the record, 
whereas 43 CFR 4.450-1 allows a party to "initiate proceedings to have the 
claim of title or interest adverse to his claim invalidated for any reason 
not shown by the records of the Bureau of Land Management." (Qnphasis added.) 
Further, noting the Department is without authority to resolve the right of 
possession to mining claims between rival claimants, we held BLM properly 
rejected appellant's request for a ruling that the conflicting claims were 
abandoned and void. 
In her petition for reconsideration, appellant alleges the initial 
action was not a private contest but was an appeal frcm an August 21, 1984, 
determination of the Utah State Office, BLM, "declaring that the Red Dane 
group of mining claims had been properly filed in conpliance with Section 314 
of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act [43 U.S.C. § 1744 (1982)]." 
Appellant alleges the Board's decision dismissing the appeal without reach-
ing the merits is in error, because BU4 had made a determination that Red 
Dome's filings were in conpliance with the mining claim recordation statutes. 
Appellant argues that, by dismissing the appeal, the Board decision effec-
tively precluded consideration of the merits of that determination, and she 
will be faced with a final Department determination that Red Dane complied 
with the mining claim recordation filing requirements in any attempt to 
litigate this matter before a state court. We find seme merit in this con-
tention. 
Had BLM merely refused to take action on appellant's request, the matter 
would properly be subject to dismissal. IMCO Services, 73 IBLA 374 (1983). 
The BLM decision did more, however. The August 21, 1984, decision states, in 
pertinent part: 
According to our records, the Red Done and Red Dane 
Nos. 1-7 placer mining claims were located 5/24/1935, 9/5/1946, 
7/21/1936, 7/21/1936, 10/19/1936, 10/19/1936, 7/1/1938, 8/1/1938 
respectively and the information received in this office 
November 27, 1978 showing the claim name, date of location, 
recording information, legal description, and the owners name 
and address. Additional information was requested regarding the 
land description for the Red Dane Claim Nos. 1, 4, and 7. This 
information was received January 31, 1979, which was prior to the 
October 22, 1979, filing date established by the Federal Land 
Policy and Management Act of 1976 for mining claims located prior 
to the Act. 
This evidence showing that a recording of the mining claims 
had been made was accepted and made part of our records. The 
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annual affidavits of assessment work performed have been timely 
filed for each year since then. The Red Dane and Red Dome 
Nos. 1-7 placer claims are considered in compliance with Section 
314 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act. 
Notice of transfer of interest should be filed with this 
office within 60 days however, no penalty for failure to file 
is assessed. 
For the reasons stated in the preceding paragraphs, your 
request that we declare the Red Dane mining claims invalid for 
noncompliance with the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 
1976 is denied. 
[1] As can be seen, rather than refusing to take action on appel-
lant's request, as was the case in IMCO Services, supra, the BLM decision 
addressed the merits of appellant's contentions. Doing so was contrary to 
the stated policy of BLM that it "will not become the forum for the resolu-
tion of private party disputes between rival claimants." BLM Manual at 
3833.41B. The Department has been consistent in its position that it is 
without authority to determine the question of right of possession as to 
claims between rival claimants. IMCO Services, supra; Gold Depository & 
Loan Co. v. Mary Brock, 69 IBLA 194 (1982); W. W. Allstead, 58 IBLA 46 
(1981); John R. Meadcws, 43 IBLA 35 (1979); John W. Pope, 17 IBLA 73 (1974). 
While a determination regarding sufficiency of mining claim recordation 
documents may be made by BLM and this Board, 1/ such determinations in 
response to third party requests should be avoided. 2/ Therefore, BLM's 
response to appellant's request should not have addressed the merits of the 
appellant's contentions. For that reason, we find it appropriate to vacate 
the August 21, 1984, BLM decision. 
Having vacated the BLM decision without addressing the sufficiency or 
correctness of that decision, we do not find it necessary to address the 
other issues raised by Manroott. 
Therefore, pursuant to the authority delegated to the Board of Land 
Appeals by the Secretary of the Interior, 43 CFR 4.1, the petition for 
1/ See, e.g., Precious Minerals Unlimited, Inc., 61 IBLA 136 (1982); John J. 
Vikarcik, 58 IBLA 377 (1981); Walter Everly, 52 IBLA 58 (1981); William E. 
Talbott, 52 IBLA 12 (1981); W. C. Miles, 48 IBLA 214 (1980); Wilma 
Hartley, 48 IBLA 83 (1980). 
~2? We do not disparage the right of BLM on its own initiative to adjudicate 
any mining claim in terms of compliance with section 314 of the Federal Land 
Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1744 (1982). Clearly, this is 
BLM's responsibility in administering the statute. We note, however, that 
upon review of the sufficiency of the section 314 filings for a claim, no 
decision would ordinarily be issued approving the filings. 
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reconsiderat ion i s granted? the August 21, 1984, BLM decision i s vacated? 
ard the Board's p r i o r decision in the ma t t e r , reported a t 88 IBLA 379 (1985), 
i s hereby reaffirmed as modified by t h i s decis ion. 
4ullen 
Administrative Judge 
We concur: 
C. Randall Grant, Jr 
Administrative Judge 
U Philip 
Chief Administrative Judge 
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Tab 2 A 
§ 3862.1-3 4«< M Ui II ( 10-1-89 Edition) 
§ 3862.1-3 Evidence of title. 
(a) Each patent application must be 
supported by either a certificate of 
title or an abstract of title certified to 
by the legal custodian of the records 
of locations and transfers of mining 
claims or by an abstracter of titles. 
The certificate of title or certificate to 
an abstract of title must be by a 
person, association, or corporation au-
thorized by the State laws to execute 
such a certificate and acceptable to 
the Bureau of Land Management. 
(b) A certificate of title must con-
form substantially to a form approved 
by the Director. 
(c) Each certificate of title or ab-
stract of title must be accompanied by 
single copies of the certificate or 
notice of the original location of each 
claim, and of the certificates of 
amended or supplemental locations 
thereof, certified to by the legal custo-
dian of the record of mining locations. 
(d) A certificate to an abstract of 
title must state that the abstract is a 
full, true, and complete abstract of the 
location certificates or notices, and all 
amendments thereof, and of all deeds, 
instruments, or actions appearing of 
record purporting to convey or to 
affect the title to each claim. 
(e) The application for patent will be 
received and filed if the certificate of 
title or an abstract is brought down to 
a day reasonably near the date of the 
presentation of the application and 
shows full title in the applicant, who 
must as soon as practicable thereafter 
file a supplemental certificate of title 
or an abstract brought down so as to 
include the date of the filing of the 
application. 
§3862.1-4 Evidence relating to destroyed 
or lost records. 
In the event of the mining records in 
any case having been destroyed by fire 
or otherwise lost, a statement of the 
fact should be made, and secondary 
evidence of possessory title will be re-
ceived, which may consist of the state-
ment of the claimant, supported by 
those of any other parties cognizant of 
the facts relative to his location, occu-
pancy, possession, improvements, etc.; 
and in such case of lost records, any 
deeds, certificates of location or pur-
chase, or other evidence which may be 
in the claimant's possession and tend 
to establish his claim, should be filed. 
§ 3862.1-5 Statement required that land is 
unreserved, unoccupied, unimproved 
and unappropriated. 
Each person making application for 
patent under the mining laws, for 
lands in Alaska, must furnish a duly 
corroborated statement showing that 
no portion of the land applied for is 
occupied or reserved by the United 
States, so as to prevent its acquisition 
under said laws; that the land is not 
occupied or claimed by natives of 
Alaska; and that the land is unoccu-
pied, unimproved and unappropriated 
by any person claiming the same other 
than the applicant. 
§ 3862.2 Citizenship. 
§ 3862.2-1 Citizenship of corporations and 
of associations acting: through agents. 
The proof necessary to establish the 
citizenship of applicants for mining 
patents must be made in the following 
manner In case of an incorporated 
company, a certified copy of its char-
ter or certificate of incorporation must 
be filed. In case of an association of 
persons unincorporated, the statement 
of their duly authorized agent, made 
upon his own knowledge or upon in-
formation and belief, setting forth the 
residence of each person forming such 
association, must be submitted. This 
statement must be accompanied by a 
power of attorney from the parties 
forming such association, authorizing 
the person who makes the citizenship 
showing to act for them in the matter 
of their application of patent. 
§ 3862.2-2 Citizenship of individuals. 
(a) In case of an individual or an as-
sociation of individuals who do not 
appear by their duly authorized agent, 
the statement of each applicant, show-
ing whether he is a native or natural-
ized citizen, when and where born, and 
his residence, will be required. 
(b) In case an applicant has declared 
his intention to become a citizen or 
has been naturalized, his statement 
must show the date, place, and the 
court before which he declared his in-
tention, or from which his certificate 
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